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This thesis examines the effect that ROE have on the
conduct of special operations in order to contribute to an
increased understanding of the proper employment of elite
forces. It argues that "inappropriate" ROE can result from
1) an imbalance in the natural tension between the
requirements of statecraft and military efficiency present in
all military operations and 2) organizational friction
resulting from inaccurate translation of broad political
objectives, through various levels in the chain of command,
into an inappropriate tactical ROE for a specific unit.
Additionally, it argues that the nature of special
operations, and the principles vital to their proper
employment, cause them to be most sensitive to these sources
of inappropriate ROE in either crisis or conflict. This
thesis concludes that ROE can be used to achieve indirect
political control over special operations, but achieving this
control is more difficult and more hazardous with special
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The ROE under which SOF operate were initially
influenced and formalized with ships, aircraft or general
purpose ground forces in mind. These ROE were created within
a Cold War setting and calibrated to minimize chances of
sparking general war with the USSR. With the end of the Cold
War and an increased focus on and employment of SOF, it is
imperative that the ROE governing special operations be
examined. The ROE used in the conduct of special operations
influence the success or failure of these operations, and in
turn contribute to the success or failure of national policy.
The purpose of this thesis is to address the effect that
the ROE have on the conduct of special operations and to
contribute to an increased understanding of the proper
employment of elite forces. Specifically, this thesis
addresses two questions. First, can ROE be used to achieve
indirect political control over special operations? Second,
what are the causes and consequences of "inappropriate" ROE
when employing SOF in pursuit of political objectives? I
argue that there are two causes of inappropriate ROE. First,
inappropriate ROE can result from an imbalance in the natural
tension between the requirements of statecraft and military
efficiency present in all military operations. This tension
becomes greater in the OOTW environment where the political
objectives and military requirements experience the greatest
XI
divergence. Oddly, the ROE are a case where healthy "pulling
and hauling" between policy makers and military commanders
makes for better, rather than worse, overall outcomes.
Second, while inappropriate ROE can result from an
imbalance in the political-military tension, I argue that
organizational friction is also a cause of inappropriate ROE.
Using organization theory, this thesis examines how
organizational friction is created from inaccurate
translation of broad political objectives, through various
levels in the chain of command, into inappropriate tactical
ROE for a specific unit. In this situation there can exist,
not only written ROE, but also implicit ROE.
Finally, I argue that the nature of special operations,
and the principles vital to their proper employment, cause
them to be most sensitive to these sources of inappropriate
ROE in either a crisis or conflict. This thesis lays out
exactly how the ROE can affect SOF and their ability to
conduct operations successfully on a strategic, operational
and tactical level in support of a larger military or
national purpose. U.S. intervention in two different cases,
Panama and Somalia, are examined through a process of
"analytic induction" to illustrate the results of employing
ROE that are inappropriate in the conduct of special
operations
.
The first case, the U.S. Navy SEAL raid on Paitilla
airfield during Operation Just Cause, illustrates how
XI
1
inappropriate ROE are created through organizational
friction. Operation Just Cause was a unilateral U.S. action
influenced by a great concern for minimizing collateral
damage in an effort to avoid domestic and international
criticism. During the translation of the political goals
into military objectives and tactical ROE by each level in
the chain of command, inferences "shaped" the written ROE and
created implicit ROE which further restricted the conduct of
this operation.
The second case, the use of SOF in Somalia during
Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II, illustrates the
creation of inappropriate ROE because of an imbalance between
political requirements and military necessity. SOF played
two main roles in the intervention in Somalia. The most
publicized was the mission to capture General Aideed
conducted by Task Force Ranger. The other role, which
received less attention, was the use of SOF in anti-sniper
and sniper operations. Looking past the political debacle
resulting from the Task Force Ranger operation, this case
features an imbalance in the political-military equilibrium
during the planning phase, but a successful use of the ROE to




This thesis draws the following conclusions:
1. ROE can be used to achieve indirect political control
over special operations, but it is more difficult with
special operations than with conventional forces.
2. Successful special operations represent somewhat of a
paradox. SOF are usually selected as a minimal force
military solution at the political and military strategic
level. However, at the tactical level, SOF must have the
latitude to apply maximum force in order to succeed.
3. An attempt by policy makers and senior military staffs
to fine tune a special operation, which by nature is already
a limited collateral damage option, can result in tactical
failure or an increase in casualties.
4. Coup de main special operations conducted at the
strategic level will have a greater chance of a political-
military imbalance, because they are directly connected to
high level policy and entail high risk.
5. Protracted special operations should be less vulnerable
to inappropriate ROE resulting from an imbalance in the
political-military tension.
6. Inappropriate implicit or inferred ROE are most likely
in tactical level operations which have multiple layers of




7. Because the tactical unit represents the lowest level of
command, written, implicit and inferred ROE will govern the
conduct of their operations.
8. Placing SOF members in staffs and ensuring that they
take a proactive role in the process of translating broad
political and strategic military objectives into appropriate
tactical level ROE is critical to the success of special
operations
.
9. Writing ROE is a two-way street and tactical units must
"push up" the chain of command and provide their concerns and




I gratefully acknowledge the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict for
providing a grant which enabled me to conduct much of my
primary source research.
I am extremely indebted to Colonel W. Hays Parks, USA
(retired) . After reading his prolific writings on ROE and
finding his name attached to nearly every scholarly article
on the subject, I was fortunate enough to meet him and spend
hours talking about ROE. I cannot thank him enough for his
review of an early draft and his detailed comments.
Also, the special operators who took time out of their
busy lives in order to answer my questions and explain their
experiences were vital to the completion of this thesis.
Through them I learned about the valor, extraordinary
professionalism, and discipline displayed by the special
operators who served in both Panama and Somalia. All these
men made great personal sacrifices and our nation owes them
our deepest gratitude.
My Professors at the Naval Postgraduate School made this
tour one of my most rewarding and enjoyable experiences. I
thank Professor Gordon McCormick who proved a valuable
sounding board for my early ideas. I am also grateful to
Professors Erik Jansen and Professor Glenn Robinson who
allowed me to write and present portions of this thesis in
their courses, which provided useful feedback.
My thesis advisor, Professor John Arquilla, and my
Second Reader, Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (retired), were
outstanding. They provided me with endless patience,
encouragement, and meticulously guided me to the creation of
a finished product. I was both fortunate and honored to have
such well respected men in my corner.
I am grateful to both my parents, Eugene and Dr. Nancy
Reilly for the emphasis they put on education throughout my
life. As career educators they convinced me that teaching is
the noblest of all professions. I thank my brother Tim, who
occasionally reminded me that I was the least educated member
of the family, for providing me the motivation to pursue a
master's degree.
Most importantly, I am forever thankful for the love and
support of my wife, Elizabeth. For over a year she patiently
listened to my ideas as I developed this thesis. I am
grateful for her understanding as writing consumed much of my
day, turned our den into an obstacle course, and delayed the





In the last decade, and especially in the wake of the
cold war, the amount of attention directed toward special
operations has increased. In 1986, the Cohen-Nunn Amendment
created the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) , which placed a special operations officer on the
same level as cheater commanders. Funding and manning for
special operations forces have increased, or at least
remained constant, even as conventional forces have
experienced cutbacks. 1 The political and military utility of
special operations forces (SOF) has increased as the
international environment has moved from a balance of power
between the U.S. and Soviet Union toward a pre-eminent
American position.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been faced
with an eruption of low intensity conflicts and humanitarian
crises along with an increasing number of conventional wars.
Consequently, missions for the U.S. military and SOF now
range from large conventional operations, such as the Gulf
War, to military operations other than war (OOTW) , such as
those conducted in Somalia, Bosnia or Haiti. OOTW appear to
have become the norm in the new international environment.
1 General Carl NT. Stiner, "Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Subject: End of Tour Report" (MacDill AFB, FL: Hq
.
USSOCOM, 1993), 4.
From 1978 until 1985 an average of five complex humanitarian
crises have occurred per year. In contrast, the world
witnessed 17 crises in 1992 and 20 in 1993 alone. 2 Since
1993, the numbers have continued to rise. While we cannot be
expected to become involved in every crisis, our involvement
will nevertheless likely increase. 3
Today's military faces unprecedented challenges in
conducting OOTW. Missions such as counterproliferation and
peace operations present new command and control challenges
for the U.S. military and a great potential for political
disaster if mismanaged. SOF, which are purposely designed to
deal with unconventional situations, stand at the tip of the
military spear when the U.S. becomes involved in these
operations. Former Chief of USSOCOM, Carl W. Stiner,
emphasized that the "future will require the regional
orientation, cultural awareness, language proficiency, and
quick responsiveness which very often make SOF the force of
choice in an increasingly unstable world." 4 Accordingly, with
SOF employed more frequently, it is prudent to examine the
Natsios, Andrew S. "The international Humanitarian Response
System." Parameters, Spring 1995, 68.
This move to increase involvement can be seen in the National
Security Strategy and A Time For Peace, Promoting Peace: The Policy of
the United States. February, 1995.
General Carl W. Stiner, "Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Subject: CJCS Roles and Missions Report" (MacDill AFB,
FL: Hq. USSOCOM, 1993), 3. Referenced in John M. Collins, Special
Operations Forces: An Assessment. (Washington D.C: National Defense
University Press, 1994), xxi
.
manner in which they are operationally managed-a key function
of "rules of engagement" (ROE)
.
B . PURPOSE
Many scholars and professional military officers have
contributed to the growing literature on ROE and their role
in controlling military force. The current literature, while
valuable, only analyzes how the ROE affect the employment of
conventional general purpose forces and assumes implicitly
that the findings apply equally well to SOF. 5 The ROE under
which SOF operate were initially influenced and formalized
with ships, aircraft or general purpose ground forces in
mind. These ROE were created within a Cold War setting and
calibrated to minimize chances of sparking general war with
the USSR. With an increased focus on and employment of SOF,
it is imperative that the ROE governing special operations be
examined. The ROE used in the conduct of special operations
influence the success or failure of these operations, and in
turn contribute to the success or failure of national policy.
The following authors provide valuable insight into the problems
associated with ROE and conventional ground, naval or air forces: Mark
S. Martins, "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training,
Not Lawyering," Military Law Review, 143 Winter 1994; The Judge Advocate
General's School, United States Army, Operational Law Handbook (JA422)
draft 3rd ed. 1993; Scott D. Sagan, "Rules of Engagement," in Alexander
L. George, ed., Avoiding War. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991),
chap. 19; W. Hays Parks, "Righting the Rules of Engagement", U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, May 1989; Brad C Hayes, Naval Rules of
Engagement: Management tools for crisis, RAND N-2963-CC, July 1989;
Captain Ashley Roach, "Rules of Engagement," Naval war College Review
vol. 46, 1983. While some of the points made by these authors apply to
SOF, none of them have specifically considered the unique problems
associated with the ROE in the conduct of special operations.
The purpose of this thesis is to address the effect that
the ROE have on the conduct of special operations and to
contribute to an increased understanding of the proper
employment of elite forces. Specifically, this thesis
addresses two questions. First, can ROE be used to achieve
indirect political control over special operations? Second,
what are the causes and consequences of "inappropriate" ROE
when employing SOF in pursuit of political objectives?
I argue that there are two causes of inappropriate ROE.
First, inappropriate ROE can result from an imbalance in the
natural tension between the requirements of statecraft and
military efficiency present in all military operations.
Christopher Gacek, in The Logic of Force, provides a thorough
discussion of the inherent tension between political and
military concerns in the application of military force. He
. . .posits the existence of an unending, conceptual
struggle within the nature of war itself: the two
poles of this tension represent on one side the
requirements of the ends of war, the policy goals
or objectives; poised on the other is the logic of
the instrument of war, which we call force. Force
is directed, controlled violence aimed at the
attainment of political goals . The logic of the
instrument of war, then, is the logic of force. In
short, the requirements of policy may clash with
the requirements of force. 6
Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited
War in American Foreign Policy. (New York: Columbia University press,
1994), 6.
This tension becomes greater in the OOTW environment. The
political objectives and military requirements for success in
OOTW have a greater tendency to diverge than in conventional
conflicts, which approach total war.
Second, while inappropriate ROE can result from an
imbalance in the political-military tension, I argue that
there is also a deeper cause in the creation of inappropriate
ROE. Once the decision is made to employ military means
toward a political objective, organizational friction can
create inappropriate ROE. Organizational friction results
from inaccurate translation of broad political objectives,
through various levels in the chain of command, into
inappropriate tactical ROE for a specific tactical unit. In
this situation there can exist, not only written ROE, but
also implicit or inferred ROE. Because the tactical unit
represents the lowest level of command, both written and
implicit ROE will govern the conduct of their operations.
Finally, I argue that the nature of special operations,
and the principles vital to their proper employment, cause
them to be most sensitive to these sources of inappropriate
ROE in either a crisis or conflict.
C . THESIS OVERVIEW
The ROE and special operations, as seen today, have
evolved significantly (but recognizably) since World War II.
The ROE were first formalized during the Cold War when the
influences of potential nuclear war, increased communications
technology and mass media affected tactical operations.
After the World War II period, SOF were organized much as
they are today in order to engage in insurgencies,
counterinsurgencies or unconventional proxy wars between the
superpowers. Although both ROE and special operations have
their roots in the beginning of armed conflict and the value
of early cases is significant, 7 this thesis concentrates on
special operations conducted in the post Cold War time period
because of their particular relevance to OOTW and current SOF
institutional designs. 8 As Clausewitz stated:
Once one accepts the difficulty of historical
examples, one will come to the most obvious
conclusion that examples should be drawn from
modern military history. . .Not only were conditions
different in more distant times, with different
ways of waging war, so that earlier wars have fewer
practical lessons for us; but military history,
like any other kind, is bound with the passage of
time to lose a mass of minor elements and details
that were once clear. 9
For a comprehensive look at SOF throughout history see John
Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern
Times. (New York: University Press of America, 1996)
.
In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, which
included the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, was widely viewed as the most
significant defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947.
As a result of this Act, SOF underwent its most extensive reorganization
since World War II.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, rev. ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984),
173 . Many would argue against studying the last war in order to fight
the next war. See Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of
Seapower Upon History. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1896), 1-23;
and Captain Wayne P, Hughes, Fleet tactics. (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1986) . I agree that the danger involved in only using recent
history is great and should not be underestimated. Older examples
provide timeless value. A broad sweep of historical cases accurately
This thesis is divided into six chapters and each
contributes to answering the questions posed above. The next
chapter uses a deductive approach to theorize about how
improper ROE are created, and how they affect the conduct of
special operations. Using organization theory, this chapter
also examines the organizational friction associated with
translating ROE theory into practice. This background is
necessary to define and understand exactly what the ROE
represent, and how they affect the conduct and likely success
of special operations.
Chapter III provides the definitions and theory of
special operations. This chapter discusses the political and
military utility of SOF in order to identify exactly what
makes special operations "special," and thus different, from
conventional forces. An understanding of the nature of
special operations is vital to a comprehensive examination of
why ROE will affect the outcome of SOF missions. This
chapter lays out exactly how the ROE can affect SOF and their
ability to conduct operations successfully on a strategic,
operational and tactical level in support of a larger
military or national purpose. Although SOF have many mission
areas, 10 the main focus of this thesis is on the highest risk
identifies major trends and constants within warfare. I use recent
cases solely because their purpose within this thesis lies in their
ability to illustrate possible ROE failures in the conduct of special
operations, rather than to identify trends or constants within warfare.
mission: direct action. 11 Direct action missions involve the
highest risk at all levels of warfare (strategic,
operational, and tactical) and for all players (the policy
maker, senior military planner and tactical commander)
.
Because these missions pose the highest risks, ROE
complications associated with their planning and execution
should logically be the greatest.
Chapters IV and V examine two different cases, Panama
and Somalia, through "analytic induction" 12 designed to
illustrate the results of employing ROE that become
inappropriate because of: a) organizational friction in
translating broad political objectives into tactical ROE or
b) an imbalance between political requirements and military
necessity. Only two cases are examined for the following
reasons. First, because their purpose lies in demonstrating
the causal relationship between the ROE and the outcome of
10 USCINCSOC designates SOF with seven core missions: Unconventional
Warfare; Direct Action; Special Reconnaissance; Foreign Internal
Defense; Counter Terrorism; Psychological Operations; and Civil Affairs.
11 USCINCSOC, in JCS Publication 3.05, defines Direct Action missions
as :
Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive
operations principally taken by SOF to seize, destroy,
capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel
or material. In the conduct of DA operations, units may
employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace
munitions and other devices; conduct standoff attacks by
fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide
terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and
conduct independent sabotage
.
12 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap, Theory and Practice in
Foreign Policy. (Washington D.C: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993),
1-19.
special operations, these two cases are sufficient as they
provide both diversity and tough tests for the arguments made
throughout the thesis. Second, they are examples of special
operations in OOTW. In the OOTW environment the greatest
divergence will occur between political objectives and
military requirements. Third, the cases of Panama and
Somalia represent two of the most significant operations
other than war conducted by the U.S. and SOF in the post -Cold
War era. Fourth, these cases were selected in order to
illustrate the ROE problems that may occur in either coup de
main special operations or in protracted special operations
campaigns, on a strategic, operational and tactical level.
Chapter IV examines the U.S. Navy SEAL raid on Paitilla
airfield during Operation Just Cause. Operation Just Cause
was a unilateral U.S. action influenced by a great concern
for minimizing collateral damage in an effort to avoid
domestic and international criticism. In this operation, SOF
were tasked with preventing the use of the airfield and
disabling President Noriega's personal plane to prevent his
escape from Panama. Many have claimed that this case
featured overly restrictive ROE which reduced the tactical
success of the operation and caused substantial casualties to
be suffered. 13 While the written ROE were restrictive,
13 This will be addressed thoroughly in Chapter VI. Examples of books
which point to restrictive ROE include: Malcom McConnell, JUST CAUSE,
The Real Story of America's High-Tech Invasion of Panama. (New York, NY:
St. Martin's Press, 1991); Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb
planners inferred from the written ROE an even more
constrained approach to the mission. During the translation
of the political goals into military objectives and tactical
ROE by each level in the chain of command, implicit ROE were
created which further restricted the conduct of this
operation.
Chapter V examines the use of SOF in Somalia during
Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II. SOF played two main
roles in the intervention in Somalia. The most publicized
was the mission to capture General Aideed conducted by Task
Force Ranger. The other role, which received less attention,
was the use of SOF in anti-sniper and sniper operations.
Looking past the political disaster resulting from the Task
Force Ranger operation, this case features an imbalance of
the political-military tension during the planning phase, but
a successful use of the ROE to control SOF during the
execution phase. In Somalia, SOF were immersed in a complex
operating environment of clan warfare and tasked to work
against an undeclared enemy while under the umbrella of vague
U.S. political objectives and in the presence of
multinational military forces.
The final chapter provides conclusions and
recommendations based on the deductive theoretical discussion
Baker, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Storming of Panama. (New York, NY:
Lexington Books, 1991); and Orr Kelly, Brave Men Dark Waters: The Untold
Story of the Navy SEALS. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992) .
10
and the analytical discussion of the specific cases. In his
book, Avoiding War, Alexander George concluded that:
It is important to recognize that the ability of
top-level political authorities to maintain
informed control over the moves and actions of
their military forces (the first of the operational
requirements of crisis management) is sometimes
jeopardized by the difficulty of keeping track of
the large number and complexity of standing orders
and ROEs that may come into effect at the onset of
a crisis and as it intensifies. Therefore, timely
arrangements and procedures must be in place to
enable top political authorities to understand the
implication of different ROEs and alerts for the
task of crisis management. 14
In the current international environment both the ROE and SOF
will become increasingly important in the application of
military force in pursuit of political objectives. SOF
provide a valuable asset to decision makers in pursuit of
military or national objectives during either a conflict or
crisis. This thesis aims to provide the top political
authorities and senior military strategists insights into the
complexities involved when using ROE as a method of control
in the conduct of special operations.




II. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Carl Von Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military
theorist, stated that
. . .war is not merely an act of policy but a true
political instrument, a continuation of political
intercourse, carried on with other means. 15
Rules of engagement (ROE) represent a fundamental application
of this concept. ROE embody the political goals of the
Commander in Chief and influence the entire chain of command,
down to the individual foot soldier in the combat arena. In
theory, ROE exist to ensure that the application of military
force complies with the larger goals of the policy maker.
However, an inherent tension is created by the "pulling and
hauling" between the political leader and the military
commander for control of military operations. 16 Retired Navy
Captain Wayne Hughes most eloquently describes this natural
tension :
A truism of international conflict is that a
nation must succeed both militarily and
politically. During a major war the political
elements are subordinated: world opinion and
international law are at best slighted, at worst
flouted. At the crisis level both military and
15 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, rev. ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984),
87.
16 For a more detailed explanation see Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic
of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy. (New
York: Columbia University press, 1994), 1-23; and Barry R. Posen, The
Sources of Military Doctrine . (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),
45; and George, 13-21.
13
political considerations weigh heavily;
circumscribed force is the order of the day. The
military tactician thinks in terms of executing his
combat mission with minimal losses to his own
force. The statesman, on the other hand, thinks in
terms of the political objective that precipitated
fighting or the threat of it. These military and
political objectives come into conflict. The
tactical commander in a crisis or confrontation
cannot escape friction between military and
political aims; the goals of statecraft confine his
military plans. 17
This chapter is composed of two sections. The first
section presents how ROE are designed in theory to ensure a
proper balance between the political objectives and military
requirements for the successful conduct of military
operations in pursuit of political goals. The second section
discusses problems that occur in reality when policy makers
use ROE to seeK control over the application of military
force. This section uses organization theory to explain the
origins of inappropriate ROE when translating broad political
objectives into tactical ROE. The problems discussed in this
section apply not only to general purpose forces, but also to
SOF.
A. ROE IN THEORY
1 . Definitions
Joint doctrine defines the rules of engagement as the
. . .directives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and
limitations under which United States forces will
17 Captain Wayne P, Hughes, Fleet tactics. (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1986), 225.
14
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with
other forces encountered. 18
This represents the broadest definition of ROE. Some authors
have restricted the definition to exclude the use of ROE to
dictate specific tactical orders or "rudder orders, " but
unfortunately for some military commanders the ROE can result
in the Chief Executive literally issuing rudder orders to a
single ship engaged in a conflict. 19 Even the well known
orders given by William Prescott in the battle of Bunker
Hill, "Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of
their eyes," falls under the current JCS definition of ROE.
ROE establish the upper boundaries for the application of
force in any given situation during a military commander's
operation. They are intended to ensure that political
objectives remain paramount over military considerations.
The military commander must accept the primacy of the
political objective, yet ensure that he is allowed the
opportunity to conduct operations with reasonable efficiency
with regard to lives, equipment and mission accomplishment.
18 Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1989), 317.
19 For example see Captain Ashley Roach, "Rules of Engagement," Naval
war College Review vol. 46, 1983, 46. Roach states that "...ROE should
not delineate specific tactics, should not cover restrictions on
specific system operations, should not cover safety-related
restrictions, should not set forth service doctrine, tactics or
procedures." (Emphasis in original).
15
2 . Development Of Current ROE Methods
As stated in the introduction, the subject of ROE has
roots dating back to the beginning of the history of armed
conflict. Throughout history unwritten constraints of armed
conflict have governed a state's application of military
force in pursuit of political objectives. Just war doctrine,
emanating from medieval religious thought, imposed
constraints on the conduct of war and the treatment of
prisoners. Unwritten "rules of conduct," such as women and
children being considered non-combatants, have evolved in an
attempt to prevent war from reaching the extremes of total
war. 20 Even in early special operations, there is evidence of
differing ROE for the application of military force using
specialized units. In the nineteenth century we see the
Russians conducting counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya
with an emphasis on the precise application of military force
and adherence to specific ROE forbidding the killing of
"civilians," even at the price of eroding military
efficiency. This represented somewhat of a contrast to the
ROE followed by the French Foreign Legion in the first
counterinsurgency operations in Algeria in the 1830' s and
1840 's. The French resorted to brutalizing an entire
society, including the use of mass forced relocation, in
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With
Historical Examples. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 34-47
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order to achieve their military counterinsurgent goals. 21 In
their 20th century struggle in Algeria, the French continued
this practice, only this time brutality led to the unraveling
of French policy.
The ROE which are familiar to U.S. forces today stem
primarily from the post World War II era. Three influences
can be attributed to the increased emphasis and formalization
of ROE after World War II. 22 First, the end of World War II
was soon followed by a Cold War which positioned two strong
states in a balance of power struggle accompanied by the
threat of nuclear weapons . Policy makers became concerned
that the unauthorized activities of military units, ships or
aircraft on a tactical level could quickly and uncontrollably
escalate into global thermal nuclear war between the super
powers. Understandably, the desire to create formal and
specific methods of control for independent military units
became paramount
.
Second, advances in technology allowed for increased
centralization of information systems, communications,
command and control of various independent military units.
21 See John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in
Ancient and Modern Times. (New York: University Press of America, 1996),
xvii .
See Mark S. Martins, "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A
Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, " Military Law Review, 143 Winter
1994, 43; and Josaph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies
.
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991), 28. Martins provides an
excellent review of the development of ROE on pp. 34-55.
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These advances enabled the policy maker to have a greater
involvement in the tactical operations of military units if
desired. Vast amounts of information moving throughout the
chain of command presented unique command and control
problems for delegating authority. Captain Hughes describes
the potential problems and the criteria required to avoid
them:
Command may be efficiently exercised at the highest
level that meets two criteria. First, command's
span of control must not be exceeded. Combat
activity must be localized so that the commander
deals with a manageable set of subordinates.
Second, pertinent and timely tactical information
must be accessible. With the modern means of
scouting and communications, an commander sited in
a command post remote from the battlefield may have
as much or more data than the on- scene commander in
a ship. While experience shows how easily the man
in a command post can overestimate the quality and
timeliness of his picture of the battlefield, it
also shows that the on- scene commander can
underestimate the strategic and political
implications of his tactical decisions. 23
The increased ability for control by policy makers brought
an increased formalization of the ROE under which tactical
units operated.
The third influence toward an increased concern by
policy makers to control the application of force on the
tactical level is what is known today as the "CNN effect."
The increased ability of the media to communicate from the
combat arena translated into the ability of a single foot
soldier to affect national policy if he made an inappropriate
23 Hughes, 226.
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decision in the application of deadly force while in front of
a news camera. The Vietnam war marked the beginning of this
media "problem" which brought both the glory and horror of
the application of military force into America's living
rooms. Recently this has gone to extremes. 24 During the Gulf
War, CNN reporters transmitted live coverage of the initial
air strikes on Baghdad from hotel roof tops in Baghdad
itself. In Somalia, the first people the military
encountered upon "clandestinely" landing on the beaches in
Mogadishu were not Somali warriors but a mob of reporters
armed with cameras, microphones and lights. 25
The first informal use of the term "ROE" was seen in the
U.S. Air Force during the Korean war. General MacArthur
received tactical orders directly from Washington dictating
the routes of ingress and egress of aircraft in order to
avoid overflight of Chinese airspace and the escalation of
the conflict. MacArthur' s protests concerning Washington's
overriding of his tactical prerogative eventually led
24 See Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus. (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1996) . This study explores the "myth" of how the CNN effect and
casualties affect public consensus during a conflict. Public support is
not solely based on the media, but on the whether the benefits for
intervention clearly outweigh the costs and if the objectives of the
intervention are clear. The media does influence this perception. Also
see John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973; and Johanna Neumann, Lights, Camera, War.
Is Media Technology Driving International Politics? (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1996).
25 DoD sources stated that this situation occurred due to an
intentional leak by DoD Public Affairs personnel. The point to be
emphasized here is the mature discipline and judgment displayed by SOF
when confronted with this unusual ROE situation.
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President Truman to remove him as the Pacific theater
commander. The "Intercept and Engagement Instructions"
dictated to Air Force pilots during this conflict became
informally known as the "Rules of Engagement" to staff
officers in Washington. The term ROE eventually became
informally recognized by the JCS in 1958 as the name for the
method of indirectly controlling the application of military
force by policy makers or senior military officers.
Similar to the concern for air-to-air engagements
potentially escalating into nuclear conflicts among the
superpowers, there was a concern with unintended conflicts
between U.S. and Soviet ships at sea producing unintended
escalation. The same desire to control the tactical
operations of aircraft simultaneously spread to ships of the
U.S. Navy. The ROE desired by policy makers implied that the
U.S. captains had to take the first hit if an encounter with
a Soviet ship occurred in order to avoid the policy makers
nightmare of unintentional escalation into nuclear war
brought on by an over reaction at the tactical level. For
naval forces these restrictions contradicted basic naval
tactics and doctrine. As retired Captain Wayne Hughes points
out
:
The great naval maxim of tactics, attack
effectively first, should be thought of as more
than the principle of the offensive: it should be
considered the very essence of tactical action for
success in naval combat. 26
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Ships are particularly vulnerable to the great destructive
power of modern weapons and thus seek to obtain the decisive
first strike, which today can mean the first kill. Efforts
to alleviate this concern with taking the first strike came
with the maritime ROE which emphasized the tactical
commander's inherent right to self defense. These ROE,
established in 1981, were the first standardized ROE for the
U.S. Navy. Admiral Crowe, while serving as Commander in
Chief of the Pacific Command recommended that these standard
ROE be adopted by all services but the JCS waited until 1986
to approve them and 1988 to implement them as the Joint ROE
for all services to be known as the peacetime ROE (PROE)
.
27
Because the primary influence for the development of ROE
came from fears of possible escalation resulting from air or
naval encounters, the ROE used for land forces basically
followed ROE used for air force and navy units, but were
modified as necessary for the particular situation. 28 It was
See Hughes, 34-35. Also see W. Hays Parks, "Righting the Rules of
Engagement", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989.
27 Prior to 1988, the JCS definition stated that ROE are
"...directives that a government may establish..." while after 1988 the
definition was changed to " . . .directives issued by competent military
authority..." (emphasis added) This change reflects the understanding
that policy makers will issue broad guidance while the military
authorities will be responsible for translating this broad guidance into
tactical ROE. For example, the policy maker may say "minimize
collateral damage" and this would be translated by military authorities
into limitations on weapons systems etc.
28 Despite the extensive ROE developed for ground forces during
Vietnam, the standardized JCS Worldwide Peacetime ROE were virtually
useless for ground forces. This situation was improved considerably in
the 1994 CJCSI 3121.01 Standing ROE because the two ground forces
combined efforts to rewrite standard ground force ROE.
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not so much the threat of escalation into nuclear war that
influenced land force ROE, but the advancements in command
and control technology and the impact of aggressive media
coverage in the post World War II period.
As a result, the ROE used to control SOF today stem from
ROE methods developed because of the threat of nuclear war,
improved command and control technology, and an aggressive
media. Ground forces, including SOF, fall under ROE heavily
influenced by the problems associated with air and naval
concerns in a crisis or combat situation. Two of the above
reasons that ROE became institutionalized do not often apply
to special operations. Special operations are usually
conducted with low visibility, clandestinely or covertly, and
may remain classified for years after completion, thus the
media is often not an immediate factor. 29 Special operations
have never involved the employment of nuclear weapons, but
may be involved in locating or destroying them. ROE designed
around the operations of ships, aircraft and to some extent
large conventional ground forces when universally applied to
SOF operations can result in unwanted outcomes. Just like
air and naval forces, SOF require unique considerations with
regards to the ROE used to control their unique operations
indirectly in pursuit of political objectives. "One size
However even these operations will eventually become public
knowledge through either declassification or books published by former
Special operations members, such as Charlie Beckwith or Richard
Marcinko.
22
fits all" ROE do not allow for the unique characteristics of
special operations to be capitalized upon in pursuit of
national interests.
3 . Forms Of Indirect Control Using ROE
The rules of engagement issued to a military commander
can take two forms, command by negation, or by positive
command. Command by negation provides the military decision
maker with a prescribed set of actions allowable at the
discretion of the on scene commander under certain
circumstances. This allows decisions to be made quickly at
the lowest possible level unless countermanded by higher
authority. Command by negation is critical in allowing
military personnel the right of self defense in response to a
threat. If threatened, a soldier can immediately fire on the
threat in order to eliminate it without permission of higher
authority.
Positive command, on the other hand, prohibits certain
actions unless specifically approved by higher authority. An
example of positive command would be the use of chemical
weapons, such as riot control agents. These agents are
unauthorized regardless of the immediate situation unless
approved for use by higher authority. The military commander
inherently desires command by negation-which allows him
greater autonomy, while the policy maker inherently desires
to operate with positive command, especially as political
risks increase.
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4 . Influences In The Creation 0£ ROE
For the military commander, the ROE serve to provide
answers to questions about when, how, where and against whom
military force can be applied. ROE are established as a
result of a combination of political, military and legal
influences, as depicted in Figure 1. Political influences
Figure 1. Political, military and legal
influences in the creation of ROE
(Adapted from Roach, 1983)
are driven by the desire for a successful political outcome
or resolution to a situation. Policy makers intend ROE to be
written so that the proper amount of force, or even the
threat of force, is applied in accordance with the desired
political objective. The proper application of force is
critical in crisis management. Too little force and the
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objectives might not be met, too much force and escalation or
mission failure can result. 30
The military influences which contribute to the creation
of ROE are derived partially from operational plans (OPLANS)
or military doctrine. Examples of the incorporation of
doctrine into ROE include the geographic limits imposed by
restricted fire areas (RFA's), or no fire areas (NFA'S),
which are established during hostilities in order to prevent
fratricide. 31 The two key concerns of any military commander
are successful mission accomplishment and force preservation.
Mission accomplishment encompasses both the tactical success
of the operation and the extent to which tactical success
translates into political success. Force preservation, or
self defense, is a cornerstone of ROE development. Article
51 of the United Nations charter supports this inherent right
to self defense for all nations by stating "[njothing in the
present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs..." 32 In
examining the military influences, it is important to note
that the tensions between the political leader and the
During a FID mission where SOF is conducting training, excessive
force on their part can result in mission failure. A high visibility
incident during sensitive training missions can bring unwanted media
attention and jeopardize both the mission and national objectives.
-3 -1
- The problem of fratricide compels senior military commanders to
lean toward positive command over subordinate commanders in order to
ensure tactical plans coordinate with larger operational objectives.
32 United Nations charter, article 51, accessed from the internet
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military commander do not necessarily imply that
. the conflict
is purely one of civilian control versus military action.
The same tension can be seen between the senior military
commander and the tactical action officer conducting the
operation in the how, when, where and against whom questions
governing the application of force.
Legal considerations also influence the ROE. 33
International law determines the boundaries of acceptable
force through many avenues. The most obvious example is the
1949 Geneva convention which delineates rules governing
hospitals, churches and the treatment of prisoners. Another
example of international law would be the proposed Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) . If the U.S. ratified this treaty,
the armed forces may be limited in their use of riot control
agents. 34 While no supranatural international enforcement
agency exists, international legitimacy is important to most
states during the conduct of diplomatic international
The international laws of war influence and place boundaries on the
ROE, but should not be included in the ROE as a checklist. This
prevents ROE from becoming too complex and eliminates misunderstanding.
For example if a soldier sees "do not rape" in one set of ROE, but does
not see it in another, will he think rape is now allowed? Granted this
is an extreme example, but it illustrates the point.
34 While it has not been ratified, the U.S. signed the CWC on 13
January 1993 which prohibits the acquisition, development and possession
of CW. Currently the U.S. is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol
from using chemical weapons except for possessing them as a deterrent,
or in retaliation to their use by others. Riot control agents are a
separate issue. The CWC allows for their possession , but restricts
their use as a method of war. Currently the use of riot control agents
by U.S. military forces is restricted by executive order 11850. Current
debates in Congress on the meaning of "method of war" will determine if
order 11850 must be rewritten.
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relations and especially during military intervention. These
international legal influences serve to place additional
restrictions on the use of force, but they also provide
guidelines for acceptable acts of self defense.
5 . How The Roe Control The Use Of Force
Because the rules of engagement are formed with
political, military and legal considerations in mind,
sometimes they become indistinguishable from policy decisions
and operational orders. Technically, ROE only dictate when
force can be used. Once a military commander determines that
force is required, then operational plans become relevant in
telling him how and where to apply the force in addition to
what type of force to apply. Not only does the operational
plan come into effect when the military commander decides to
use force but so does political policy. The political
policy, which determines why force is being used, provides
the final and overriding guidance on when, where and against
whom force will be used.
The determination of how, and how much, force can be
used will also be influenced by political policy because it
can change the ROE and thus change how a military commander
is authorized to use military force. 35 The 1965 "Rolling
See Hayes, Naval Rules of Engagement: Management tools for crisis
and Scott D. Sagan, "Rules of Engagement," in Alexander L. George, ed.,
Avoiding War. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), chap. 19. Hayes
and Sagan differ from Roach on some of their points, especially on the
question of how force will be applied. Roach, coming from a military
background, sees the question of how coming solely under the operational
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Thunder" bombing campaign against North Vietnam serves as an
example of this point. The political goal was to deliver a
specific signal to North Vietnam- their continued aggression
against South Vietnam would not be tolerated. Because the
U.S. stated that it did not intend to invade North Vietnam,
destroy the Hanoi regime nor devastate the people, the ROE
placed upon the U.S. Air Force bombers were severely
restrictive. Specifically, how the targets would be selected
and how bombs would be delivered were personally directed by
the President during the infamous "Tuesday lunches." 36
Specific tactical direction from the policy maker on how
and how much force will be applied is the exception rather
than the rule. Usually the policy maker issues broad
guidance for the application of military force. When an
emphasis is placed on limiting collateral damage or avoiding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) warfare by the policy
maker, the senior military strategists and staffs are
responsible for translating this broad guidance into a
tactical ROE. Thus how and how much force should be applied
plan and not influenced by the political policy. He feels that ROE
should never dictate tactics or be rudder orders. This, of course is
what the military commander would ideally want, but Sagan is correct in
that the policy maker might dictate the method of force application. In
the special operations environment this happens quite often. An example
would be the denial of the use of riot control agents in the conduct of
operations. Also political desire for minimal collateral damage might
not be left in the hands of the military commander. The policy maker may
dictate to a SF team specifically how he wants a target disabled.
See W. Hays Parks, "Rolling Thunder and the Law of War, " Air
University Review (January-February 1982), 2.
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is usually decided at this level. 37 During the Gulf war,
concern over Saddam's possible use of chemical weapons meant
that the use of riot control agents by U.S. forces was
prohibited. The fear was that their use would be seen by
Saddam as an initiation of chemical warfare and could result
in unintended escalation. In the OOTW environment the issue
of how much force to apply becomes even more important . How
force will be applied in OOTW is described in the ROE as that
which is proportional to the threat, a key element of just
war doctrine. For example, if a Somali sniper is firing from
a rooftop at U.S. personnel, engaging the sniper with anti-
sniper tactics is authorized, but shelling the building with
artillery is out of proportion and unacceptable. Also in
Somalia, the use of pepper spray versus lethal weapons was
directed in some instances because of policy concerns
regarding collateral damage and the humanitarian objectives.
During Operation Just Cause (Panama), the policy maker's
concerns for limiting collateral damage were translated by
The 1986 bombing of Libya serves as an example. In this case many-
authors mistakenly stated that President Reagan personally placed
restrictive ROE on the F-111F pilots to avoid collateral damage. See
David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of
America ' s War Against Terrorism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1988) and
Brian L. Davis, Quaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack
on Libya. (New York: Praeger, 1990). Actually Reagan only provided
broad guidance. The USAFE commander placed the requirement that F-111F
pilots have operational bombing, navigation, radar and Pave Tack systems
before dropping bombs. Neither the President, Secretary Weinberger,
Admiral Crowe nor EUCOM was aware that this ROE restriction was added by
the USAFE commander. (17 September 199 6 letter to author by W. Hays
Parks. Mr. Parks was the legal advisor for these air strikes).
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the military chain of command into restrictions on the use of
certain weapons systems and tactics
.
For the military commander, the question of when force
can be used is critical to unit survival. The answer to the
question of when to use force depends on whether peacetime
rules of engagement (PROE) or wartime rules of engagement
(WROE) are in effect. 38 PROE are derived from the right of
self defense. Nearly all ROE issued to military units
contain the phase "nothing in these rules is intended to
limit the commander's inherent right to self defense." Thus
force is only authorized when friendly units are threatened
or attacked with lethal force. In a situation where the PROE
are in effect, the right to self defense hinges on two
concepts, hostile action and hostile intention. A hostile
act is the actual use of potentially lethal force against
friendly units. These concepts become difficult to define in
some situations and have a tendency to place the soldier into
a "police officer's paradigm" for ROE. What if an enemy shot
does not hit a friendly target, but was "only a warning?"
What if an attack is made on a third party which the U.S. is
In October of 1994 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued new Standing
Rules of Engagement (SROE) to replace the PROE. The SROE provide a
generic ROE for all situations that can be modified to fit particular
situations including war if needed. Despite this change the problems
associated with PROE and WROE still exist. The SROE was mainly a name
change to avoid tne confusion raised when soldiers conducted
humanitarian operations which involved combat but were governed by rules
called peacetime ROE. This change came after intervention in Panama and
Somalia, thus did not impact the SOF operations examined in this thesis.
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protecting? What if the attack was obviously accidental?
Hostile intent becomes even more difficult to define than a
hostile act. In Somalia, for example, what if a civilian
points a weapon at a soldier? Can the soldier fire or must
he take the first hit? These situations will be examined in
more detail later.
The WROE differ from the PROE in that WROE provide
guidance on the application of force for offensive operations
against a declared hostile force. For example, the Iraqi
military was declared a hostile force during the Gulf War.
Under WROE and against a declared hostile force, a soldier is
authorized to engage the enemy forces on sight without
waiting to take the first hit. Even when WROE are in effect,
there are restrictions on tactics and weapons in order to
keep the military activities within the constraints of the
political objective.
Where force can be applied is also determined by
political, military, and legal considerations. There might
be buffer zones established by political agreements which
confine the use of force to certain geographical boundaries
in order to prevent unwanted crisis escalation. In Somalia,
U.S. troops were confined to the areas and routes used to
deliver food supplies and could not roam out of certain
geographic boundaries. Military considerations can include
limiting force in areas of friendly concentrations or keeping
operations in line with the overall battlefield strategy.
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Legal considerations will also impact on where force can be
used. Hospitals and civilian facilities are usually off
limits and international boundaries of neutral states must be
observed.
The ROE also establish criteria for whom force may be
used against. Again political, military and legal
considerations impact on the development of the ROE. In
Somalia, for example, heavy weapons on vehicles were declared
acceptable targets for SOF snipers and could be engaged on
sight. In the case of self defense, the "whom" is obvious,
the person committing the hostile act or displaying hostile
intent is the authorized target.
B . ROE IN REALITY
Creating the proper ROE which incorporate all political,
military and legal concerns will always be a difficult
balancing act. While the political considerations and
objectives are paramount, the political objectives will not
be achieved unless the military considerations are properly
addressed. If the ROE are too restrictive, then the
commander cannot accomplish the military objective and could
potentially suffer unnecessary human and material losses.
Either military failure or unnecessary losses could translate
into political failure. Scott Sagan labels the failure
resulting from a too restrictive ROE as a type 1 ROE failure.
If the ROE are too relaxed or unclear, then the military will
maximize its chances for success while minimizing casualties.
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This can result in an excessive, disproportionate use of
force and lead to unwanted escalation of the situation or
adverse domestic and/or international opinion. Sagan calls
this a type 2 ROE failure. 39 Sagan assumes that these
failures occur because inappropriate ROE are created at the
policy level and directly influence operations at the
tactical level. While this is true in the abstract sense,
tactical ROE are not written at the national level. ROE are
created in the Defense organization by "competent military
authority" (JCS definition) . This "competent military
authority" is usually a member of the theater commander's
(CINC's) staff. 40 How do these failures materialize within an
organization? Organization theory offers some insight into
the answer of this question.
1 . Organization Theory-
Organization theory is useful in understanding how ROE
work as a means of indirect control of military force.
Ideally, the senior policy maker or military leader should be
able to use the ROE to ensure all members under their command
execute operations and make decisions as intended by their
seniors. In reality, the form of the organization and the
friction within it can create inappropriate ROE and impede
the ability of the policy maker to properly govern delegated
39 Sagan, 451.
40 W. Hays Parks, letter to the author dated 17 September, 1996
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decision making. See Figure 2. In the last twenty five
years, four major schools of thought in organization theory
have been developed, namely the structural systems, human
resource, political, and cultural frames of reference. This
section uses all of these various frames of reference within
organization theory to exposit the problems which may occur
when using ROE to control delegated decision making
indirectly.
R





























Figure 2. Impact of organizational friction on the creation of ROE and
possible outcomes
2 . Definitions
Before examining ROE through the various frames of
reference, the purpose, task, technology and environment of
the military organization must be defined. Because ROE may
be set by the highest levels of command, the military
organization which uses ROE as an indirect control over the
use of military force in pursuit of political objectives must
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include the state leader. In the case of the U.S., the
military command organization is defined as that organization
consisting of the President, the many layers of command, and
the individual foot soldiers operating in the conflict
environment. The President, who is the "National Command
Authority, " establishes strategic policy while the military
formulates strategic and tactical plans to accomplish the
established strategic policies. 41 The purpose of this
military organization is to provide an instrument or means to
foreign policy makers in pursuit of national interests and to
produce governmental action. The task of the organization is
to apply military force in order to achieve the policy
maker's political objectives. The technology of the
organization includes the technical system (resources such as
supplies and military equipment) and the knowledge to employ
this technical system (tactics, doctrine and operational
plans) . The operating environment of the military
organization is predictable during peacetime or training, but
unpredictable in war or a real world conflict.
41 The National Command Authority (NCA) is a complicated hydra-headed
creature in practice. All members of the NCA act in the name of the
President as members of his extended staff. See Hughes, 225-6 and AFSC
Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. (Washington D.C: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 2-2.
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3 . The Structural Frame of Reference
Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal best describe this frame of
reference as one which
...focuses on the two central dimensions of
organizational design. Organizations divide work
by creating a variety of specialized roles,
functions and units. They must then tie all those
elements back together by means of both vertical
and horizontal methods of integration.
"
42
The structure of an organization depends on the environment
in which it operates. For an organization to be successful,
form must follow function and maintain coherence or fit
within its operating environment . In a predictable
environment, a hierarchical structure with many levels is the
ideal organization. This type of organization, such as the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) , is highly centralized and
functions using pre-established rules and procedures in order
to accomplish its task. On the other hand, an organization
which operates in an uncertain or unpredictable environment,
such as a software development company, would require the
flexibility inherent in a flat structure with few levels of
hierarchy. A flat structure facilitates task accomplishment
through decentralized decision making at the operational
level. The DMV would be called a machine bureaucracy and the
software company would be called an "adhocracy" in
Mintzberg's structure modeling system. 43
42 Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal, Refraining Organizations . (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1991), 77.
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Military organization resembles the machine bureaucracy,
as it is a large, hierarchical organization with numerous
independent operating units. Usually, the defense
organization operates in a predictable environment until a
crisis or conflict erupts, at which point it faces an
uncertain environment. When the policy maker reacts to a new
situation and makes decisions he triggers established
organizational routines such as operational plans and
indirect methods of control such as standing rules of
engagement . In this uncertain environment of a crisis or
conflict the control of military force in pursuit of
political objectives becomes difficult when using an indirect
means of control such as ROE. The amount of friction in an
organization can be influenced by the number of intermediate
levels between the policy maker and tactical military
commander, through which the ROE must flow.
The ROE, in theory, are meant to control the extent of a
subordinate's decentralized decision making by formalizing
their task via written rules and requirements (serving a
similar purpose to standardized forms used by employees of
the DMV in the conduct of daily business) . The ROE are
designed to ensure and maintain vertical coordination between
the policy maker and the tactical military commander.
Creating ROE at the highest level in an organization becomes
43 Henry Mintzberg, The Structure of Organizations . (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979), 325-443.
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difficult because the policy maker may not fully understand
the operational requirements at subordinate levels, or the
myriad of organizational routines triggered by his decisions
Figure 3 shows the relationship between a decision maker's
level within the organization, the amount of knowledge he
possesses on any one topic and the number of topics about
which he is required to have knowledge. As John W.
Sutherland warns
:
Simply, as the scope of a decision maker's
authority increases (as the number of units for
which he is responsible expands) , the probability
that he will make rational, accurate decisions








ON ANY ONE TOPIC
Figure 3. The information Problem for the Decision Maker
The limited ability of the decision maker to have
perfect knowledge of all subordinate units results in
discretionary decision making being conducted at all levels
44 John W. Sutherland, Administrative Decision-Making : Extending the
Bounds of Rationality. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1977), 277.
Also see Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality Volume 2.
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982), 405-492.
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within an organization. 45 Anthony Downs further emphasizes
that
:
. . .at every level there is a certain discretionary
gap between the orders an official receives from
above and the orders he issues downward, and every
official is forced to exercise discretion in
interpreting his superior's orders. 46
In sum, using indirect methods of control, such as ROE,
policy makers and senior military planners strive to control
the tactical units within the military organization in a
predictable manner during any possible set of circumstances.
However, the policy makers and military superiors are unable
to predict and create rules for every conceivable situation
at the tactical level. They must allow for the discretionary
delegation of decision making down to the tactical and even
individual level with regard to the use of military force in
unanticipated situations.
With discretionary decision making occurring at many
levels within the organization, two problems can develop.
First, translation of the policy maker's broad guidance can
become misinterpreted as it flows through multiple layers of
command. In the case of ROE in the OOTW environment, this
can result in rather restrictive ROE. The policy maker may
emphasize the need to minimize collateral damage in a broad
45 Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 4.
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy. (Boston: Little & Brown, 1967),
134.
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statement, but this statement may be translated and
interpreted at each level in the chain of command into
operational ROE that become more restrictive than intended.
This happens in much the same sense that a message gets
distorted in transmission between a large number of
messengers. A good example of how a message becomes more
restrictive when distorted occurs as follows. Suppose a four
star general calls a one star and states that he will conduct
a uniform inspection of the men in squad A of first platoon
at 1400. As the news of this inspection travels down the
multiple layers in the chain of command, the time the troops
are required to be in formation becomes earlier and earlier
until they are standing in formation at 0800 or even
conducting practice inspections days in advance. The same
can happen in the translation of ROE down the chain of
command. 47 This change might not necessarily occur in the
actual writing of the ROE, but rather in the inference of the
written ROE at each level of command resulting in "implicit"
ROE. An extreme emphasis on minimizing collateral damage can
create an environment where the written ROE, which rely on
individual judgment, can be interpreted in ways unintended by
superiors in the chain of command.
Second, decoupling between levels in the chain of
command can occur when facing an opponent. When the military
My thanks to W. Hays Parks for providing this analogy.
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organization is involved in a crisis or conflict, this
involvement will occur on multiple levels in what Joseph
Bouchard described as "stratified interaction." 48 In the
defense organization these levels can include the political
or diplomatic, strategic, tactical and individual level, as
shown in figure 4. In this diagram the lines connecting the
various levels represent interaction. The line from the
policy maker down to the individual soldier, passing through
































indirect methods of control such as the ROE. The outside
lines connecting the policy maker directly to the individual
soldier illustrate how the policy maker may dictate ROE
directly to the individual soldier, or tactical commander.
As a result, an outcome at the tactical level may effect the
outcome on the policy level. Bouchard built upon Paul
Bracken's concept of tightly coupled forces which explained
how two nuclear armed states interact during a crisis as a
result of their command and control systems. 49
Because of stratified interaction a situation may arise
during a crisis or conflict in which interaction on the
tactical level' may escalate independent of the strategic or
policy level. Bouchard terms this phenomenon of tactical
interaction proceeding beyond political objectives during a
crisis as "decoupled interaction.
"
50 This phenomenon can
easily occur with naval forces. As stated earlier, naval
forces on the tactical level rely on the ability to fire the
first shot in order to achieve success during a tactical
encounter with enemy forces . Decoupling on the tactical
level can occur if the policy maker deploys ships in harm's
According to Bracken, two forces become tightly coupled because of
two aspects of their command and control systems. First, the tactical
nuclear forces on each side posses early warning capabilities in order
to prevent surprise attack. Second, coupling occurs vertically through
the strategic and policy levels due to the warning systems and
intelligence systems on each side at each level.
50 Bouchard, 42.
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way merely as a signal of intent during coercive diplomacy. 51
Once the naval forces of both sides become coupled on the
tactical level there is the possibility of conflict
escalation as they continually maneuver with each other in an
attempt to gain an advantageous position once the shooting
starts, thus avoiding the first hit. What is beneficial on
the policy level in a crisis will not necessarily be
beneficial on the tactical level, thus a ship commander will
view the situation differently than a policy maker.
Decoupled interactions occur despite ROE, because the
tactical commanders maintain different goals and perceptions
during a crisis or conflict than the policy makers. The
"human resource" aspect of organization theory provides the
best reference to further explore this problem of indirectly
controlling the application of military force in crisis or
conflict
.
4 . The Human Resource Frame of Reference
The human resource frame of reference views an
organization differently than the structural frame, in that
it defines the organization not as a structure but rather as
consisting of numerous groups which interact and combine to
form the organization. The human resource frame of reference
focuses on the fit between the group or individual and the
51 For more on the use of the military during coercive diplomacy see
Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994).
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organization. Each group and individual may have different
goals and different perceptions of their operating
environment. Discrepancies in goals and perceptions of
different groups and individuals can create problems for
policy makers :-,nd their desire to indirectly control the
application of military force through the ROE. Each group
seeks complete decision making autonomy in the application of
military force. This desire for autonomy of control
intensifies as the uncertainty of the environment and risk
increases. Special operations, usually associated with high
level policy and high risk (discussed in the next chapter)
,
will tend to further increase each groups desire for maximum
autonomy in the control of the application of military force.
Upon examining the military organization, three
generally distinct groups emerge when military force is
employed in pursuit of national interests. 52 First is the
policy maker who desires to avoid conflict altogether through
crisis management strategies or to avoid conflict until he
deems the time is right to ensure an optimum advantage.
Accurately and proportionally applying military force when
and only when desired and without leakage of authority is the
goal of the policy maker when choosing a military option.
In organization theory these groups are called stakeholders, in
that they have a stake in the success of the organization. See Richard
0. Mason and Ian I. Mitroff, Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions
,
Theory, Cases, and Techniques. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1981), 43.
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The next group, the senior military strategists or
planners, consists of military personnel who plan and conduct
military operations on the strategic level in support of the
strategic policy formed by the policy maker. The military
personnel in this group will not directly apply the military
force desired by the policy maker, that responsibility is
delegated to the tactical commanders. Instead, this group's
main priority is to accomplish the military objectives
required in order for the policy maker to achieve his
political objectives. The strategic success of military
operations takes priority over tactical requirements when the
tactical requirements run contrary to strategic goals. This
strategy group essentially is viewing the situation from a
macro perspective and desires to ensure that tactical level
operations remain within the larger objectives of the
strategic plan, which translates military success into
political success for the policy maker. Moreover, the
strategy group may be willing to sacrifice the goals of a
tactical group, including its safety and freedom to act, for
the strategic goal. As a result, the strategic group will
modify the ROE dictated by the policy maker to ensure that
the tactic? 1 use of force remains in concert with larger
strategic goal?. 53 It is with this group that the greatest
By law senior military commanders may only further restrict the
established ROE. They are by no means allowed to relax the ROE. The
JCS 1994 standing ROE, CJCSI 3121.01, added that intermediate commanders
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problems associated with ROE can occur because they must
interpret and translate broad policy objectives into
achievable operational and tactical missions and ROE. If
this group is ignorant of SOF requirements for tactical
success or if SOF units fail to tell them of the
requirements, they will have a greater tendency to create
inappropriate written and implicit ROE.
The last group, the tactical military planners and
operators, may have different goals and objectives than the
other two groups . The units and individuals on the tactical
level are the tip of the military spear used in the
application of military force. At this level, the group's
goal is to complete its own operations successfully with
minimal casualties. The tactical group desires autonomy, in
the form of an unrestricted planning and operating
environment, in order to achieve this goal. Although goal
congruence is desired, the goals of the policy maker,
military strategist and tactical operator will not always be
identical. 54 Describing ideal goal congruence, Bouchard
states
:
may not further restrict ROE for subordinate commanders without the
approval of the next higher authority. While this move ensures that
written ROE will not become more restrictive at each level of command,
it cannot address the implicit ROE that are informally sent down the
chain of command to the tactical units. Implicit ROE can create an
environment which impairs tactical judgment and interpretation of the
written ROE.
54 In weak and ill-disciplined organizations, the tactical group may
care only about creating the perception of loyalty to strategic goals
but in fact subordinate the greater good to its immediate interest
.
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Hypothetically, if all of those decision makers
possessed identical beliefs, objectives and
perceptions, the operational decisions they would
make would be the same ones that national leaders
would make if exercising direct control. 55
Because this will not always be the case, the ROE may serve
to constrain subordinate decision makers and ensure that
their actions remain in concert with the superior's goals and
objectives. It is important that the tactical units provide
the chain of command their concerns and requirements with
regards to ROE. This "push" up the organization serves to
ensure the next level of command does not operate in a vacuum
when translating the policy maker's broad guidance into
tactical ROE.
Another organizational friction which the Human Resource
frame illuminates is the subjective rationality of each of
these groups and especially of those within these groups.
Subjective rationality means that individuals act rationally
within their own frames of reference depending on the level
they occupy in the organization and the environment in which
they make decisions. The ROE attempt to control the decision
of the individual foot soldier in order to ensure compliance
with political objectives. A dichotomy exists between the
environment in which the policy makers/senior military
planners develop ROE and the environment in which the
tactical unit or individual implements the ROE.
55 Bouchard, 10
47
According to Mark Martins, a military lawyer, the
current approach to ROE resembles a legislative model. He
argues that
:
This model serves certain established interests and
provides a traditional role for judge advocates,
but is not optimal for inculcating initiative and
restraint in a military land force. Rules of
engagement in this legislative model are laws-
primarily written texts that authorities issue,
supplement, and perhaps supersede; that members of
the controlled group consult, interpret, and
sometimes obey; and that other functionaries
implement, distinguish, and occasionally prosecute.
A legislative approach to land force ROE can create
danger when the time comes for living, breathing,
sweating soldiers to translate the texts into
results on the ground. 56
In the current legislative model, the ROE are developed at
the policy and strategic level in writing by senior policy
makers and military officers surrounded by advisors and
counselors within a leisurely environment. This environment
encourages a subjective rationality which results in numerous
rules and extensive written text in order to cover any and
all possible contingencies that might arise during combat.
On the contrary, the operational environment within which the
physically exhausted and overwhelmed pilot, ship commander or
foot soldier operates is permeated by the fog of war. He
alone must quickly rely on his personal judgment and training
assisted only by what his memory retains regarding the
directed ROE for the situation. Obviously, what is rational
56 Martins, 55
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regarding ROE in one environment is not necessarily rational
in the other.
Soldier selection and training can, in part, substitute
for centralized control using ROE, but cannot fully
anticipate all tactical situations. 57 The fact remains that
the judgment of the on- scene tactical commander or individual
soldier will be critical to obtaining a desired outcome which
is congruent with the goals of the policy maker. The human
resource frame of reference identifies four inputs which
effect individual performance and in turn effect the
consequent outcome as shown in Figure 5
.
First, one must have a clear understanding of what is
expected of him, or role clarity. Second, he must possess
the ability to produce the desired outcome. This ability can
be gained through skills and knowledge obtained during
training. Third, he must have the resources necessary, such
as supplies and equipment, to perform. Finally, he must have
the motivation to perform and put forth the required effort
to achieve the required outcome.
Martins prescribes an excellent model for training of both
individuals and units on the problems associated with certain ROE
issues. His ideas are useful for making training more realistic with
regards to ROE. While training can improve the ability of soldiers to
conduct operations under varying ROE, it cannot fully anticipate all
tactical situations. There remains a gap between real world and









Figure 5. The individual process model (Erik Jansen,
1996)
With regard to effort, today's all volunteer force
desires to perform well, which contributes to the ability of
ROE to govern individual tactical judgment. 58 For today's
forces, the only shortfall to following ROE and achieving the
desired outcome may be caused by a lack of role clarity and
ability. Operations other than war (OOTW) and their unique
environments create difficulties in clearly identifying the
exact role of the tactical unit or soldier. Reliance on a
legislative rather than training model of ROE diminishes the
individual's ability for successful judgment in a crisis
situation. 59
Motivation to follow ROE is greater with today's all volunteer
force when compared to that of Vietnam era draftees
.
59 See Martins, 55-85
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5 . The Political Frame of Reference
The political frame views an organization through a
perspective of power. It is concerned with the types of power
which influence the output of an organization and who within
the organization controls this power. In the military
organization, most power sources are legitimate in that they
are based on established rank or position. For the policy
maker his superior position allows him to dictate a desired
political objective and to task the military with
accomplishing the established goals. The threat of
punishment or the promise of reward enables the policy maker
to control the military system when goal congruence is
lacking. Legitimate power runs down the entire military rank
structure to the individual soldier ensuring the political
objectives are obtained.
Another source of power within an organization is
information dominance. 60 This form of power allows either end
of the organization's chain of command to influence the
nature of the organization's output. The policy maker and
the strategic military planner usually possess more complete
situation information than those on the tactical level. A
lack of information on the tactical level compel unit
commanders and individuals to comply with a superior's
In this context I define information dominance as the power that
flows to those who have the know-how and information to understand the
full scope of a particular issue or situation, and provide solutions.
See Bolman and Deal, 19 6.
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desires because they lack the necessary information to take a
contradictory position. Subordinates must trust that
decisions made by their superiors are in accordance with
larger goals and objectives.
Information dominance and the power it carries will
sometimes put subordinates in a powerful position. As stated
earlier the higher up a decision maker is within an
organization the greater number of subjects he must know but
the less he will specifically know of any one subject.
Because the tactical commander is an expert in his chosen
profession, he can influence the conduct of the organization
by asserting the personal power of professional knowledge.
In this case the policy maker or even the strategist must
bend to the desires of the tactical commander because of
their lack of technical expertise and the power associated
with it. Additionally, the tactical commander, by virtue of
his presence on the immediate scene, will sometimes have
first availability of information at the tactical level which
could have consequence at higher levels
.
Another aspect of the political frame of reference is
organizational politics. Groups within the organization
compete for limited resources and use various sources of
power to further their interests. Bureaucratic politics
could impact the development of ROE as the policy maker
relies on the military experts to provide ROE guidance for a
particular situation. Conflicts involving military force are
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limited and as a result when they do occur, all the services
compete for a meaningful role in the conflict in order to
justify their existence and budget. Interservice rivalry
could surface as one set of ROE may benefit one service over
another in the application of military force. For example,
conventional forces may be too blunt an instrument compared
to the surgical aspects of SOF in an environment requiring
otherwise restrictive ROE. In such a case, SOF may be
favored because massive, high profile conventional forces
might appear politically inappropriate.
One last note under the political frame of reference.
Risk in military operations is often great and the policy
maker, military strategist and tactical commander all attempt
to minimize risk. In order to minimize risk, each group
attempts to maximize its control over military operations.
Control over military operations is zero-sum, an increase in
one group ' s control translates into a decrease in the other
group's control. 61 As a result of each group maximizing
control, risk minimized at the policy level may maximize risk
at the tactical level and vice versa. The ROE can be viewed
as a method of isolating superiors from the consequences of
risk resulting from the actions of subordinates. The U.S.
Operational Law Handbook states:
61 For an excellent analysis see P. Gardner Howe, Risk in Military
Operations . (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
1995) .
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ROE protect the commander by providing guidance
assuring that subordinates comply with the law of
war and national policy. For example, the
commander may issue ROE that reinforce the law of
war specifically prohibiting destruction of
religious or cultural property. In the area of
national policy, ROE can limit such items as the
use of chemical weapons, riot control agents, and
herbicides. The inclusion of restrictions on these
agents in a OPLAN insulates, to the extent
possible, the commander from subordinates who may
violate national policy out of ignorance. 62
This statement implies that the unit commander or the
individual foot soldier carries all responsibility for his
actions under the ROE. Obviously, in this case maximum risk
is passed to those with minimal power.
6 . The Cultural Frame of Reference
The last frame under organization theory with which to
view the ROE is the cultural frame of reference. While this
frame does not provide as much insight into possible ROE
problems within the military organization as other frames, it
does provide a valuable perspective. This frame of reference
for thinking about ROE mirrors the larger literature on
strategic culture and other aspects of military strategy and
doctrine. 63 Cultural influences on ROE can be seen when a
nation employs military force unilaterally or as part of an
international coalition. The cultural frame also provides
The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army,
Operational Law Handbook (JA422) draft 3rd ed. 1993, p. H-92.
63 See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1984) .
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insight as to how different service cultures within the
military can affect ROE.
All states strive to lay claim to the moral high ground
during a unilateral crisis or conflict. Through moral
relativism a state can claim that it only fights just wars
(jus ad bellum) and does so justly (jus in bello) . 64 Domestic
and international pressures limit the use of military force
to methods acceptable under the laws of war. The ROE a state
develops to control the use of force reflect the character of
that state and the domestic concerns of maintaining
legitimacy throughout a crisis or conflict . The ROE also
reflect the state's concern that it is viewed favorably under
international scrutiny while using military force. As U.S.
involvement in Vietnam and Somalia illustrated, a clashing of
cultures can complicate how the ROE work in controlling the
use of military force. The U.S. entered Vietnam culturally
accustomed to fighting a conventional war where the Geneva
Convention held meaning, combatants wore uniforms and
military units consisted entirely of men. In Vietnam, U.S.
ROE were restrictive in order to limit collateral damage and
remain within limited political objectives. The ROE where
eventually ignored or abandoned by some troops as they were
forced to engage in combat with guerrilla forces who were
64 gee walzer, pages 13-20 on moral relativism and how a state
rationalizes the morality of the wars it engages in and the methods
employed to ensure victory. Pages 263-268 use the U.S.'s decision to
drop the H-bomb on Japan as an example.
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soldiers by night and civilians by day. 65 In addition, women
and children regularly engaged U.S. troops in combat. The
same situation was seen thirty years later when Somalis used
women and children as both shields and combatants during the
Task Force Ranger operation launched to capture the Somali
warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed. The ROE which embodied the
U.S. culture became complicated and frustrating when the U.S.
attempted to maintain the moral high ground during a conflict
with a state influenced by different cultural values and no
apparent ROE of their own.
This frame also reveals how different cultures within a
multinational force can effect the ROE and control over the
application of force. The cultural differences complicating
the use of ROE to control military force which arise fighting
against another state also occur when fighting alongside
another state. The increased reliance of the U.S. on
multinational coalitions introduce such problems regarding
the ROE. Even if all countries were to adopt the same ROE,
cultural conflict would still arise in the interpretation of
the ROE. In Somalia, for example, all countries involved in
Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II operated under ROE
For examples of flagrant ROE violations see Andrew F. Krepinevich,
Jr, The Army in Vietnam. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986),
198-203. Also see Walzer, 188-196. Of course this statement is not
true for all units which operated in Vietnam. Some USMC and USA units
understood the nuances of guerrilla warfare and avoided the "find, fix
and destroy" mentality (described to the author in a lecture by Larry
Cable on 2 February, 1995 at NPS Monterey). These units didn't find the
ROE to be the salient problem.
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developed by the United States . Even though under the same
ROE, each nation interpreted or implemented the ROE
differently. The French Foreign Legion interpreted and
implemented the ROE more loosely than the U.S., while the
Pakistanis interpreted them more tightly. This resulted in
problems such as conflict within the coalition concerning the
use of force and exploitation of the varying levels of
enforcement by the Somalis.
Viewing the military organization through the political
frame also illuminates the problems associated with different
services and warfare specialties. The Army, Navy and Air
Force all have different institutional histories with ROE.
Naval forces are continuously on patrol throughout the world
and engaged with potential enemy forces. This experience
allows the Navy to develop and realistically practice
operating under established ROE in a real world environment.
The Air Force has less of an opportunity for engagement
during peacetime when compared to the Navy. As a result,
they enter conflict with less practical experience in real
world ROE issues. The Army also has a different peacetime
experience with ROE and has thus developed a slightly
different interpretation of ROE problems than the Navy or Air
Force. Part of this cultural difference comes with how the
services operate. With naval forces ROE entail risk because
so much value is contained in a single ship. On the other
hand with ground forces the ROE entail the opposite risk:
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there are so many individuals that some are bound to be
intermittently vulnerable.
Problems arise when staffs comprised of members from
different services attempt to write ROE for a joint command.
A naval officer might not fully understand the culture of
another service with regards to ROE. This argument can be
expanded by examining the cultural differences between
conventional and special operations forces. Conventional
soldiers on a staff may not fully understand the ROE
complications that will affect the conduct of special
operations. Cultural differences in philosophy, training,
and doctrine can create organizational friction in
translating theoretical ROE into realistic ROE. Bridging
this cultural gap by providing insight into ROE complications
when conducting special operations is one of the main
purposes of this thesis.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Ideally, the ROE ensure, that all levels within the
military organization make decisions consistent with those
the policy maker would make if complete centralized control
existed. Unfortunately, the military organization is large
and complex, and the application of force must be delegated
to tactical units and individuals. The ROE serve to impose
limits on the discretionary decentralized decision making
which occurs at all levels within the organization and
hopefully maintain goal congruence among all levels in
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pursuit of the political goals designed to serve the national
interest. However, translation of the policy maker's broad
guidance can become misinterpreted as it flows through
multiple layers of command and create implicit or inferred
ROE. In the case of ROE in the OOTW environment, this can
result in rather restrictive ROE. The policy maker may
emphasize the need to minimize collateral damage in a broad
statement, but this statement may be translated and
interpreted at each level in the chain of command into
operational ROE that become more restrictive than intended.
Regardless of how well written, no ROE can completely
eliminate the possibility of either a type 1 (too
restrictive) or type 2 (too relaxed) ROE failure. Morality
and good judgment cannot be legislated and training cannot
anticipate every possible future tactical situation. W. Hays
Parks, a well respected Army ROE expert, accurately sums up
the problem:
The ROE never will draw a line that, once crossed,
automatically authorizes the use of force- -except
that very clear line a protagonist crosses when he
fires first. The line otherwise cannot be drawn
because it does not exist. Herein lies the
frustration. While there is a reluctance to be the
first to shoot, there is an equal desire not to be
the first to be shot, shot down, or sunk: the
temptation by many is to endeavor to write ROE that
go beyond the basic self-defense language in
receiving a clearer picture of the potential
threat . Yet no word picture can be drawn that
offers an effective substitute for the discretion
or judgment of the man on the scene. 66
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Of course efforts must be made to draft the best possible ROE
and to conduct the most realistic ROE training possible.
Examining the problems associated with indirect control of
military force using ROE is best conducted through various
frames of reference in order to anticipate as many potential
problems as possible. The better these problems are
anticipated and understood the better the chance of the ROE
effectively controlling the use of military force in pursuit
of political goals and national interests.
As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, ROE designed
for conventional forces can result in unwanted outcomes when
universally applied to SOF. Just as ROE for air and naval
forces differ, SOF require unique considerations with regards
to the ROE used to control their unique operations in pursuit
of political objectives. "One size fits all" ROE do not
allow for the unique characteristics of special operations to
be capitalized upon in pursuit of national interests.
The next chapter builds on the ROE problems presented in
this chapter by focusing on the unique nature of special
operations, and the principles vital to their proper
employment, which cause them to be most sensitive to
inappropriate rules of engagement
.
66 Parks, 86. Many of his points were incorporated into the 1994
CJCSI 3121.01 standing ROE. See CJCSI 3121.01, Appendix C to Enclosure A
(air operations), Paragraph 3b(l).
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III. THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND ROE
IMPLICATIONS
Political, military and legal "pulling and hauling,
"
which often deepen the organizational friction associated
with using the ROE for indirect control, sharpen further when
SOF are employed in pursuit of strategic political or
military objectives. 67 Because of the unique nature of
special operations, the potential ROE problems associated
with their employment are proportionally greater than with
conventional forces. What makes special operations unique
when compared to conventional forces? Joint Pub 3-05
specifies
:
Special operations differ from conventional
operations in the degree of physical and political
risk, operational techniques, modes of employment,
independence from friendly support, and dependence
on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous
assets . 68
While JCS Pub 3-05 offers some distinction between SOF and
general purpose forces (GPF) this chapter provides greater
insight into the unique characteristics of SOF and
This becomes greatest when SOF are used in efforts to solve a
foreign policy crisis. See Lucien S. Vandenbroucke , Perilous Options
:
Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-8.
Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint
Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1993) .
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specifically explains how these unique characteristics
complicate the use of ROE in the conduct of special
operations
.
A . DEFINITIONS AND TYPOLOGY
1 . Definitions
Definitions of special operations range from the broad
to the specific, and anywhere in between. A broad
definition, sensitive to the historical antecedents of modern
special operations, defines them as:
...that class of military (or paramilitary) actions
that fall outside the realm of conventional warfare
during their respective time periods." 69
The Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Joint Pub 3-05)
defines special operations rather specifically as:
. . .operations conducted by specially organized,
trained, and equipped military and paramilitary
forces to achieve military, political, economic, or
psychological objectives by unconventional military
means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
areas. These operations are conducted during
peacetime competition, conflict, and war,
independent or in coordination with operations of
conventional, non special operations forces.
Politico-military considerations frequently shape
special operations, requiring clandestine, covert
or low visibility techniques and oversight at the
national level. 70
For the purposes of this thesis the Joint Pub 3-05 definition
allows for a thorough examination of the problems associated
John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient
and Modern Times. (New York: University Press of America, 1996), xvi
.
70 Joint pub 3-05., 10.
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with controlling special operations through ROE during the
modern era
.
2 . Typology of Special Operations
Special operations can be categorized in two ways.
First, they can be categorized by the level of warfare at
which they occur. Special operations may be conducted on the
strategic, operational or tactical level of warfare. Second,
special operations can be categorized by the time required
for the accomplishment of an intended purpose. Mission
accomplishment can be achieved in either a single operation
or through an extended special operations campaign.
Strategic-level 71 special operations position SOF as the
primary means for application of military force in pursuit of
a political objective by a policy maker. Strategic special
operations, because of their direct link to high level
policy, typically have greater political risk than special
operations conducted at lower levels. 72 Examples of strategic
71 Joint Publication 1-02 defines the strategic level of conflict as
"the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a
group of nations, determines national or
multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and
guidance, and develops and uses national resources to
accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level
establish national and multinational military objectives;
sequence initiatives; define global plans or theater war
plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military
forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic
plans
.
This is more so the case with coup de main special operations.
Continuous tactical special operations campaigns, such as the operations
conducted by the Paratroop Corps in Algeria, also have the potential for
high political consequences.
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level special operations include the U.S. attempt to rescue
American hostages in Iran, the Task Force Ranger attempt to
snatch Aideed during UNOSOM II in Somalia, or the Scud hunt
conducted during the Gulf War by British and U.S. SOF. On
the lowest end of the levels of warfare lie tactical
operations which are usually conducted as part of a larger
employment of military force as a means to a political end. 73
These special operations, while not necessarily linked
directly to high level policy, support the operational or
strategic objectives of senior military commanders. Examples
of tactical special operations include the Paitilla airfield
raid conducted by U.S. Navy SEALs in Operation Just Cause,
SOF sniper operations in Somalia, and
reconnaissance/deception operations conducted by SOF during
the Gulf war. Connecting the strategic level with the
tactical level of special operations is the operational level
of conflict. 74 The operational level ensures that tactical
Joint Publication 1-02 defines the tactical level of conflict as
"the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and
executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or
task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement
and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the
enemy to achieve combat objectives."
74 Joint Publication 1-02 defines the operational level of conflict as
"the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within
theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics
and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish
the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational
objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about
and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension to
time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and
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operations are planned and conducted in order to contribute
to accomplishing overall strategic objectives. Special
operations campaigns, such as counterinsurgency operations,
usually fall under the operational level of conflict. 75
The length of a special operation provides another
useful distinction for categorizing special operations. At
any level of warfare, special operations may accomplish their
political or military objectives in a single operation, coup
de main, or may require an extended series of operations, a
campaign, in order to achieve objectives. 76 Coup de main
operations usually occur at the strategic level in support of
high level policy or a military campaign strategy and provide
a clear and decisive outcome: the target is destroyed or the
hostages are rescued. These operations are usually limited
to single episodes, as they are conducted against high value
targets or designed to take advantage of a favorable
situation during a narrow window of opportunity. Examples of
coup de main operations include the 1980 hostage rescue
attempt by the U.S. in Iran; 77 the 197 6 rescue of hostages by
administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by
which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.
In counter- insurgency operations, the border between the
operational and strategic levels may become blurred, particularly in a
protracted campaign.
Drawing from the JCS definition of a military campaign, I define a
special operations campaign as a series of special operations aimed to
accomplish a common objective within a given time and space.
77 See Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force. (New York:
Random House, 198"*); and Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special
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Israeli commandos in Entebbe, Uganda; 78 or the U.S. SOF
attempt to snatch the Somali warlord, Mohamed Aideed, during
UNOSOM II.
Protracted special operations consist of a series of
special operations which combine into a campaign in order to
reach a desired military or political goal . These operations
can be conducted as strategic or tactical campaigns. Special
operations campaigns may be either offensive or defensive on
the strategic level. Offensive campaigns might include
extensive reconnaissance operations involving numerous
missions behind enemy lines as seen in the Gulf War or
counterinsurgency operations such as seen with the French
operations in Algeria; Australian SAS and Navy SEAL
operations in Vietnam; 79 British SAS operations in Borneo; 80
or the British SAS campaign in Dhofar. 81 Defensive campaigns
might include SOF employed as a stay-behind force to disrupt
Operations as an instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
For description and analysis of this operation see: Arquilla, 333-
44; and William H. McRaven, Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations
Warfare. (Navato: Presidio Press, 1995), 333-81.
See T.L. Basilivac, SEALS: UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam. (Boulder
Colorado: Palidin Press, 1990) and D.M. Horner, SAS Phantoms of the
Jungle: A History of the Australian Special Air Service. (Sydney: Allen
& Unwin, 1989) .
80 See Peter Dickens, SAS: The Jungle Frontier. 22 Special Air
Service Regiment in the Borneo Campaign, 1963-1966 . (London: Arms and
Armor Press, 1983).
81 See Colonel Tony Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman. (London: William
Kimber, 1980) .
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enemy lines of communications and harass enemy forces as
friendly forces withdraw. 82
For the purposes of this thesis, the theory of special
operations and the ROE implications for either coup de main
or prolonged operations can be best examined through the
three different levels of analysis presented above, namely
strategic, operational and tactical. First, analysis at the
strategic level allows for an examination of the concerns of
both the policy maker and the strategic military commander.
ROE at the strategic level provide the policy maker and
military commander with an indirect form of tactical control
over strategic special operations. Second, the theory of
special operations and the ROE implications can be examined
at the operational level of conflict. At this level, SOF
provide the military commander flexibility in the creation of
an operational plan in order to meet strategic objectives.
Third, the theory of special operations, and the ROE
implications derived therefrom, can be examined at the
tactical level of analysis by considering the specific
tactical requirements for mission success. The unique
characteristics of special operations can create situations
and problems for the ROE on the tactical level which are not
present during conventional operations. This level of
Initially, this was the reason for Army SOF ' s continued existence
after World War II. During the cold war, Army SOF had the mission of
becoming a stay-behind guerrilla force in the event a Soviet offensive
pushed NATO defenses back.
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analysis allows for examination of the tactical commander's
concerns when conducting special operations, and an
understanding of how the ROE affect the chances for mission
success with minimum casualties.
B . THE STRATEGIC LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
SOF can be employed in numerous ways as a military means
by which a policy maker can achieve national goals in either
a crisis or non-crisis situation. During a foreign policy
crisis, SOF ofcen provide an attractive option which promises
a quick and decisive resolution, in lieu of diplomacy, or
when other crisis management strategies have failed. The use
of SOF by Israel in Entebbe and by the U.S. in the Iranian
hostage situation illustrate both the utility and risks of
SOF as an instrument for crisis resolution. In the first
case, a daring raid thousands of miles from their country,
Israel was able to end a crisis in ninety-nine minutes by
using SOF to secure the release of nearly all hostages with
minimal friendly casualties. 83 The tactical success of
Israeli SOF resulted in strategic political success. Israel
gained international and domestic respect while maintaining a
policy of not negotiating with terrorists. On the other
hand, the failed hostage rescue attempt by U.S. SOF was a
great embarrassment and may have cost President Carter his
re-election. Also, the United States' military reputation
83 McRaven, 3 69
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was damaged because their best soldiers were unable to
complete an operation against the third world country of
Iran. This failure launched fundamental changes within the
U.S. special operations program. 84
The political risks of conducting dramatic and high
profile special operations in pursuit of a quick solution to
a foreign policy crisis often may be proportionally higher
than using general purpose forces toward the same end because
SOF represent the elite soldiers of a state's military. The
romance and mystery surrounding special units and their
members amplifies a strategic failure when journalists place
such stories into the headlines. 85 To both the international
community and the domestic population, the failure of a
special operation on the strategic level clearly demonstrates
the state's inability to solve a problem despite having
employed its best military units. 86
84 For more on the political and organizational consequences of Desert
One see Vandenbroucke, 152-181.
See Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians . (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1978)
.
86 This problem illustrates another political utility of SOF, as
either an outward (international) or inward (domestic) signal. Examples
of outward signals involving SOF include the Sontay raid and the
Mayaquez crisis. Also SOF can provide a positive demonstration of
support to a client state through FID missions or with military
advisors. The best example of inward signaling is the British
exploitation of Commando operations in order to boost moral in the home
front during World War II. Successful SOF operations can provide the
heroes needed to rally the public in support of the policy maker's
course of action, while failed SOF operations can spell the end of a
policy maker's career and a blow to public moral.
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Recognizing the high risk associated with strategic
special operations, the U.S. occasionally attempts to
attenuate this risk during coalition warfare. During the
Gulf War the U.S. came under increasing pressure from Israel
to suppress Iraq's Scud launching capability. Israel
demanded that the U.S. deploy its best troops into Iraq on a
scud hunt or else Israeli would act unilaterally with their
own SOF. 87 Understanding the high risks of failure associated
with this type of operation (SOF deaths or U.S. POWs) , the
U.S. turned to the British and their SAS in order to initiate
a Scud hunt deep into the deserts of Iraq. 88 Eventually U.S.
SOF also became involved in the operation. Additionally,
when the U.S. desired to capture the Somali warlord, Aideed,
the British were initially approached with the possibility of
using their SAS for the operation. 89 The British declined and
For a good description of the scud hunt operations during Desert
Storm see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The
General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. (New York:
Little, Brown and Co., 1995), 227-48; and Douglas C Waller, The
Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers . (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1994), 335-51.
Richard Cheney, the Secretary of Defense during Desert Storm,
stated that he had decided that SOF should be used to appease Israeli
concerns. He directed Schwarzkopf to solve the Scud problem.
Schwarzkopf selected the British SAS over U.S. SOF for the operation.
Because Cheney approved the decision, Schwarzkopf was able to stay
focused on the conventional battle and pass the risk of possible failure
in the special operation onto another nation's soldiers. (Based on
Secretary Cheney's response to a question posed by the author during a
lecture at the Naval Post Graduate School on 5 June 1996) .
Interview with Major General Garrison on 18 April, 1996 at Ft.
Bragg North Carolina. MG Garrison was the commander of Task Force
Ranger during UNOSOM II.
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the U.S. attempted the high profile special operations
mission unilaterally and unsuccessfully.
Political risks are not limited to the strategic level
coup de main. Even in special operations campaigns there can
be great political risks as seen when the French employed the
Paratroop Corps during a counterinsurgency campaign in
Algeria. 90
Once the decision is made to launch SOF in hopes of
resolving a crisis, the tension between the desire for
control of the operation by the policy maker and the military
commander can become intense due to the great political risks
involved. Linkage to high level policy and the possibility
of great political risk means that the planning, rehearsal
and conduct of special operations are usually under the
direct supervision and approval of a high command up to and
including the state leader. Intense concern by the policy
maker translates into his desire for increased control of the
military operation and the establishment of unique chains of
command not seen with conventional forces. Short-circuited
chains of command between the policy maker and the tactical
commander, typical of strategic special operations, has the
potential for placing inappropriate ROE on SOF and their
operations. 91 Inappropriate ROE can affect the political or
This case illustrates how relaxed or non-existent ROE failed to
control operations at the tactical level, resulting in near disaster for
French statesmanship, an obviously unintended outcome.
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tactical outcome of the operation, sometimes via placing
excessive restiictions, sometimes by lack of restrictions,
and sometimes by lack of clarity in the ROE.
The ROE implications of using SOF at the political-
strategic level are not all negative. SOF do provide the
policy maker some advantages with regard to constraints and
control of military forces during the various phases of
crisis management. In a crisis situation where tight
diplomatic, strategic and tactical coupling is vital, SOF
represent a flexible instrument of military force. SOF can
remain an "ace in the hole" for policy makers as they attempt
to employ various crisis management strategies. The ability
of SOF to plan and prepare covertly for possible
implementation provides the policy maker with a military
option that avoids the control problems created by having to
prepare for combat on the tactical level while trying to
avoid war on the diplomatic level. Unlike forces deployed on
the ground for possible military action, SOF can remain a
visible, a low visibility, or an invisible military option
without the risk of tactical de-coupling which occurs when
using ROE to control conventional tactical units indirectly.
This unique characteristic of SOF allows the policy maker the
freedom to conduct diplomatic negotiations without the
concurrent concern of maintaining indirect control of
91 Additionally, in low visibility operations associated with high
political objectives abroad, the U.S. Ambassador in the country could
become involved and influence the ROE with which SOF must operate.
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tactical interactions of military units. During the Entebbe
crisis, Israel was able to prepare the commando operation
covertly while remaining engaged in diplomacy , thus
maintaining the military option without the distraction of
ensuring that tactical units remain synchronized with policy.
SOF and their ability to prepare covertly allows the policy
maker to employ crisis management strategies without the
worry of tactical de-coupling and unintended escalation.
Also, during conflicts where nonmilitary aspects of the
situation overshadow the military aspects (e.g., counterdrug
operations in South America) , SOF provide the policy maker an
indirect method to apply military force. Through its foreign
internal defense mission, which includes the training and
assistance of paramilitary and host nation military in the
pursuit of U.S. national interests, SOF can influence
outcomes well beyond the limits of direct intervention by
conventional military forces. Because SOF can be used
covertly to apply military force indirectly (e.g., training
indigenous military units) , the policy maker maintains
plausible deniability of U.S. involvement in the enemy's
sphere of influence during a crisis or conflict.
Specifically, the involvement of media and public awareness
can be delayed until well after the completion of
operations . 92
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In addition to avoiding the possibility of decoupling by
stratification and providing indirect military force in a
crisis or conflict, SOF provides a means of surgical strike
where the use of conventional forces would be overwhelming
and unacceptable in either international or domestic opinion.
As John Collins stated in his book based on his SOF
assessment report to Congress
:
Special operations often are employable where high
profile conventional forces appear to be
politically, militarily, or economically
inappropriate. Small, self-reliant, readily
deployable units that capitalize on speed,
surprise, audacity, and deception may sometimes
accomplish missions in ways that minimize risks of
escalation and concurrently maximize returns
compared with orthodox applications of military
power, which normally emphasize mass. 93
Controlling collateral damage becomes a paramount concern of
the policy maker, especially in OOTW where the political
objectives are limited and fall far short of the objectives
typical in, say, a total war. In an OOTW environment the
military and political goals tend to have a greater
divergence when compared to wartime, where both military
commanders and policy makers will likely desire the maximum
use of military force to accomplish objectives. For example,
the decision to employ Task Force Ranger in Somalia to
For more on the media and military operations, see Johanna Neumann,
Lights, Camera, War. Is Media Technology Driving International
Politics? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
93 Collins, 6.
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apprehend Aideed instead of increasing the size of the U.S.
force was a political move designed to maintain the focus on
limited objectives. The military commanders in Somalia
desired overwhelming conventional forces, including armor, in
order to ensure military success with minimal casualties.
However on the other extreme, during the Gulf War, the
political and military goals and desired means to achieve
them were more in agreement because this conflict was far
more conventional than the operations in Somalia.
Many times concern about suffering negative
international and domestic public opinion when using military
force leads policy makers toward restrictive ROE in order to
reduce the collateral damage of a military action. The
policy maker selects SOF as a surgical instrument of military
force rather than massive conventional units because of this
concern for minimizing collateral damage. 94 Even when SOF are
selected as the military option the policy maker may feel
compelled to refine the already surgical aspects of a special
operation further by limiting SOF ' s use of force. This
attempt to fine tune an operation, which by nature is already
a limited collateral damage option, can result in tactical
failure of special operations or an increase in casualties.
94 FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces emphasizes that
SOF will operate inder legal and political constraints, such as less
than optimal ROE, when compared to the employment of conventional
forces. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, Doctrine for Special
Operations Forces, (Washington D.C: Dept . of the Army, 1990), 1-10.
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This type of ROE problem was seen in the Paitilla airfield
operation where four U.S. Navy SEALS were killed partly due
to restrictive ROE placed on an already surgical military
operation. 95
C . THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
SOF not only exhibit unique characteristics in terms of
political utility on the strategic level, but also in terms
of military utility in the execution of a field campaign on
the operational level of conflict. SOF are an essential
element of strategy for a military commander, as they
represent a versatile military force capable of doing the
unexpected. SOF can provide the military planner flexibility
and a measure of cost effectiveness in many situations due to
their unique characteristics. As a force multiplier they can
have disproportionally great effects against enemy forces and
installations. 96 They provide the commander force projection
beyond friendly lines for either offensive or defensive
objectives. Offensively, SOF can scout the battlefield for
conventional units, train resistance groups or conduct raids
on enemy lines of communications to facilitate an advance. 97
95 The circumstances will be examined in detail in Chapter IV.
For a concise summary of SOF capabilities see Steven Lambakins,
"Forty Selected Men Can Shake the World: The Contributions of Special
Operations to Victory," Comparative Strategy 13 no. 2, (April/June
1994), 211-221.
Many early examples include the raiding tactics of Lord Cochrane
which might have eliminated the need for, or at least substantially
improved, the Peninsular conventional war waged by Wellington for six
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Defensively, they can conduct operations behind enemy lines
to slow the advance of enemy troops while friendly forces
retreat. SOF also provide a rapid response capability to the
policy maker ar.d strategic commander.
SOF can be quickly deployed to a hostile operating area
providing an immediate U.S. military presence while
conventional troops prepare to deploy. SOF can also provide
quick response combat search and rescue to locate and return
downed pilots., thus avoiding potential problems and
liabilities associated with having friendly POWs in enemy
hands
.
As on the strategic political level, concerns for risk
on the part of the senior military commanders are translated
through the ROE and can affect the proper employment of SOF
in support of conventional forces. Failing to understand the
requirements for the success of special operations and
imposing conventional force ROE restrictions on SOF can lead
to their failure and reduce the impact of their contributions
to the conventional campaign. Limitations may be imposed on
SOF because of the concern for maintaining strategic surprise
during the campaign. SOF teams, if compromised behind enemy
lines, might alert enemy forces of possible friendly
objectives. Also, the translation of political objectives
into tactical ROE by senior military commanders and their
years. Another example is the effective use of special operations




staffs at each level in the chain of command may further
restrict how SOF operations are conducted. This becomes
amplified in the OOTW environment where emphasis is usually
placed on minimizing collateral damage.
D . THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
This section looks at the tactical requirements
necessary for SOF to succeed once a policy maker or senior
military strategist decides to employ them. The political,
military and legal considerations which establish the ROE can
complicate the conduct of special operations at the tactical
level. By the very nature of SOF and their requirements for
success, the FOE will have a proportionally greater effect on
their employment in pursuit of political objectives than on
conventional forces. Historically, most successful special
operations were conducted under decentralized control with
few ROE considerations . The SOF commander strives to
maintain maximum control over his operation in order to
ensure military success and minimal casualties.
What makes special operations unique on the tactical
level? At this level, special operations are inherently
offensive operations
.
98 Although SOF may be employed as part
of a strategic defensive, on the tactical level they still
conduct purely offensive operations, that is, using
While special operations are usually offensive at the tactical
level, offensive tactical operations can be conducted as part of a
larger defensive campaign.
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initiative, movement, and surprise attacks. In nearly all
missions, special operations forces conduct offensive
missions against defended positions with enemy troops in a
defensive posture. As Clausewitz states:
The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically
stronger than the offense. [It] contributes
resisting power, the ability to preserve and
protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has a
negative aim, that of resisting the enemy's
will... if we are to mount an offensive to impose
our will, we must develop enough force to overcome
the inherent superiority of the enemy's defense."
The way special operations succeed is to use methods which
provide a force multiplier in combat operations. Commander
Bill McRaven coined the term "relative superiority" to
describe the concept of establishing force multipliers. The
"superiority" is achieved through SOF ' s ability to gain
superior, if transitory, combat power. 100 This concept refers
to the ability and necessity of SOF to conduct operations in
such a way as to achieve a virtual superiority or decisive
advantage in power and numbers over an enemy. Relative
superiority is short lived and must be "achieved at the
99 Clausewitz, pp. xxx, 358
100 McRaven ' s term "relative superiority" could more accurately be
called "transitory combat power." FM 31-2 0, p. 1-6 states: "In
contrast to conventional forces, SOF cannot hope to bring overwhelming
combat power against a target except at the lowest tactical level. They
do not normally seek dominance in size of force or firepower. Instead,
SOF focus on selecting and applying sufficient military power to
accomplish the mission without adverse collateral effects. The
application of minimum force is dangerous, but SOF commanders must
sometimes accept the higher risk associated with not massing in the
conventional sense." (emphasis added) The term transitory combat power
will be used in subsequent chapters.
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pivotal moment in an engagement." 101 Surprise and speed are
essential to providing SOF a decisive, but temporary
advantage upon initial enemy engagement. According to
McRaven, relative superiority "must be sustained in order to
guarantee victory." 102 This can be accomplished through the
perseverance and courage of the SOF members or by follow-on
conventional reinforcements. Additionally, McRaven states
that once relative superiority is lost it is difficult, if
not impossible to regain because SOF will be outnumbered and
cannot be easily reinforced. This will be seen in the Task
Force Ranger raid.
McRaven identifies six principles of special operations
which must be adhered to if relative superiority is to be
achieved. These six principles are simplicity, security,
repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. 103 Each of these
principles are necessary if special operations are to have a
101 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations
Warfare. (Navato: Presidio Press, 1995), 4.
102 Ibid., p. 5
103 While discussing the requirements for an increased probability for
success in specie.1 operations, the variables of leadership and luck must
be addressed. Leaders such as Major Rogers of Roger's Rangers or T.E.
Lawrence were highly instrumental to the success of special operations.
Great leaders create opportunities for success due to their ability to
lead by example, invent new tactics and remain focused on the critical
objectives. On the other hand, the variable of luck can subject a
perfectly planned mission to the friction of war and completely unravel
what should have been a certain success. As Clausewitz explained, "In
the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game
of cards." (Clausewitz, 86). The ROE have little influence on these two
variables but their importance in special operations must not be
underestimated.
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reasonable probability of success. 104 Each of these
principles can be affected by the ROE that either political
or military leaders impose on SOF in the conduct of their
missions. Because the ROE have an effect on these
fundamental principles of SOF, they in turn have an effect on
SOF ' s ability to achieve a decisive advantage and to meet
military and political objectives necessary for mission
success
.
Simplicity, according to McRaven, is the ability of a
planner to limit the number of moving parts in an operation.
The more complex special operations become the more likely
they are to fail. The ROE affect this principle when they
impose restrictions on the use of force. For example, if the
political objective requires a severe limit on collateral
damage, then the SOF planner must add more steps to an
otherwise simple plan thus increasing the complexity, the
chances for mission failure and the risk to the men
conducting the operation.
Security is essential to the success of special
operations. 105 Because SOF require the element of surprise to
104 rp^g theory of special operations which McRaven creates is useful
for analyzing special operations on the tactical level of analysis.
While he states all six principles are required for success, the theory
should be considered probabilistic rather than absolute, that is chances
are favorable, not guaranteed, for success if these six principles are
followed. Exceptions to this theory exist, but as with any theory there
will be exceptions. His theory is used for my analysis as it represents
the best tactical level theory of special operations created thus far.
105 FM 31-20, the Army doctrine for special operations, states
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succeed, security during planning is critical to mission
success. In sustained multinational operations, such as in
Somalia, security can become difficult. In Somalia portions
of the ROE were shared with other nations and some
information on 'SOF missions had to be provided for
coordination, support and the prevention of fratricide. This
situation presented enormous possibilities for security
compromises and potential mission failure. Task Force Ranger
lost strategic surprise in Somalia because it became common
knowledge where and how they were deployed.
Repetition, or the ability to conduct detailed
rehearsals, is another vital principle of special operations.
Even the simplest plan on paper can become complex and
confusing when executed. Repetition through rehearsals
ensure that each member knows his role and that the plan is
feasible. Because the team rehearses sometimes for weeks or
even months for a specific mission, the conditions assumed
for the operating environment are critical. While conducting
these rehearsals, the team must learn what ROE will allow
them to use the tactics and weapons required for executing a
carefully created plan. The ROE can have a detrimental
effect if, once the mission is launched in the actual combat
environment, the ROE become unexpectedly restrictive. The
"In SO, security is often a dominant consideration, rather
that a supporting consideration as is often the case in
conventional operations."
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chances for mission failure will increase as well as the risk
to the personnel
.
Surprise is a straightforward concept in special
operations, yet vital. It is fundamental to achieving
relative superiority. Surprise can be in the form of
strategic, tactical or doctrinal surprise. 106 The advantages
gained by the use of strategic, tactical and doctrinal
surprise can be compromised if the ROE are too restrictive.
For example in some situations, such as Operation Just Cause
in Panama or Urgent Fury in Grenada, the ROE required U.S.
forces to identify themselves or provide warning before
moving onto a target. Restrictive ROE, which affect the
ability of SOF to gain the advantage of surprise, can be
detrimental to the success of special operations.
Speed is of the essence for the conduct of special
operations. As McRaven states:
In a special operations mission, the concept of
speed is simple. Get to your objective as fast as
possible. Any delay will expand your area of
vulnerability and decrease your opportunity to
achieve relative superiority. Most special
operations involve direct, and in most cases
immediate, contact with the enemy, where minutes
106 strategic surprise involves concealing the fact that SOF are even
operating in the area or theater of conflict. Tactical surprise is
achieved when the enemy is in a fortified position and in a defensive
mode, yet does not know exactly when, where or how he will be attacked.
Special operations, according to their joint doctrine, "strike the enemy
at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared." The
third form of surprise is doctrinal surprise. Achieving doctrinal
surprise requires that SOF use innovative and unconventional techniques
and approaches against the enemy.
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and seconds spell the difference between success
and failure. 107
Any ROE which restrict tactical movement or lengthen the time
on target makes the unit vulnerable to defeat by a reaction
force. For example, most SOF utilize claymore mines or
booby-traps as area security during the conduct of operations
because of their inferior numbers. These defenses provide
SOF an advantage in overcoming a reaction force. Many times
conventional ROE will restrict the use of such devices and
thus create a greater potential for mission failure or excess
loss of life. SOF operate as small, lightly armed units
which must rely on both surprise and speed in order to
succeed.
Purpose is the last principle of special operations that
McRaven identities. This is the understanding of the mission
and dedication to its successful completion by the members of
the team. This is a key principle of special operations and
results from the selective screening and demanding training
which all special forces personnel endure. If the ROE create
a mission statement which is unclear, or overly solicitous of
the enemy's capabilities, then the SOF members will lose
focus on the critical aspects vital to success of the
mission. Additionally, restrictive ROE emphasizing the
importance of limiting collateral damage, can give the
107 McRaven, 19
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special operators the impression that they are being sent on
a mission which is not as dangerous as combat. An over-
emphasis on collateral damage can create a non-aggressive
mind-set which undermines the sense of purpose required for a
small unit to fight outnumbered and succeed at minimal cost.
In addition to the principles discussed above, which are
required for success of special operations on the tactical
level, there remain two other tactical distinctions between
SOF and GPF which aggravate the effects of inappropriate ROE
on achieving success during SOF operations. First, in nearly
all instances where military force is employed as an
instrument of policy, SOF is among the first, if not
literally the first, forces sent in harm's way. This
characteristic of SOF is embodied in the command logo of
USSOCOM: The tip of a spear. Being the first military force
to enter the hcstile environment of enemy territory carries
with it the many problems associated with peacetime and edge-
of-war ROE.
Secondly, the force first sent into action usually has
to deploy into a hostile and uncertain environment suddenly
with little or .no notice for preparations. The lack of
notice will mean a hastily drawn up set of ROE, and hence all
of the problems associated with the translation from theory
to reality discussed in Chapter II.
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Many times the policy makers will have not yet
specifically defined the goals or objectives when sending SOF
in as "advisors" or even when they are already deployed as an
instrument of force. This is when the ROE will not be firmly
established for the particular situation. Even if they are
perfectly drafted, there remains little time for their proper
dissemination and comprehension through the chain of command
down to the individual SOF operator. Being the first in
harm's way also gives SOF the dubious opportunity of being
the first to learn of any ROE problems during live combat
operations. There remains the potential for SOF to correct
inappropriate ROE by rewriting them in blood for follow-on
conventional forces.
SOF regularly find themselves involved in the area of
operations during the transition from peace to war in the
beginning of a military build up, as seen in Vietnam or The
Gulf War. They also remain in areas at the conclusion of
combat in order to continue foreign internal defense
missions. Both of these transitional periods create problems
for SOF with regard to the ROE. Typically, in these times of
transition, the ROE lag behind the changing operational
environment, as policy makers are either conducting crisis
management to prevent conflict or conducting peace
negotiations in order to end conflict.
86
Additionally, SOF usually find themselves in difficult
geographical situations when compared to GPF. SOF sometimes
operate hundreds of miles behind enemy lines in small numbers
in order to conduct operations such as preparing the
battlefield, raids, pilot rescues or reconnaissance. Not
only will SOF operate far behind the forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA) , but many times will find themselves alone
and unsupported in enemy territory long before conventional
forces have even established a presence in an area. Enemy
contact and the ROE implications take on a whole new meaning
in these situations. What happens if a SOF operator is deep
behind enemy lines and is discovered by a civilian? This and
many other "what ifs" must be pre-planned by SOF in the
conduct of deep reconnaissance. A conventional soldier could
be in a similar situation in which he is compromised by a
civilian when on an operation, but the fact remains that the
SOF soldier will have to make his decision in tougher
circumstances, often hundreds of miles within enemy territory
without the support of local conventional forces or the
ability to quickly move to the friendly side of the FEBA.
E. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, SOF operations can be broken down into
coup de main or protracted campaigns, at either the
strategic, operational or tactical level. At the strategic
level of analysis, SOF ' s unique political and military
utility set them apart from general purpose forces and
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increase both the military and political risk associated with
the outcome of special operations. The unique
characteristics of SOF change the nature of the political and
strategic military concerns which in turn influence the
creation of the ROE in the conduct of special operations.
At the tactical level, SOF operate with small forces and
require relative superiority in combat power in order to
complete operations successfully. The requirements for
tactical success in special operations are considerably
different than those of conventional units and consequently
the ROE which govern these operations must be considered.
SOF require a temporary advantage in order to successfully
complete missions. Six principles combine to allow for a
decisive advantage: simplicity, security, repetition,
surprise, speed and purpose. Each of these principles can be
affected by the ROE by which special operations forces must
conduct their missions. If ROE affect any one on these
principles, they can in turn reduce the possibility of
achieving the transitory combat power advantage and become a
cause for mission failure or unnecessary lose of life.
Additionally, the tactical environment in which SOF
operate must also be considered. Being first into the
battlefield or deep behind enemy lines without support
requires that care be exercised to ensure the ROE are
consistent with mission accomplishment and force survival
rather than a threat to either.
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The distinctions made in this review of the theory of
special operations are important in order to allow for an
understanding of why special operations are most sensitive to
inappropriate ROE, and how the ROE designed for general




IV. PANAMA: THE PAITILLA AIRPORT OPERATION
A. INTRODUCTION
As stated in the introduction, many secondary sources
which examine the SEAL operation at Paitilla airfield point
to the restrictive ROE as a major cause of the casualties
suffered. 108 They imply a simple cause and effect
relationship between the established ROE for the operation
and the four deaths and nine injuries sustained by the SEALs
.
A closer examination of this operation reveals a more complex
relationship between the political objectives and the final
ROE used by the participants in the actual operation. I
present this operation as a case in which a great concern for
minimizing collateral damage filtered down the chain of
command in the form of ever tighter implicit ROE. The higher
than anticipated casualties sustained on this operation
occurred not only because of the written ROE given to the
SEALs, but also because of the inferred and implicit ROE.
Inferred ROE resulted from the interpretation and translation
of the written ROE by the various levels of command and was
influenced by the great concern at all levels for the •
^-®° Examples of books which point to restrictive ROE include: Malcom
McConnell, JUST CAUSE, The Real Story of America' s High-Tech Invasion of
Panama, (New York NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Thomas Donnelly,
Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Storming of
Panama, (New York NY: Lexington Books, 1991); and Orr Kelly, Brave Men
Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALS, (Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 1992) .
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minimization of collateral damage. The organizational
friction discussed in chapter two influenced the
interpretation and translation of the ROE at each level in
the chain of command causing the implicit ROE to become
increasingly restrictive.
The objective of this chapter is in no way to point
fingers or lay blame, but to determine in what way the ROE
developed during this operation and the concern for
collateral damage contributed to a greater than necessary
number of casualties. Additionally, this chapter examines
how using SOF, rather than conventional forces, magnified the
consequences of inappropriate implicit ROE. This chapter is
divided into three sections. The first section provides the
necessary background on Panama and identifies the political
goals and military objectives of operation Just Cause. This
section concludes with a discussion of the ROE that were
developed to achieve the political goals and military
objectives and why SOF were selected over conventional forces
to conduct the operation. The second section examines the
planning and execution of the SEAL raid at Paitilla airfield
in terms of the ROE, both written and otherwise. This
section examines how the ROE affected the principles required
for success in special operations; and how this in turn
contributed to higher casualties. The last section provides
conclusions and additional insights gained from this case.
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B . BACKGROUND
1 . The Situation in Panama
America's primary interests in Panama included the
security of the Panama Canal and the safety of the American
soldiers and citizens residing in Panama (see Appendix G, Map
1) . The level of threat to these and other U.S. interests
posed by the Noriega regime escalated until the U.S. finally
invaded the country in December 1989. The roots of this
invasion can be traced back over the previous decade with the
rise to power of General Manuel Noriega. In the early 1970s,
increasing anti-American violence and instability in Panama
led to negotiations between President Carter and the de facto
leader of Panama, General Omar Torrijos. These negotiations
resulted in implementation of the Panama Canal treaties on
October 1, 1979. By 1983, when Torrijos died suddenly in a
plane crash, Noriega had risen to power as Torrijos'
intelligence chief. With Torrijos dead, Noriega became the
commander of the National Guard and prevented the successful
transition of the country to democracy.
Noriega established the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) and
gained control of all aspects of Panamanian business and
government. He eventually became increasingly involved in
non-official endeavors including arms trading, money
laundering, drug trafficking and employment as a paid agent
of the CIA. As his illegal activities increased and became
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more flagrant, the U.S. began to alienate him. 109 In 1987,
Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, the former PDF Deputy
Commander, publicly exposed Noriega's activities and accused
him of involvement in Torrijos' death, rigging the 1984
elections, and the brutal murder of Hugo Spadafora, Noriega's
political opponent. Noriega's ruthless repression of the
resulting public demonstrations also encouraged the U.S. to
oppose his leadership. In 1988 two Florida grand juries
indicted Noriega on criminal drug trafficking charges. 110
Finally, on March 16, 1988 a coup attempt was made to oust
Noriega, but he used his troops to crush the attempt and
quiet the violent protesters.
Relations between the U.S. and Panama continued to
deteriorate and U.S. citizens living in Panama came under
increasing harassment by the PDF. Between February 1988 and
May 1989, over 600 treaty violations occurred. 111 Most of
these violations were the work of the PDF and included
illegal searches, detention, and beatings of U.S. citizens.
109 In 1985, John Poindexter, the Nation Security Advisor for
President Reagan, and Elliot Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs, became concerned with Noriega's activities
and formally warned him that the U.S. looked unfavorably upon his
actions. See Operation Just Cause, Panama. (Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office: 1995), 6 (Here after
referred to as JC3 History)
.
110 For a chronology including these indictments, see Bernard E.
Trainor, "Gaps in Vital Intelligence Hampered U.S. Troops," New York
Times, December 21, 1989, A21.
111 See Susan G. Horwitz, "Indications and Warning Factors," in
Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama edited by Bruce W.
Watson and Peter G. Tsouras . (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), 52.
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In one 1988 case, a U.S. service man was beaten and locked in
the trunk of his car while his wife was beaten and raped. 112
The situation was beginning to get out of hand.
On 7 May 1989, elections were held in Panama. Despite
transparent election fraud conducted by Noriega, his
candidate, Carlos Dupue, was clearly defeated by the
opponent, Guillermo Endara. With the support of Noriega,
Dupue declared victory anyway. Panamanians filled the
streets in protest. Noriega's Dignity Battalions suppressed
the protesters and went after Endara and his vice president,
seriously injuring both of them. 113 Endara looked to the U.S.
for assistance, but nothing significant was forthcoming.
On 3 October 1989, Major Moises Giroldi, the Chief of
Security at the Commandancia (PDF Headquarters) , led soldiers
of the PDF in an attempt to persuade Noriega to step down.
Unfortunately, the rebels' plan was not thorough. They
merely sought to force Noriega to resign (as opposed to
exiling or executing him) and install the legitimate
President, Endara. 114 While the rebels negotiated with
Noriega, they requested U.S. assistance. Washington was
caught by surprise and saw the attempt as half baked, while
the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was unprepared to take
112 Ibid.
113
"Panama- -Chronology of a Crisis," Reuters (December 20, 1989).
114
"Coup Leader Barred Giving Us Noriega, " Washington Post, October
10, 1989.
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any immediate action in this type of situation. The new
Commander in Chief of the Southern Command (CINCSOUTH)
,
General Thurman, was distrustful of Giroldi and his plan.
Thurman stated that the plan was "ill-conceived, ill-
motivated and ill-led." 115 When it was clear the rebels had
no U.S. support, the 6th and 7th Rifle Companies of the Macho
de Monte flew over U.S. forces blocking the west side of
Panama City. With mechanized units from Battalion 2 000, they
closed in on the Rebels. As a result, the rebels surrendered
and were eventually tortured and executed. The coup was a
miserable failure, partly because of the lack of a quick U.S.
response
.
By December, 1989 the situation in Panama was dismal.
Panamanians were protesting against Noriega remaining in
power, and he continued to antagonize the U.S. On 15
December Noriega was named the "chief of the government" and
the "maximum leader of national liberation" by the Panamanian
National Assembly. The Assembly also announced that "the
Republic of Panama is declared to be in a state of war." 116
This came as no surprise, considering Noriega appointed all
members of the Assembly. With these declarations,
confrontations between U.S. and PDF troops increased as
115 JCS History, 15.
116 See "Noriega Appointed 'Maximum Leader'," Washington Post,
December 16, 1989, A21; and "Panama Assembly names Noriega Government
Chief," Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1989, A4
.
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Noriega's loyalists became more aggressive toward U.S.
servicemen and their families. The culminating point was
reached when PDF guards fired their AK-47 ' s at a car
containing four U.S. servicemen. One Marine, First
Lieutenant Paz, died as a result of the attack. Next, the
same guards detained a Navy officer and his wife who had just
witnessed the Paz shooting. Both were detained for hours
while being harassed and beaten. 117
President Bush was notified of the situation, and on 17
December gave authorization to execute operation Blue Spoon,
the plan to invade Panama, with the words: "Okay let's do it.
The hell with it." 118 Three days later the invasion of Panama
began under a new name, operation Just Cause.
2 . The Political Objectives
In his speech delivered to the American people on 2
December 1989, President Bush stated that the U.S. had four
goals for the military action in Panama:
The goals of the United States have been to
safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend
democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and
to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal
Treaty. 119
117 See "U.S. Officer, Wife Beaten in Panama," Los Angeles Times,
December 18, 198?'. Al ; and "Fighting in Panama: Six Days Leading to the
Attack," New York Times, December 21, 1989, A21.
118 JCS History, 30.
119 George Bush, "Panama: The Decision to Use Force," Vital Speeches
of the Day 56, no. 7 (January 15, 1990), 194.
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The first goal, safeguarding the lives of Americans, was most
important. At the time of the invasion there were
approximately 3 0,000 U.S. citizens residing in Panama.
Additionally, 142 U.S. defense sites were located in
Panama. 120 The safety of U.S. citizens and facilities was
clearly in jeopardy as Noriega had been appointed "maximum
leader," declared a state of war against the U.S., and
established a pattern of brutalizing U.S. citizens living in
Panama. Secretary of State Baker, in an interview with the
New York Times pointed to Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter and Article 21 of the Organization of American States
Charter which supported the U.S.'s decision to use
appropriate measures in defense of U.S. citizens and
facilities. 121 Additionally, in an era of terrorism and
hostage taking, demonstrating strength when U.S. citizens
were threatened served to strengthen respect for U.S. resolve
and so deter future aggression against U.S. interests.
The second stated goal, to defend democracy in Panama,
fit the U.S. National Security Strategy of promoting liberal
democracy. Noriega had failed to recognize popularly elected
leaders and had resorted to violent repression of citizens
who resisted his rule. Additionally, Noriega became hostile
toward the U.S. and had turned to Cuba, Nicaragua and Libya
120 JCS History, 29.
121
"Fighting in Panama: The Pentagon; Excerpts From Briefings on
U.S. Military Action in Panama," New York Times, 21 December 89, A19
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for both economic and military assistance. Cuba and
Nicaragua provided communist bloc weapons and military-
instructors which resulted in the creation of the Dignity-
Battalions. Noriega used the Dignity Battalions for
intelligence collection and population control. Libya paid
$20 million in exchange for Noriega allowing Panama to be
used as a coordination base for insurgent and terrorist
activities in South America. 122
The third goal, to combat drug trafficking, placed
Noriega in the sights of the U.S. war on drugs. As stated
earlier, Noriega was heavily involved in drug trafficking and
had close ties to Colombian drug cartels. Prior to the
invasion, federal grand juries had indicted Noriega on
numerous counts of involvement in the drug trade. Secretary
of Defense, Dick Cheney, modified DoD Directive 5525.5 in
order to allow the use of U.S. troops to bring Noriega to
justice. Until this modified DoD directive, the Posse
Comitatus Act and title 10 of the United States Code
prohibited the use of military troops to enforce civil laws.
The directive did not specifically apply to enforcing U.S.
civil law outside of the U.S. territories. Cheney's modified
DoD Directive 5525.5 allowed for the legal use of federal
122 JCS History, 6. This publication cites various top secret
intelligence messages as evidence of these activities.
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military forces to apprehend Noriega in Panama for trial in
the U.S. 123
The final stated goal was security of the Panama Canal.
The canal was important both for commercial shipping and for
the mobility of U.S. Naval forces. Noriega's gravitation
toward Cuba, Nicaragua and Libya; his heavy involvement in
drug trafficking; his failure to recognize popularly elected
leaders; and his hostility toward the U.S. together
threatened the security of the canal . In the control of a
hostile and unpredictable government, the security of the
canal would be in jeopardy, especially after the agreed 1999
turn over to Panama
.
While these represented the stated political objectives
justifying U.S. intervention into Panama, there remained
other political objectives which influenced how the military
intervention would be conducted. First, with the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the U.S. stood alone as a superpower in a
new post-Cold War world. How the U.S. intervened in Panama
might set the tone throughout the world, but especially in
South America. The U.S. was concerned with how a military
invasion would sit with both domestic and international
opinion.- Violating the sovereignty of another nation through
unilateral intervention could be a disaster for the U.S.
reputation as the world's sole superpower. Excessive force
123 Ibid., 43-4.
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resulting in destruction of property or the death of innocent
civilians would bring harsh domestic and international
criticism down upon the U.S. The long term goal was to
maintain good relations with Panama well beyond the 1999
canal turn over date. Acting so as to minimize both the
threat to U.S. forces and the destruction inflicted on the
Panamanians and their country would be difficult. Of course,
covert operations conducted by the CIA could eliminate the
risk to U.S. troops. Under President Reagan this option was
explored, but the Senate Intelligence Committee stopped it
for fear that a CIA-sponsored overthrow of Noriega might lead
to his death and accusations of assassinating a foreign
leader. 124 Secondly, the U.S. desired to make up for its
failure to support the October 3 coup attempt adequately.
The administration was under considerable domestic criticism
for apparently bumbling of the October 3 coup attempt. Both
the public and Congress were critical of the slow U.S.
response to the rebel call for U.S. assistance. 125
3 . Military Objectives
As the political situation deteriorated in Panama, the
military planning began for possible contingencies in order
to protect U.S. interests. Planning began as early as
124 Horwitz, 51
12 5 See Molly Moore and Patrick Tyler, "Strike Force Struck Out, " The
Washington Post, 23 December 1989, Al
.
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November of 1987. 126 These plans evolved under various code
names. A series of early plans were fittingly called
Elaborate Maze. Later, a collection of four separate plans
which covered a wide range of pre-combat, combat and post-
combat operations was developed under the code name Prayer
Book. Blue Spoon was the code name for the combat phase of
operations within Prayer Book. Blue Spoon was renamed Just
Cause the night of the operation because General Lindsey,
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command
(USCINCSOC)
,
proposed that when troops told their
grandchildren about the invasion it would sound better. 127
The initial strategy under USCINCSOUTH, General Frederick F.
Woerner, would gradually increased the number of U.S. forces
in Panama. This build up was intended to discourage Noriega
from interfering with U.S. forces and the Panama Canal, and
perhaps persuade the PDF to attempt another coup d'etat.
However, this approach failed to deter Noriega, and he became
increasingly belligerent toward the U.S. Unhappy with this
strategy, President Bush put General Maxwell R. Thurman in
charge of the Southern Command in place of General Woerner.
General Thurman had a reputation for vigor,
aggressiveness and drive. Once he became. CINCSOUTH, he was
able to secure Lieutenant General Carl Stiner to serve as his
126 Donnelly, 17. The JCS History states that planning began after
the federal grand jury indictments on February 1988. See JCS History, 7
127 JCS History, 32.
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Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander for the operation. Under
new leadership, Blue Spoon became a plan based on surprise
rather than on a slow build up aimed at either deterrence or
coercive diplomacy- The new plan involved deploying forces
quickly in either a U.S. initiated deliberate action or in
response to a "trigger event" that required U.S.
intervention. 123 Thurman did not want his plan to revolve
around reacting to another ill-conceived PDF coup attempt.
If the U.S. military was to be deployed, it would be on his
terms
.
Three options with various force levels were considered
in this surprise plan. 129 The first option involved going
after Noriega in a snatch operation conducted solely by SOF.
This option, however, would leave the PDF intact. The second
option used SOF to apprehend Noriega and rescue hostages,
while forces already stationed in Panama would seize key
Panamanian facilities, interdict PDF units and protect the
canal facilities. These two options together could not
guarantee that all the political objectives would be
achieved. Each posed great risks of becoming undesirable,
protracted military operations. Protracted operations could
128 See ciNCSOUTH OPORD 90-1, pp. 4-9; JCS History, 18; and Lorenzo
Crowell, "The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, The Adequacy
of Intelligence and its Success as a Joint Operation, " in Operation Just
Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama edited by Bruce W. Watson and
Peter G. Tsouras . (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), 68.
129 Ibid., 68. Also see JCS History, pp. 18 and 28.
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result in large amounts of property damage and civilian
casualties; domestic and international public criticism; and
Panamanian resentment toward the U.S.
The third option was similar to the second, but included
U.S. -based forces and the execution of the plan with
overwhelming force. Decisive, overwhelming force would
significantly decrease the duration of the intervention, as
Noriega and his supporters would clearly see that they had no
realistic chance for survival, other than surrender. Even if
Noriega escaped, his support base, comprised mainly of PDF,
would be eliminated. With the PDF dismantled, reconstruction
and placement of the elected government after the
intervention could be expedited. Overwhelming force would
also convince the Panamanians that their best interests would
be served in supporting the U.S. and the popularly elected
government, rather than Noriega. Additionally, a decisive
military move of this scale executed with surprise would




To make this plan of overwhelming force succeed was
ensuring that the large number of troops accomplished the
military objectives without much collateral damage. During
the planning, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stressed the
need to minimize casualties in executing the operation. 131
130 JCS History 29.
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With this advice in mind, the military planners fine tuned
the Blue Spoon contingency plan so that all the political
objectives would be met while minimizing damage to the people
and property of Panama. This planning resulted in the
creation and release of Operational Order 1-90 (OPORD 1-90)
by General Thurman on 30 October 1989. This OPORD stated the
Joint Task Force mission and execution as follows:
Mission: When directed by NCA, through CJCS,
USCINCSO conducts joint offensive operations to
neutralize the PDF and other combatants, as
required, so as to protect U.S. lives, property,
and interests in Panama and to assure the full
exercise of rights accorded by international law
and the U.S.- Panamanian treaties.
Execution: To accomplish [the] objectives
U.S. forces must: Protect U.S. lives and property;
exercise U.S. treaty rights and responsibilities;
defend the canal; be prepared to support Panamanian
initiatives with military operations; and be
prepared on order to capture Noriega, capture key
Noriega accomplices, fix the PDF, and neutralize
the PDF. Additionally, U.S. forces must be
prepared to rescue any [U.S. citizens] detained by
the PDF and to conduct law and order
operations . . . 132
When the specifics for operation Blue Spoon were briefed to
President Bush on the afternoon of 17 December 1989, his
first questions were:
Would the plan work? Did it have to be that big?
How many casualties would there be? How much
damage would be done? What would be the diplomatic
consequences throughout Latin America? 133
131 Ibid., 18.
13 2 See ciNCSOUTH OPORD 1-90, 4.
133 JCS Historv, 29.
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General Thurman, General Stiner and their staffs had
anticipated these Presidential concerns. The political
objectives would be achieved using overwhelming force, while
minimizing collateral damage. The rules of engagement (ROE)
were to be the key in accomplishing the objectives without
inflicting heavy collateral damage, which could become a
lightning rod for international and domestic criticism.
4 . The Resulting ROE for Operation Just Cause
OPORD 1-90 contained very specific ROE for the use of
military force during the intervention. The OPORD ROE were
divided into two sections (for the complete ROE contained in
OPORD 1-90 see Appendix A) . The first section included the
usual generic ROE, such as direction to conduct military
operations in accordance with international law of armed
conflict, the soldiers' inherent right to self defense, and
the treatment of prisoners. The second section contained
specific ROE for the intervention. It identified the PDF,
regular forces, the Dignity Battalions, Transito police,
Centurion police, and the Doberman Riot police as hostile
forces. It stipulated that all PDF, armed civilians with the
PDF, PDF vehicles, bases, aircraft, boats, and equipment
could be attacked and destroyed. Exceptions included marked
medical personnel and equipment. Unidentified commercial
aircraft could not be attacked unless carrying enemy forces.
The decision to use Riot control agents (RCA) could not be
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made by commanders below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or
Commander
.
Lieutenant General Stiner, as the Joint Task Force
Commander, issued Operational Plan 90-2 (OPLAN 90-2) which
included the specific tactical direction required in order to
implement the broad military objectives of OPORD 1-90. OPLAN
90-2 included even more specific ROE for the use of military
force. General Stiner' s guidance was that "commanders would
ensure that troops used the minimal force necessary to
accomplish military objectives." 134 Specific approval by a
ground commander of Lieutenant Colonel (Commander) or above
was required before using heavy weapons in populated areas. 135
Heavy weapons included: artillery, mortars, naval gunfire,
tube-launched rockets, tank main guns, helicopter gunships,
and AC-130 gunships. The SEALs were planning on having
three types of these heavy weapons available for the
operation at Paitilla airfield: mortars, tube-launched
rockets and an AC-130 gunship.
As shown above, the deep concerns about minimizing
collateral damage were emphasized at each level in the
defense organization. Translating broad political and
military guidance into tactical level ROE resulted in rather
134 Ibid., 23. Also see Crowell, 80-2.
135 Ibid. Alsr see General Stiner 's comments at a Pentagon Press
Brief on February 26, 1990 which were published in "The Architect of
'Just Cause' Lt Gen Carl Stiner Explains His Panama Plan," The Army
Times (March 12, 1990), 68.
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restrictive ROE. 136 Below General Stiner were several more
layers of command. Each layer had a commander and staff
which had to interpret and translate the OPLAN 9 0-2 ROE into
a language which could be understood and used for their
specific missions. This included Task Force (TF) White, the
Naval Special Warfare element of the Joint Special Operations
Forces (JSOTF) under the JTF. The next section examines how
ROE interpretation and translation down the TF White chain of
command influenced how they planned, rehearsed and executed
their operations.
C . TASK FORCE WHITE OPERATIONS
1. TF White's Objectives
As stated earlier, the political objectives required
that Noriega be captured to face drug trafficking charges in
the U.S. and that the PDF resistance be quickly subdued. TF
White's role toward accomplishing this objective came with
two missions. 13 ' The first mission was to secure Paitilla
airfield and disable Noriega's personal jet. Eliminating
this escape route was a priority. 138 The second mission was
136 For a similar conclusion see authors noted in note 108 and the
Army Times article noted above.
137 In the early planning there were three TF White missions. The
third was an assault on Flamenco Island. This Island housed the UESAT
special forces which were loyal to Noriega. After the October 3 coup
attempt, Noriega moved these forces off the island and dispersed them
throughout Panama in order to increase his security. With the forces
off the Island, the mission to assault it was dropped.
138 Interview with Captain Tom McGrath on 21 September 1996 at
Alexandria Virginia. Captain McGrath was the Commanding Officer of SEAL
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to put three PDF patrol boats located in Balboa harbor out of
action. The focus of this section is on the Paitilla
operation as it provides the toughest test of ROE problems
associated with SOF missions. Of the two, it was more
complex and involved more problems during execution. The
Balboa harbor operation will be used to enrich analysis of
the Paitilla airfield operation with regards to ROE issues.
Because the U.S. military desired to crush all PDF
resistance quickly during the invasion, it was vital that the
PDF be denied the use of Paitilla airfield. Paitilla
airfield, located north of the Bay of Panama on the southern
coast of Panama City, was home to Noriega's personal 1earjet.
This jet, which he kept in a guarded hangar, was the only
aircraft he owned with the range to get him safely out of
Panama in an emergency. 139 Another objective at Paitilla was
to block the runway in order to prevent any aircraft from
taking off or landing. Neutralizing the airport was required
to prevent both Noriega ' s escape and its use by the PDF for
rallying reinforcements, as they had done at Tocumen airport
during the October 3 coup attempt. 140
Team Four and served as the overall commander for the Paitilla
operation. Also see CINCSOUTH OPORD 1-90, 8.
139 Interview with Commander Patrick Toohey on 20 September 1996 at
Little Creek Virginia. Commander Toohey was the Executive Officer of





Paitilla airfield was already a designated target when
the U.S. first began contemplating the use of military force
in late 1987 and early 1988. Initial plans involved using
two possible conventional approaches. The first approach
involved using conventional aircraft to crater the airfield
with bombs, rendering it unusable. The second approach
called for the Panamanian defenders to be eliminated or
scared off with aerial strafing runs followed by the
helicopter insertion of hundreds of Rangers. 141 As the
political objectives and requirements to minimize collateral
damage were solidified, these plans were considered
unacceptable. Paitilla airfield was a 3500 foot runway
running north-south within Panama City. Both the west and
east sides of the airport were heavily populated areas. On
the west lay apartment and embassy buildings and on the east
were slums and a secondary school. A major highway passed
around the northern end of the runway. A strike using
conventional forces would greatly increase the risk of
collateral damage (see Appendix G, Maps 2 and 3)
.
Planning this portion of the operation was eventually
turned over to SOF. The plan was revised to be more
surgical, in line with the political objectives. 142 Tactical
Toohey interview and Kelly, 254-5
110
surprise was deemed essential, along with the backup of an
AC-13 gunship for surgical fire support. SEALs were chosen
for the operation because they had the capability to conduct
a water insertion onto the target. 143 This was critical
because air assets were stretched beyond their limits in
order to support the fast paced and overwhelming scale of the
intervention. During the planning, any option which could
maintain surprise and not have to rely on air assets was
attractive. 144 During the early planning phase, the ROE were
rather restrictive. The plan called for the SEALs to
approach from the water and block the runway by pushing
civilian aircraft and airport vehicles onto it. To ensure
that the aircraft would stay on the runway, the SEALs planned
to cut the valve stems on the tires. Emphasis was placed on
minimizing the damage to the aircraft so they could be
returned to Panama after the intervention. Additionally,
damaging these aircraft would affect the most wealthy and
influential citizens of Panama. Noriega's learjet was also
to be disabled by cutting the tire valve stems with dikes
(wire cutters). 145 This method ensured that the extent of the
14 ^ Toohey interview. While at JSOC prior to his assignment as
Executive Officer at SEAL Team Four, Toohey was involved in the early
planning of the Paitilla operation.
143 Kelly, 255; and McConnell, 54-5.
144 McGrath interview.
145 McGrath interview. Some accounts say the SEALs were to slash the
tires (See Kelly, 262 for example) , but this is difficult as aircraft
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damage would be limited to the aircraft's inner tubes. The
plan was rehearsed numerous times as personnel within the
platoons rotated in and out of SEAL Team Four.
At this point one might question the tactic of placing
SOF on the airfield. Could the runway be denied by using
standoff weapons, such as snipers? One plan proposed placing
snipers with .50 caliber sniper rifles and rufus rounds 146 at
each end of the runway. If any aircraft attempted to land or
take off, the SEALs could shoot it down or damage it. 147
There were two problems with this approach. First, the
written ROE at the time of the operation restricted how
aircraft were to be engaged and thus eliminated this tactic.
OPORD 1-90 specifically stated:
All PDF aircraft, except medical aircraft, may be
attacked and destroyed. Unidentified and
commercial aircraft may not be attacked unless they
are carrying enemy forces. 148
Differentiating aircraft categories from a distance and at
night would be difficult for the snipers. Even more
difficult would be determining if an unidentified or
commercial aircraft was carrying enemy troops. If they
followed the written ROE, the snipers would have to allow the
tires are designed to be puncture resistant. Cutting the valve stems is
easier and provides a minimal damage result.
146 Rufus rounds are .50 caliber rounds with exploding tips designed
to penetrate hardened equipment.
147 Kelly, 255.
148 CINCSOUTH OPORD 1-90, C-l-2.
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aircraft to land and then determine if the passengers were
enemy. If upon landing, an aircraft pulled immediately into
a covered hangar to unload its passengers, enemy
identification would become impossible. Thus a stand-off
option was not thought feasible under the written ROE.
Second, snipers could be easily run off by the PDF Armored
Personnel Carriers (APCs) in the area, which would result in
mission failure. As a result, mission success would not even
be guaranteed under looser ROE should the PDF APCs arrive at
the airfield. 145
When Commander Tom McGrath became the Commanding Officer
of SEAL Team Four in November of 1988, planning and
rehearsals had been underway for months. Upon reviewing the
plan he had inherited for the operation, he was not
completely satisfied. As the owner of a small six-passenger
plane, he felt that the plan of cutting aircraft valve stems
would not guarantee success. A plane with flat tires could
still be moved. If owners or guards drinking at the Club
Union, a bar near the airfield, saw people moving their
aircraft, they would surely try to intervene or simply move
the planes back after they were in place. McGrath pushed for
the authority to destroy the planes if necessary. He met
149 Interview with Lieutenant Commander Tom Casey on 7 September 1996
at Little Creek Virginia. Lieutenant Commander Casey served as the
Platoon Commander of Gulf Platoon during the Paitilla operation. The
SEALs planned to carry AT-4 tube launched rockets in order to deal with
any PDF APCs.
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resistance from senior staff officers within General
Thurman's CINCSOUTH staff. Later, when a planning meeting
was conducted in Panama at CINCSOUTH headquarters, Commander
McGrath had a direct avenue to General Thurman and General
Downing. Once the General officers heard the planning
concerns, the ROE for actions on the airfield were loosened
up and destruction of the aircraft was allowed if absolutely
mission essential. Stern guidance remained which emphasized
that the amount of material damage should still be minimized.
The direction to cut the valve stems with dikes never
surfaced again during the planning phase, but further
restrictions originating from the staff levels would arise
once the operation commenced. 150
While Commander McGrath worked on the Paitilla
operation, Commander Norm Carley, the Commanding Officer of
SEAL Team Two, was planning for the Balboa Harbor operation.
His plans were also hampered by restrictive ROE governing
target engagement. 151 Like McGrath, he became proactive and
sought more flexibility with regard to defining what
"minimizing material damage" to the target meant. As with
the civilian aircraft, the U.S. wanted to minimize the damage
150 McGrath interview.
151 All facts related to the Balboa harbor operation were extracted
from an interview with Commander Norm Carley by the author on 2
September 1996 at Norfolk Virginia. This operation was planned to be
conducted simultaneously at H-hour with the Paitilla operation. Also
see Kelly, 252-4.
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to the three PDF patrol boats in order to return them to the
newly installed Panamanian government. Initially, the CINC '
s
staff directed the SEALs to board and seize the patrol boats.
This would ensure minimal damage to the boats, but place the
SEALs at risk, because boarding the boats and seizing them
from the PDF crew would involve close quarters combat (CQB)
.
Carley rejected this plan and proposed a subsurface combat
swimmer attack. In this type of operation, SEALs would swim
underwater using closed circuit breathing devices and attach
explosives beneath the patrol boats. Timers would be used to
detonate the explosives once the swimmers were safely out of
the area. The explosives would severely damage or sink the
boats
.
The CINC ' s staff was unfamiliar with combat swimmer
attacks and assumed that boarding and seizing the boats would
entail less risk to the SEALs than an underwater attack.
Once Carley explained that the swimmer option actually
involved less risk to the SEALs, the planners agreed but
still pushed for minimal collateral damage. The CINC ' s staff
countered with a proposal to use cables in order to tangle up
the propellers and prevent the boats from being moved or used
for escape. By replacing the explosives with cables, the
planners hoped to minimize the risk to the SEALs and still be
able to return the patrol boats to the Panamanians after the
intervention. Carley argued that this would not prevent the
boats from being used as a gun platform to fire at troop
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transports arriving from the U.S. 152 Also, the noise created
by the swimmers placing metal cables against the metal
propellers of the PBs would be excessive, and would place the
SEALs at greater risk. Nothing short of sinking the PDF
boats would be satisfactory. Commander Carley's persistence
paid off and the CINC ' s staff agreed that the mission would
be a sub-surface combat swimmer attack with enough explosives
to sink the PDF boats. Unlike the Paitilla airport
operation, further restrictions did not develop prior to
commencement of the swimmer attack.
At SEAL Team Four, rehearsals and planning continued for
the Paitilla operation. Even though the requirement to cut
valve stems had been successfully addressed, the goal of
minimal collateral damage persisted on the basis that most of
the Panamanians would be friendly and supportive of U.S.
troops during the intervention. It was also believed that
the PDF were not loyal to Noriega, and would quickly abandon
him when faced with overwhelming U.S. military power. 153 It
was supposed that the PDF would realign quickly with the new
government. This mind-set influenced the planning and
rehearsals for the operation. ROE discussions which entailed
on engaging PDF troops became murky and confusing. Friend or
foe identification, which is already a difficult task for
152 Additionally, the TF White Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was
within range of the PDF patrol boat's guns.
153 McGrath interview.
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ground forces at night, was complicated by the fact that the
"enemy" PDF could also be "friendly." Early ROE was based on
whether the target had a uniform, a weapon and how they were
moving. If they were not moving in an aggressive manner,
such as running away, they could not be engaged. 154 Once the
shooting started, this could become even more confusing,
because the PDF might remove uniforms and friendly civilians
might take up arms to defend themselves and their property
from looters
.
Rehearsals were conducted and the ROE were reviewed and
discussed extensively. One of the rehearsals, called "MOD
4, " was conducted at Navare airfield, located five miles west
of Hurlbert Air Force Base in Florida. Navare airfield was
situated near the water similar to Paitilla airfield. This
rehearsal was significant because it was a full scale
rehearsal and involved U.S. Army soldiers playing the role of
an opposing force. When the SEALs hit the beach from the
water, the Army engaged them in a firefight. One of the
exercise graders judged that the Army force had been killed,
so the SEALs increased their pace and successfully completed
the operation. 155 The rehearsal debriefing focused on whether
154 Toohey interview and interview with Tony Ducci on 5 July 1996 at
San Diego Ca . Ducci was a petty officer in Bravo Platoon during the
Paitilla operation. He has been used by the Naval Special Warfare
Center to brief the operation to prospective Commanding and Executive
officers of SEAL Teams.
155 McGrath interview.
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the ground force commander, Commander McGrath, should report
such an enemy contact to the commander of TF White, Captain
Sandoz, at the Tactical Operations Center (TOO . Some
participants thought the contact and the associated problems
were a typical exercise glitch, 156 while others thought the
tactical ROE implications of the contact on the beach were
overshadowed during the debrief by the eventual debate
concerning reporting procedures. 157 After the debrief, the
decision was made to put Commander McGrath on the Patrol
Boats (PBs) as the overall mission commander and a positive
communications link to the TOC. Lieutenant Commander Pat
Toohey, the Executive Officer of SEAL Team Four, was moved
into the Ground Force Commander (GFC) position and would
report directly to McGrath.
The SEALs in the platoons were constantly reminded that
minimal collateral damage was paramount; the Panamanians
would be friendly and supportive; and the PDF would be
overwhelmed by the sight of a huge U.S. force and offer
little resistance. Intelligence briefs describing minimal
security on the airfield reinforced the mind-set created by
the constant emphasis on minimizing damage. Other briefs
implied that the airfields would probably be guarded by old
men with rusty weapons who would run before they fought. 158
156 Casey interview.
Toohey and Ducci interview.
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The SEALs were briefed that they would have to exercise
"diplomacy" if they encountered civilians or drunk
Panamanians returning from the Club Union, which was located
beside the airfield. 159 In some instances, the operation was
described by senior officers as a cake walk that even a bunch
of Boy Scouts could pull off. 160
The ROE for dealing with the aircraft, including
Noriega's, were relatively clear: minimize material damage
as much as possible. The ROE understood by the SEALs for
people was that they could fire if they felt threatened, 161
but defining what was a threat in an atmosphere which
emphasized minimal collateral damage, was more difficult.
The ROE for engaging people was understood to be as follows:
if they had no weapon the SEALs could not engage them; if
they had a weapon and were not an immediate threat, a verbal
warning to drop the weapon should be given; if they refused
to drop the weapon and were a threat, then the SEALs could
engage. 152 This meant that if a Panamanian with a weapon was
seen running away, he could not be shot unless he became an
immediate threat. Additionally, in order to minimize







162 Toohey and Ducci interview.
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should be limited to small arms fire, specifically 7.62 and
5.56 mm weapons. 163 The GFC, Lieutenant Commander Toohey, was
comfortable with the ROE because he expected to have SOF eyes
on the target prior to H-hour and the presence of the AC-13
gunship for fire support during the operation.
Unfortunately, General Stiner would later disapprove SOF eyes
on the target because of fear that they would compromise the
entire operation and the AC-130 would not be used because of
communications problems. 164
The final plan designated the Naval Special Warfare
(SEAL) element of Blue Spoon as TF White. The Task force
consisted of units mainly from the U.S. with supporting
forces provided by NSWU-8, the SEAL unit based in Panama.
U.S. -based forces accounted for most of the Task Force
personnel: four SEAL platoons and a ground command, control
and communications (C^) group. Three of the SEAL platoons,
Bravo, Delta, and Golf, were assigned the Paitilla airfield
operation. 165 They would be augmented by NSWU-8 personnel and
by Special Boat Unit 2 6 (SBU-2 6) , which provided the sixty
163 Toohey interview. Also see Kelly, 264.
164 por details on the AC-130 communications problems see Barbara
Starr, "Comms Failure Blights SEAL Operation," Jane's Defense Weekly
(Vol. 13, No. 18., May 5, 1990), 834.
The three platoons from SEAL Team Four would conduct the operation
at Paitilla airfield under the control of a seven-man ground command and
control element which consisted of a Ground Force Commander (GFC) , a
SEAL lieutenant as communications coordinator, two SEAL communicators,
two SEAL corpsmen, and two Air Force Special Operations Combat Control
Team (CCT) members.
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five foot MK III patrol boats and crews. Four members of the
fourth platoon would conduct the Balboa harbor attack on the
PDF patrol boats
.
In the Paitilla operation, the SBU-2 6 MK III PBs would
tow the Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) containing the
assault force to a position 2000 yards off the coast from
their insertion point south of the airfield. The PBs would
maintain station off the coast and provide overall
operational command and control. Once ashore, the SEALs
would move up either side of the runway in order to secure
the area and block the runway with aircraft and vehicles.
The tower on the east side was considered the greatest threat
and the most experienced platoon, Delta, would move toward
this area. 166 Once the runway was blocked, the SEALs would
then move into Noriega's hangar and disable his aircraft.
The ground force C-^ unit would follow the platoons up the
airfield. Once in place, the SEALs would monitor the
helicopters, which were also on the airfield, and be prepared
to engage them if they were used in an escape attempt. 167
Simultaneously at H-hour, four SEAL Team Two members would
conduct a combat swimmer attack against the PDF patrol boats
in Balboa Harbor.
Interview with Lieutenant Commander Kevin Baugh on 23 September
1996 at the Pentagon, Washington D.C Lieutenant Commander Baugh served
as the second in- command under Commander Toohey in the ground C^ element
during the Paitilla operation.
167 Ibid,
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Overall, the written, inferred and resulting implicit
ROE for the operation created an expectation of an operation
other than combat. Brief after brief emphasized that the
Panamanians would be friendly and supportive; the PDF would
quickly roll over; restraint and "diplomacy" on the part of
the SEALs would prevent the accidental shooting of a friendly
drunk Panamanian; and minimizing collateral damage to the
aircraft would ease the transition and financial burden for
the new government and align with the political objectives of
the U.S. After extensive rehearsals, the SEALs were ready
for the operation, but the constant emphasis on minimal
material damage and restraint when engaging targets impacted
the mind-set of those about to conduct the operation. When
they deployed, the SEALs still carried dikes in their combat
equipment for cutting valve stems. 168
3 . Execution
On 17 December 1989, the alert order was issued for the
execution of operation Just Cause. NSWG-2 (TF White)
deployed from Little Creek Virginia on 18 December on two C-
141 starlifters. Once they arrived at Howard Air Force Base
in Panama, they moved to NSWU-8's compound at Rodman Naval
Station and set up the Tactical Operations Center (TOO for
TF White. Preparations were conducted at a brisk pace, as H-
hour was scheduled for 0100 on 20 December. To meet this
168 Ibid.
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timeline, the platoons would have to launch their operations
shortly after nightfall on December 19. While the platoons
prepared, Commander McGrath attended a last minute
coordination meeting at the Joint Operations Center (JOC)
.
All the key players for the intervention were present,
including Generals Downing and Thurman. At this meeting the
commanders were reminded that the U.S. had no quarrel with
the Panamanian people. Heavy emphasis was placed on
minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties. They
were also reminded that CNN would be present along with two
other news organizations. The briefer concluded by stating
that "we will have to live with our image for a long time." 169
Thus the Commander of the Paitilla operation received a firm
reinforcement of the written and inferred/ implicit ROE within
hours of launching on the operation.
Shortly after nightfall on evening of 19 December, both
the PBs and the CRRCs departed Rodman Naval Station in order
to conduct a rendezvous and connect the tow line for the
transit to the airfield. Once the rendezvous was completed,
the PBs towed the CRRCs toward the drop-off point 2 000 yards
off the airfield. At 2 052, Commander McGrath received a
radio transmission from the TOC . The message stated that the
SEALs should try not to destroy any aircraft. This could
have meant anything. Did they again want the valve stems
169 McGrath interview.
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cut? Did they want the aircraft not damaged at all? McGrath
requested additional clarification. The TOC responded that
the SEALs should try to keep the destruction "below the
knees, " specifically, that if they had to resort to
incapacitating the aircraft then to damage only the landing
gear with nothing more than small arms fire. 170 Receiving
this type of transmission while already on the operation
certainly reinforced previous emphasis on minimizing
collateral damage and influenced how the SEALs were to make
ROE judgments. The origins of this transmission are vague.
The TOC transmitted it to Commander McGrath, but the Joint
Operations Center (JOC) , the command above the TOC, asserted
that the message did not originate there and denied that any
such message was ever transmitted. 171 One author points to a
misinterpretation of a transmission sent by General Stiner to
Rangers who were confronted with a civilian airliner at
Torrijos International Airport. That is where Stiner was
emphasizing the ROE and the requirement to minimize
collateral damage and casualties. 172 Regardless of where the





interpreted General Stiner's message very broadly concerning
collateral damage and it eventually became specific direction
to Commander McGrath.
The new orders were passed on to each SEAL by word of
mouth because excessive radio transmissions could potentially
compromise the operation. Because the PBs had the CRRCs in
tow, there was a time delay in getting the new information
passed through the Ground Force Commander and to all the
Platoons. The Platoons received the renewed emphasis on
minimal collateral damage and the specific order to keep the
damage "below the knees" of the aircraft approximately 15
minutes before they detached from the PBs on their way into
the beach. 173 As a result, the last instruction the SEALs
received when leaving the PBs was to minimize material
damage. This would certainly reinforce the inferred/implicit
ROE created throughout the briefings and rehearsals and cause
them to be cautious when making any ROE judgments. Further
complicating the situation, the SEALs received word that H-
hour had been advanced form 0100 to 0045 by the CJTF, General
Stiner. 174
173 Casey and Baugh interview.
174 General Stiner explains the indicators he used to determine that
H-hour had been compromised in his comments reported by the Army Times
article, 15.
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With these last minute adjustments understood, the SEALs
departed for the beach in the CRRCs . At about 0100 the
platoons moved onto the beach, followed by the ground C^
element. An AC-130 was firing its 105 mm gun at targets only-
half a mile from the airfield at H-hour, so the SEALs had now
surely lost strategic surprise, and perhaps tactical
surprise. The target was within an urban area which offered
minimal cover and concealment. This certainly was not an
environment similar to the jungles of Vietnam, where many of
this operation's critics had served. The west side of the
runway consisted of high- and low-rise buildings, with a
chain link fence running up the west side of the airfield
behind the hangars. It was thought that all the fence's
gates would be locked. 175 The east side consisted of shanty
buildings and slums. 176 Avoiding civilian contact was
paramount given the urban setting, the ROE, and the concern
for minimizing collateral damage and Panamanian casualties.
Moving directly up the sides of the runway provided the best
possibility of avoiding contact with the population on either




176 Commander Tcohey was hesitant to fire in this direction for fear
that their weapons could easily start an uncontrollable fire in the
shanties
.
177 McGrath, Toohey and Casey interview.
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Bravo and Golf Platoons moved up the west side of the
runway. Their objectives included clearing the buildings on
the west side, blocking the runway and disabling Noriega's
learjet. They were also to provide a blocking force for any
Panamanian troops which approached from the north. 178 Delta
platoon, the most experienced platoon, and the ground C^
element moved up the east side of the runway in order to
clear the east side buildings and the control tower. The C-^
element maintained radio contact with the AC-13 and with the
operation's commander stationed on the PB.
While moving up the west side of the runway, the SEALs
encountered Panamanians, probably civilians and private
security guards, inside and among the southern most
hangars. 179 Identifying whether these people were armed or
not was the first big difficulty for the SEALs. Some of the
people were Caucasians and looked like many of the Americans
living in Panama. Some even shouted words of encouragement
to the SEALs such as "go get him (Noriega) guys, he's getting
what he deserves." 180 Others they contacted were more
belligerent and verbal exchanges ensued. When some of these
people refused to leave as directed, the verbal confrontation
turned into what seemed like a brawl. 181 Bravo platoon
178 Casey interview.
179 Casey interview. Also see McConnell, 63
180 Casey interview.
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eventually subdued and bound the trouble makers while Golf
continued up the runway. By now tactical surprise was lost.
Because target identification was difficult and the ROE
required an immediate threat before engagement, shooting
these people was not a possibility. Even without the
restrictive ROE, it would have been wrong to gun down these
early contacts as some could have been Americans and others
were just innocent Panamanian workers who were supposedly
friendly. Belligerence by the Panamanians was understandable
as they saw armed men (SEALs) trespassing on their property.
Additionally, these contacts were not an immediate threat to
the mission, as later contacts would be at Noriega's hangar.
On the east side, Delta platoon and the ground C-^
element continued to move. The GFC received a transmission
that Noriega's aircraft was inbound. The original message
stated that an aircraft was inbound, but somewhere along the
line this was interpreted as being Noriega's aircraft. 182 The
GFC ordered Delta platoon to stop their progress up the
runway and prepare an ambush for the approaching aircraft
.
The GFC then received another transmission indicating that
three PDF APCs were heading toward the airfield on the road
which looped around the north side of the runway. This
report of additional security arriving at the airfield
181 McConnell, f3-4. McConnell conducted interviews with the
Assistant Platoon Commander of Gulf, Mike Phillips.
182 Toohey interview.
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reinforced the belief that the inbound aircraft was
Noriega's. The GFC ordered one of the platoons to move north
and prepare to intercept the APCs. 183 All these developments
complicated the execution of the operation and created a
sense of urgency. In this pressurized environment, the SEALs
would rely on their planning and rehearsal experience in
order to judge any situations that developed, including ROE
judgments. As the GFC began to make adjustments to the plan,
a firefight broke out on the west side of the runway. 184
When Golf platoon had approached Noriega's hangar, the
Assistant Platoon Commander saw soldiers armed with AK-47s
and ammo pouches running from an apparent bunk room to
sheltered positions within. 185 Intelligence had indicated
that only civilian security guards, not PDF, would be at the
hangar. But two weeks prior to the invasion, Noriega had
placed these PDF soldiers, formerly at Flamenco Island, in a
double wide trailer behind the hangar. Noriega did this not
only to maintain security on his airplane, but to provide
security when he visited one of his girlfriends living in an
apartment on the west side of the runway. 186 These soldiers
183 The APCs eventually arrived on the road north of the runway, but






were probably awakened by the AC-13 firing its 105 mm gun at
another target half a mile away. Most likely, as the
Panamanians scurried to the hangar they saw one of the SEAL
squads, only eight men, and took defensive positions. 187
Because the SEALs did not realize the soldiers were assuming
defensive positions, rather than just running away, they held
their fire in accordance with the ROE. Golf, first squad,
stopped their movement to the northern end of the runway and
became engaged in a verbal exchange with the Panamanian
soldiers. The troops in the hangar ordered the SEALs to drop
their weapons. Following what they understood to be the ROE,
the SEALs replied with a verbal warning. One of the Spanish
speaking SEALs warned in Spanish: no, you drop your weapons!
The soldiers refused and one of the SEALs saw a Panamanian
soldier leveling his weapon. Now that an immediate threat was
apparent, he opened fire. 188
Golf, first squad, stopped on the concrete runway when
the shooting began. Golf took return fire from the
Panamanians and suffered hits directly and from rounds
bouncing off the concrete. Seven of the eight members of the
187 ibid.
188 Finding out who initiated fire was more difficult than expected.
Many authors who interviewed SEALs from the operation have different
accounts of how the first shots were fired. The uncertainty of who
fired first in the various earlier accounts of the operation indicates
that the SEAL who had fired the first shot was concerned that he might
be in trouble under the strict ROE. This fact reinforces my arguments
in this case. Years later, all the SEALs I interviewed said that the
SEALs fired first.
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squad were killed or wounded. Golf, second squad, which was
in the grass nearby, moved to reinforce them. The SEALs
returned fire into the hangar. When the platoon commander
radioed the GFC about the heavy casualties, the GFC ordered
both Bravo and Delta platoons to assist Golf. Delta moved
toward the north flank of the hangar and Bravo moved directly
toward the hangar. At this point Bravo also suffered
casualties. 189 Additional casualties were incurred when some
of the SEALs attempted to move the wounded before the
fire fight had ended.
When the firefight was initiated, the GFC shouted into
the radio for the SEALs to use high explosives, as they had
only been using small arms fire so far in the engagement as
directed by their ROE. 190 The GFC ordered the SEAL officer in
the ground C^ element to raise the AC-13 for fire support
and then quickly ran across the runway toward Golf's
position. When the GFC arrived, he saw that the SEALs were
laying down heavy return fire and the Panamanians in the
hangar had stopped firing. He ordered a cease fire,
established a security perimeter, and started moving
casualties to a triage area. The hangar had been heavily
damaged and Noriega's plane was riddled with bullet holes.
189 Baugh interview.
190 Toohey interview. The SEALs were operating within the ROE when
resorting to high explosives because at the time they felt heavier
weapons were required to ensure mission success.
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Additionally, an AT-4 tube launched rocket had been fired
into the plane. Four SEALs were dead and nine were seriously
injured. 191
D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this case, the translation of the ROE from theory
into practice was complicated by organizational friction
within the chain of command. Organizational friction
resulted from the translation of the broad ROE associated
with the political objectives into the specific tactical ROE
used by the SEALs on the operation at Paitilla airfield. The
political objectives required that minimal collateral damage
occur during the unilateral intervention into Panama. The
President, the Secretary of Defense and others emphasized the
requirement for minimal material damage and Panamanian
casualties. As a result, SOF were chosen as a minimal
collateral damage option for the Paitilla airfield over
conventional forces
.
The military objectives were to conduct the operation
using overwhelming force in order to expedite the achievement
of the political objectives. The ROE were designed to ensure
that the overwhelming military force did not create excessive
Contrary to SOF planners, some conventional planners would
consider these looses minimal. Compared to the size of the force used
by the SEALs, 60 men, they incurred a proportionally large number of
casualties. Operation Just Cause involved 25,000 troops and the entire
operation suffered 19 KIA and 99 WIA including the SEAL losses.
Obviously, the SEALs suffered a proportionally large number of
casualties in achieving the objectives when compared to other units.
(Figures obtained from JCS History, pp. 2 and 41.)
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collateral damage. OPORD 1-9 translated the political
objectives into military objectives and thus created rather
restrictive ROE. The ROE in OPORD 1-90 were further refined
in OPLAN 90-2 in order to translate the broad ROE of OPORD 1-
90 into tactical ROE for forces within the JTF. These
written ROE precluded the conduct of a stand-off operation
and required that the SEALs physically occupy the runway.
Each level of the defense organization further
translated the ROE into understandable and relevant ROE for
their specific missions. This translation at each level in
the chain of command resulted in a written and implicit ROE.
Both were continually emphasized during this operation in
briefs and rehearsals contributing to a mind-set
counterproductive to a special operations mission. The SEALs
received continued emphasis to reduce material damage and
civilian casualties at every level in the chain of command.
This included briefs the operation's Commander received the
day of the operation which emphasized minimizing damage, the
friendliness of the people and the presence of CNN. Last-
minute ROE instructions were transmitted over the radio which
further restricted the use of force by demanding aircraft
damage be restricted to only the landing gear. The SEALs
received this order within minutes of launching onto the
target area. The continual emphasis on collateral damage
influenced the judgment the SEALs used in any situation
governed by the ROE. As a result, the SEALs were inclined to
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be overly cautious in any ROE judgments made during the
operation.
Once on the beach, the SEALs did what they were
constantly reminded to do in numerous briefings and in the
last minute updates regarding ROE. When they first made
contact with civilians in the first hangar, target
identification and determining if people were carrying
weapons was difficult. The SEALs exercised diplomacy and
conducted a verbal exchange with the belligerents at the
first hangar. Once they arrived at Noriega's hangar, they
continued this tactic, which they understood was required by
the ROE. They did not fire upon the running soldiers, who
unbeknownst to the SEALs were moving into defensive
positions, because of their understanding that under the ROE
they could only fire if immediately threatened. As a result,
they resorted to a verbal exchange with the armed soldiers
who were by then in a defensive position. The earlier verbal
exchange in the first hangar had been resolved successfully,
so they hoped for the same result at Noriega's hangar. Once
the shooting started, they initially kept their return fire
limited to only small arms as required by the ROE. The GFC
eventually had to yell in the radio for them to use high
explosives, before they used 40 mm grenade launchers and AT-4
tube launched rockets to suppress the enemy fire. He acted
appropriately, as the successful completion of the mission
was at risk.
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The combination of the written and inferred/ implicit ROE
had caused the SEALs to hold back the maximum combat power at
their disposal while on the target. They did not shoot on
the PDF maneuvering to defensive positions; they provided
verbal warning; and when engaged, they initially held back on
the amount of fire power delivered to the target. While
"diplomacy" was required and appropriate on civilian contact
at the first hangar during the approach, the same method of
providing verbal warning prior to firing had deadly
consequences at Noriega's hangar. Proximity to the target
should call for different judgment with regard to ROE. In
the Balboa harbor operation, the lives of the PDF patrol
boat's crew members were not a consideration during the
operation. The PDF or civilians located next to Noriega's
aircraft at Paitilla could have been treated in a similar
manner and engaged without warning or verification of
weapons. Unfortunately, the organizational friction turned
the already restrictive written ROE into an even stricter
implicit ROE. The SEALs received last minute briefs and
radio transmissions which turned the implicit ROE into
specific directions concerning target engagement. These
directions caused the SEALs to use rather cautious judgment
when following what they understood to be the ROE. As a
result, they suffered almost 25 percent casualties in the
successful completion of the mission.
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The ROE, written, implicit and inferred, were at
variance with the principles required for success in special
operations with minimal casualties. As Chapter III
established, SOF rely on establishing transitory superior
combat power in order to succeed against a numerically
superior force or a force in a defended position. SOF rely
on at least tactical surprise in order to attack a defended
position successfully. Being restricted in their ability to
fire on maneuvering enemy forces within the target area;
having to provide verbal warning and diplomacy; and having to
hold back firepower when initially engaging, contributed to
an erosion of the principles required for SOF to succeed with
minimal casualties. The SEALs gave up the advantages SOF
rely on: surprise, speed and violence of action.
Additionally, the constant emphasis on applying minimal force
to accomplish the objective eroded the principle of purpose
which contributes to SOF achieving almost unimaginable feats
in the worst of situations.
As stated earlier, SOF form an inherently minimal
collateral damage military option for accomplishing broader
military and political objectives. General James Lindsey,
USCINCSOC during the operation, stated after Operation Just
Cause that
:
[A] surgical strike at Point Paitilla still averted
civilian loss of life that would have been likely
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if Air Force bombers, instead of SEALs, had been
sent to destroy the jet. 192
In earlier plans, conventional forces would have conducted
the operation at Paitilla using overwhelming force. After
initial mortar and aircraft fire to soften the target, nearly
3 00 soldiers would have landed in the center of the target in
an aerial assault. They would have quickly formed an ever
expanding "donut" until they consumed the entire airfield.
They would enjoy an absolute combat power advantage over any
PDF whether or not the PDF were in a defensive position.
Most likely, the overwhelming presence of this amount of
force would have scared off any PDF in the area. 193 Instead,
the PDF only saw about eight opponents at the initial contact
at Noriega's hangar and decided to fight. A conventional
force can afford to operate under a more restrictive ROE than
SOF. Not only do they operate with permanent combat
superiority (as opposed to the transitory combat power of
SOF), they usually plan for losses during any operation. 194
SOF does not plan for losses, because even the loss of one
man in an eight-man team can result in mission failure.
192 See Them Shanker, "Special Forces Checkered Past and Rambo Image
Haunt America's Warrior Elite," Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine, August
26, 1990, 10.
193 Casey interview.
194 General Stiner stated that conventional airborne forces routinely
plan for 6 percent casualties. See Army Times, 15.
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Employing SOF as a military means to a political end
magnify the consequences of inappropriate written, or in this
case, implicit ROE. SOF must sustain a superior transitory
combat power in order to achieve tactical success with
minimal casualties. In the Paitilla airfield operation, the
SEALs accomplished the mission, but suffered needless
casualties because the implicit ROE influenced the conduct of
the operation and the mind-set required to succeed in special




SOF played two main roles during the intervention in
Somalia. The more publicized was the mission to capture
General Aideed conducted by Task Force Ranger. The other
role, which received less attention, was the use of SOF in
anti-sniper and sniper operations. At first glance the case
of Somalia raises doubts about the ability of the U.S. to
address the tension between political objectives and military
requirements in the conduct of special operations. The first
thoughts of most Americans when remembering U.S. intervention
in Somalia are 18 dead U.S. soldiers; an American pilot held
hostage; and the badly beaten body of an American serviceman
being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a seemingly
out-of -control mob.
Upon examination, many observed that the ROE were
restrictive and thus caused the disastrous result of the Task
Force Ranger operation. 195 The public, the media and members
of Congress argued that the lack of U.S. armor in the quick
reaction force, restrictions on the use of air fire support
and ineffective UN command and control were responsible for
the 18 deaths and 75 injuries in this mission. On the other
195 For example see David S. Harvey, "U.S. Forces in Somalia denied
use of Black Hawk Gunships, " Defense Daily (Vol. 187, No. 12), p. 80.
Also see Storer H. Rowley, "Marines Vexed by Restrictions," Chicago
Tribune, 20 December 1992, 1.
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hand, in SOF sniper operations there were numerous media
reports and allied nation concerns that the ROE were
interpreted toe freely by U.S. snipers. 196
Retired Army Captain James H. Smith, a disabled Vietnam
veteran who had lost his son during the Task Force Ranger
raid conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 October, 1993
stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee that
. . .we must learn what was the decision making
process in the White House?.... it is also important
that we discover and find out what input the UN
Envoy Jonathan Howe and UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali had in the deployment, combat
support, and rules of engagement for our troops.
If we are to truly clarify the causes of the
Somalia fiasco, we must clarify these concerns. 197
While the answers to all of Captain Smith's questions are
beyond the scope of this chapter, I intend to investigate one
of his concerns: the rules of engagement. Specifically, I
intend to determine the following: how successful were the
rules of engagement (ROE) in balancing the tension between
the political objectives and the military requirements during
special operations in Somalia? What unique variables were
present in this case which complicated the application of
military force in pursuit of the political objectives? How
196 These repor-.s are cited later in the chapter in the discussions of
each operation.
197 See James H. Smith testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on 12 May 1994. U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S.
Military Operations in Somalia. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate. (Washington DC: GPO, 1994), 76.
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did the ROE influence the conduct of Special Operations in
Somalia?
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first
section provides the background which led to UN intervention.
The second section outlines the political goals, military
objectives and ROE for each phase of the intervention:
United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) , United Task
Force (UNITAF) , and UNOSOM II. The third section identifies
the unique variables that were present in Somalia which had a
direct effect on ROE. The fourth and fifth sections analyze
SOF ' s role in Somalia and the effect the ROE had on the
employment of SOF. The final section provides conclusions.
B . BACKGROUND
Before our forces became involved in Somalia, Under
Secretary of State Frank Wisner asked other U.S. diplomats to
provide him with any suggestions on the situation. Smith
Hempstone, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya sent a candid
response on 1 December, 1992. He stated:
...Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered
to their discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas.
They will mine roads. They will lay ambushes.
They will launch hit and run attacks. They will
not be able to stop the convoys from getting
through. But they will inflict -and take-
casualties .. .There will be an abduction or two. A
sniper will occasionally knock off one of our
sentries. If you loved Beirut, you'll love
Mogadishu. . .think once, twice and three times
before you embrace the Somali tarbaby. 198
198 Published in U.S. News and World Report, December 14, 1992, 30.
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He accurately predicted the difficulties both the UN and the
U.S. would face in attempting to apply a military solution to
the political and social problems of Somalia.
In addition to the problems Ambassador Hempstone so
accurately predicted, the military faced many challenges
posed by the geography of Somalia. Somalia, which is located
on the Horn of Africa, is a hot, dry and sparsely settled
desert environment of nearly 250 million square miles, about
the size of New England (see Appendix G, Map 5) . It is
nearly 24 hours by air and several weeks by sea from the
United States. The roads and public services are non-
existent or deteriorated.
Politically, Somalia was in anarchy. It had no
government, no police force, no military and no social
services. Prior to 1977 Somalia was a Soviet client state
under Siad Barre . When he fell from Soviet favor, the U.S.
stepped in and provided nearly $200 million for updating
Somalia's ports and airfields. Partly because the Siad Barre
regime severely repressed its population, the U.S. government
concluded that Somalia served of little value and severed all
ties in 1988. By 1991, Siad Barre had lost control of his
adversaries, especially Mohamed Farah Aideed whom he had
imprisoned for seven years in 1969. On 27 January, 1991 Siad
Barre was overthrown and fled the country. Civil war broke
out among fifteen clans. The two most powerful clans, led by
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Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, fought for
control of Mogadishu. Clan dynamics and politics prevailed:
me against my brother; me and my brother against my cousin;
me, my brother and my cousin against another clan. Clan
warfare and the struggle for control created political chaos
in Somalia.
In addition to the civil war, drought struck resulting
in massive famine. By early 1992 more than half a million
people had starved to death and nearly a million more were
threatened. Mogadishu seemed the worst hit and to complicate
matters the famine began to spread to neighboring Kenya. By
January 1992 Somalia was "the greatest humanitarian emergency
in the world." 199 The U.S. Center for Disease Control and
Prevention reported that mortality rates were "among the
highest ever documented by a population survey among famine-
affected civilians." 200 The UN negotiated a cease-fire on
February 29, 1992 with Ali Mahdi and Aideed in order to begin
an attempt to save the nearly one million people threatened
by starvation.
199 Statement by Andrew Natsios, assistant administrator for food and
humanitarian assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development,
before the House Select Committee on Hunger, January 30. 1992.
David Brown. "Data Indicates Somali Famine among Worst,"
Washington Post, January 9, 1993, A17
.
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C. THE INTERVENTION: POLITICAL GOALS, MILITARY
OBJECTIVES AND THE ROE
The intervention into Somalia by the UN and the U.S.
went through three phases beginning with United Nations
Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) , followed by United Task
Force (UNITAF) and finally UNOSOM II. For each of these
periods a brief chronology is provided along with a
description of the political goals, military objectives and
the resulting ROE which influenced how military forces
conducted operations.
1 . UNOSOM I
UNOSOM I, also called Operation Provide Relief, was
established by UN resolution 751 in April 1992. Its
objectives were to provide humanitarian aid for starving
Somalis, and to find an end to hostilities between the clans
under Chapter VI "peace keeping" of the UN charter.
Initially fifty unarmed Pakistanis were sent into Somalia as
observers. By July 1992, five hundred armed Pakistan troops
were sent to accomplish the mission while other nations
provided the financial and logistic support. After UN
resolution 767 passed, which initiated increased
intervention, the U.S. sent Humanitarian Assistance Survey
Teams (HAST) into Kenya to ascertain the extend of the famine
in both Kenya and Somalia. The U.S. also provided the
majority of the support aircraft for the relief operation.
These U.S. operations were coordinated by a joint task force
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under the control of the United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM) . The military objective was simply to ensure the
delivery of supplies to those in need.
The Pakistanis in Somalia were under restrictive ROE and
could only engage forces which posed an immediate and deadly
threat to their forces: they had to take the first hit. As
a result of the small number of soldiers and their
restrictive RCE, the Pakistanis were ineffective in
delivering food and supplies within Somalia and the clans
dominated the country by continually looting food, extorting
relief organizations and hijacking relief vehicles. The
security situation for UN peacekeepers steadily worsened and
Somalis continued to starve.
2 . UNITAF
Because of the ineffectiveness of the UN operation thus
far, resolution 794 was passed on 3 December 1992 which
created the U.S. -led United Task Force (UNITAF) . On 4
December 1992, President George Bush announced the beginning
of Operation Restore Hope which marked an increased U.S.
involvement in Somalia. President Bush stated that the U.S.
would send a substantial force "with a limited objective: to
open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to
prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it
moving." 201 The U.S. became more involved partly because of
201 President 3ush is quoted in United States Senate Committee on
Armed Services Memorandum from Senator Warner and Senator Levin to
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the nightly images of starvation delivered by the media to
the living rooms of America. USCENTCOM was again designated
as the lead command and was given the following mission
statement
:
When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct
joint/combined military operations in Somalia to
secure major ports, key installations and food
distribution points, to provide open and free
passage of relief supplies, provide security for
convoys and relief organizations operations, and
assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief
under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure
environment for uninterrupted relief operations,
USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief
operations to UN peacekeeping forces. 202
At its peak, UNITAF was comprised of 38,000 troops from
twenty one different nations. The U.S. provide the majority
of the forces, 2 8,000. As a result of using overwhelming
force and the ability of the U.S. soldiers to disarm and
neutralize threats under looser ROE, UNITAF was a success. 203
Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn titled Review of the Circumstances
Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia,
dated September 29, 1995, here after referred to as Senate Memorandum.
This report was the result of hundreds of interviews with all the key-
planners and operators. This included all U.S. players up to the
Secretary of Defense, U.N officials and even the Somali warlord, Mohamed
Aideed.
202 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations : Lessons Learned (Washington
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 16.
203 UNITAF achieved the following:
1. The daily death rate in Bardera fell from more than 300 in November
1992 to five or less in April 1993.
2
.
The number of daily gunshot victims admitted to Mogadishu hospital
fell from about 50 to five or less.
3. The street price of an AK-47 rose from $50 to $1000, while the
price of a 50-pound sack of wheat fell from $100 to about $10.
See Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia,"
Parameters (Winter 1993-94), 47.
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The looser ROE allowed the soldiers to engage and remove
hostile threats with proportional force. This included the
authority to shoot first if hostile intent was displayed. 204
The primary goal of U.S. involvement in UNITAF, as stated in
the USCENTCOM mission, was only to get the flow of supplies
moving and to remove the threat imposed by the warring clans
.
Once these goals were accomplished, the UN was scheduled to
assume the leadership role in Somalia and begin nation
building. There were, however, delays in getting the UN to
take the reins. UNOSOM II was established under UN
resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, but the U.S. joint task
force was not relieved by UN forces until 4 May 1993.
3 . UNOSOM II
The UN resolution, 814, which established UNOSOM II was
a milestone in many ways. Most importantly, it represented
the first ever UN intervention under chapter VII operations
titled "peace enforcement." It also entailed the objective
of re-establishing the political and economic institutions of
Somalia. This resolution went far beyond the objectives of
the U.S. led UNITAF operation. The goals in Somalia expanded
to include: "forcibly disarming the warring factions;
political reconciliation; and nation-building." 205 The UN
took over a relatively peaceful Somalia in which Aideed had




shown support to UN Special envoy Robert Oakley's request for
an end to the clan warfare. With the arrival of a new U.S.
Envoy, Robert Gosdende, relations with Aideed went sour
because Gosdende saw Aideed as the problem, not the solution,
to the crisis in Somalia. Jonathan Howe, who replaced Oakley
as UN Special Envoy, was in concert with Gosdende ' s opinion
that Aideed was to be eliminated. His relentless drive to
neutralize Aideed seemed to be the force behind the Clinton
administration attempting to employ a "dual track" policy of
military force coupled with political negotiations. The
Senate investigation found that
. .
.
[p]olicy makers within the Clinton
Administration were determined to ensure that the
United Nations nation-building efforts in Somalia
did not fail. They, along with the U.N.
Representative in Somalia, Admiral Howe, pushed
incessantly for the U.S. to provide Special
Operations forces to capture Aideed. This was at
the same time that these Administration officials
were directing the U.S. military to reduce the
overall level of U.S. troops in Somalia -- an
inconsistent, two-track policy. 206
This policy was destined to fail as it divided the policy
makers and senior military officers on whether Aideed was
truly the problem. The political objectives became moving
goal posts. 207
206 Ibid., 5
Those in favor of deploying SOF in pursuit of Aideed included
Admiral Howe; the U.N. commander, General Bir; and the Senior U.S.
commander in Somalia, General Montgomery. Those opposed to the use of
SOF included Chairman of the CJS, General Powell; and USCINCCENT,
General Hoar. The Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, was reluctant to
send SOF into Somalia.
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Because Aideed was now being marginalized by Howe and
the UN, he began to reassert his military control with
increased violence toward UN peacekeepers . The violence
culminated on 5 June 1993 when Pakistani soldiers, conducting
a scheduled inspection at one of Aideed 's weapons storage
sites, were ambushed resulting in 24 KIA, 54 WIA and 10
missing. This enraged Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Howe. UN
resolution 837 passed which called for "the arrest and
detention for prosecution" of "those responsible" for the
Pakistani deaths and "the disarmament of all Somalian
parties." 208 While the resolution did not name Aideed as
being responsible, it was clear that he was the target as
Howe immediately placed a $25,000 bounty for information
leading to his capture. 209 This set the stage for the request
and use of Task Force Ranger, which was destined to end in
disaster and cause the Clinton administration to announce the
withdrawal of US troops from Somalia seven days after the
failed raid.
To accomplish the political objectives of UNOSOM II, a
multinational force was assembled. A Turk, Lieutenant
General Cevik 3ir, was placed in command of UNOSOM II with an
American, Major General Thomas Montgomery, as the Deputy
208 Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, Testing U.S. Policy in
Somalia (Annapolis.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 90.
General Bir and General Montgomery thought this reward should have
been closer to one million dollars. See Senate Memorandum, 23.
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Commander. General Montgomery also served as Commander of
U.S. Forces in Somalia, subordinate to General Hoar,
USCINCCENT. The commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR)
,
General Garrison, reported directly to General Hoar. The
stated military objectives for international forces in
Somalia included the requirement
. . .to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the
organized factions which will have been brought
under international control pending their eventual
destruction or transfer to a newly-constructed
army; to seize small arms of all unauthorized armed
elements and to assist in the registration and
security of such arms... 210
In support of UNOSOM II, the U.S. provided approximately
3 000 troops who were primarily support personnel which
facilitated air deliveries into Somalia. The U.S. also
provided forces to perform an active role in establishing
U.N. control over Somalia which included a Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) and SOF sniper teams. The QRF consisted of about
1500 soldiers from the 10th mountain division who were placed
under the tactical command of U.S. forces in Somalia. The
QRF was established in order to provide the UN forces with
assistance if the crisis escalated. Their primary role came
with the rescue of Task Force Ranger on 3 October, 1993. The
U.S. SOF sniper teams were used to enforce the U.N. ban on
heavy weapons. The mission of these 4,500 U.S. troops read:
210 Senate Memorandum, 14
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When directed, UNOSOM II Force Command conducts
military operations to consolidate, expand, and
maintain a secure environment for the advancement
of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and
political reconciliation in Somalia. 211
The ROE during UNOSOM II remained similar to those used
under the U.S. -led UNITAF operations and were universally
accepted by the other nations involved in UNOSOM II. These
new ROE emphasized a specific ramp-up process in the
application of force. 212 The UNOSOM II ROE required that a
verbal warning followed by a warning shot be provided, if
practicable, before resorting to deadly force. They detailed
how to disarm crew served weapons and armed personnel; how to
control unarmed rioters; and procedures for detaining and
releasing "violators" of the U.N. requirements. The UNOSOM
II ROE became less restrictive as the political objectives
drifted from a mission of disarming warring factions and
feeding starving Somali s to a manhunt for Aideed. The
remaining sections describe these changes in detail and
analyze their effect on the conduct of special operations
during UNOSOM II.
211 Allard, 19.
212 For the complete unclassified UNOSOM II ROE see Appendix C
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D . FACTORS COMPLICATING THE ROE
Intervention into Somalia was unique and several factors
complicated the use of ROE in both the Task Force Ranger
operation and the SOF sniper operations. The complicating
factors included: the intervention was the first ever UN
"peace enforcement" mission; drifting political objectives;
the unique Somali culture; multinational forces; and the
presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) . Because
this was the first UN operation under chapter VII of the UN
charter, there was a fine line between peace enforcement and
combat. As Major General Montgomery stated, "If this isn't
combat, then I'm sure having a helluva nightmare." 213 The ROE
became tricky in this situation because peace enforcement
relied on military restraint and perceived legitimacy in the
application of force if the political objectives were to be
met. The assignment of a Belgian lieutenant colonel who had
no working experience with ROE as the UN staff officer
responsible for ROE did not help ease the complications
caused by multinational operations in Somalia. 214
The changing political objectives also made the use of
force difficult. The operation in Somalia seemed to
experience mission creep as the policy makers seemed to lack
a clear political objective in Somalia. The mission of
213 Allard, 63.
F.M. Larenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia", Parameters (Winter
1993-94), 38.
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feeding Somalis began to wander off track when the hunt for
Aideed became the obsession of Boutros-Ghali, Howe and the
Clinton administration. 215 The shifting emphasis between a
political solution and a military solution increased the
difficulties for the military in determining the proper
application of force under the ROE.
As the emphasis went from the political to the military
track, the ROE were amended toward a less restrictive stance
on applying lethal force. The ROE under UNITAF were already
rather liberal. When UNOSOM II began and the political
differences with Aideed intensified, Fragmentary Orders 39
and 101 were issued by the UN Force Commander. These orders
loosened the ROE by stating, "Organized, armed militias,
technicals, and other crew served weapons are considered a
threat to UNOSOM Forces and may be engaged without
provocation." 211'' This change brought the situation more in
line with a military, rather than a political solution, as
policy makers in the UN and the U.S. conscientiously decided
to increase the level of military force. To their credit
they also loosened the ROE which enabled the military,
including SOF, to conduct operations without unnecessary
restrictions. Former Army Colonel and Korean war veteran,
215 gee Michael R. Gordon and John H. Cushman Jr., "After Supporting
Hunt for Aideed, „T .S. is Blaming U.N. for Losses," New York Times, 18
October 1993, Al
.
216 For the complete text of Fragmentary orders 39 and 101 see
Appendix D.
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David Hackworth stated that the "rules of engagement were
sledgehammer simple and as loose as I have ever seen: fire
if threatened." 217
In addition to changing political objectives, SOF faced
other complications with regard to the ROE. Peculiarities in
the Somali culture, the fact that the operation was
multinational and the presence of NGOs further complicated
the conduct of special operations. These problems will be
examined in the next sections with the analysis of the Task
Force Ranger ard the sniper operations.
E . TASK FORCE RANGER OPERATIONS
1 . Background
Before looking at how the ROE affected this operation,
some background on the events is appropriate. 218 After the
Pakistani UN peacekeepers were ambushed and killed on 5 June
1993, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) began
looking at a possible mission involving the capture of
Aideed. 219 Once Howe got approval to use Task Force Ranger,
General Garrison, the Task Force Ranger commander, and his
217 David H. Hackworth, "Making the Same Dumb Mistakes, " Newsweek, 18
October, 1993, 43.
218 rp^g details of the TFR operation were taken from General
Garrison's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12
May 1994. See U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. Military Operations
in Somalia . Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate. (Washington DC: GPO, 1994). The author's interview with the
General also provided details of the operation.
219 Garrison, Maj . Gen. William F., testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 12 May 1994, 2.
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unit deployed to Somalia on 22 August 1993 . Their mission
was simply to apprehend Aideed and disarm his lieutenants. 220
In Somalia they conducted a total of seven operations, all
similar in method to the 3 October operation, which was the
last mission attempted.
Their force was headquartered at the Mogadishu
International Airport (see Appendix G, Map 6) . On 3 October,
shortly after breakfast one of the Somali observers being
used for intelligence by the CIA reported that three of
Aideed 's top lieutenants were scheduled to hold meeting in
the Olympic hotel that afternoon and Aideed' s presence was
expected.
The attack force left the airport at approximately 153 0.
SOF Helicopters conducted gun runs over the hotel but
refrained from firing, as no threat was seen. Garrison
stated that daily flyovers of Mogadishu were conducted by
helicopters in order to establish a familiar pattern to the
local population. Because of these flyovers, Garrison felt
that Task Force Ranger had maintained tactical surprise on 3
October. Army commandos fastroped near and onto the Olympic
hotel while Rangers fastroped onto the surrounding streets in
order to provide security for the commandos. Within fifteen




A Ranger Ground Reaction Team was called in to take the
Ranger Task Force and the detainees back to the airport using
five-ton trucks fortified with sandbags (the drive to the
airport was approximately 15 minutes) . After the detainees
were loaded inuo the five-ton trucks, an outgoing helicopter,
which was providing air support, was hit by a rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) shot from the street by a Somali.
The helicopter crashed into a narrow alley between two
buildings and both pilots were killed. Six passengers
remained alive. A second helicopter landed near the crash
sight and could only evacuate two soldiers due to limited
passenger space. Fifteen SOF personnel, designated in
planning as the primary rescue team, approached the crash
site in a third helicopter and fastroped near the site.
While inserting the team, this helicopter was also hit by a
RPG. Only damaged, it managed to complete the insertion of
the team and limp back to the airport for a crash landing.
At this point General Garrison alerted General
Montgomery and the QRF. Soon another helicopter was hit by a
RPG round and crashed at a second site less than one mile
from the first crash site. This helicopter was flown by
Warrant Officer Durant who eventually became a hostage. This
second site was quickly overrun by an angry mob of Somalis. 221
221 At this second site two Army soldiers, Master Sergeant Gary I.
Gordon and Serge&xit First Class Randall D. Shughart bravely fastroped on
to the crashed helicopter from another helicopter in order to protect
Durant and fended off the Somali mob until they ran out of ammunition.
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The Rangers and Army commandos who had just cleared the hotel
moved toward the first crash site to provide assistance. At
this point, in the transit from the hotel to the first crash
site, Task Force Ranger received nearly all of its
casualties. A helicopter overflew the second crash site, but
failed to find any survivors. The QRF, which was approaching
to the second site, returned to the airport. General
Garrison then requested the assistance of Pakistani and
Malaysian armor from General Montgomery in order to get the
QRF to the first site. The Somalis had barricaded the
streets surrounding the site and had fired intensely at
vehicles which had earlier tried to reach the first crash
site. At this point Garrison stated that the first site was
in control of the Rangers, but they remained in the area in
order to remove the bodies of the two pilots which were
pinned by the collapsed canopy of the destroyed helicopter.
Five hours after the request for armor, the QRF launched to
rescue the Rangers at the first crash site. Once they
arrived, the unit spent four additional hours trying to free
the pilot's bodies from the downed helicopter. When the
bodies came free, all personnel returned to the airport and
the operation was over early the next morning, 4 October
1993.




Deploying SOF to apprehend Aideed was a risky-
proposition given only a twenty five percent chance for
success by General Hoar. 222 Militarily, the TFR operation was
successful, in that it captured many of Aideed' s top
lieutenants, but costly. Luck ran out for TFR after six
operations when an RPG hit a helicopter during the escape
phase of the seventh operation. What effect did the ROE have
on this final operation? This question is best answered by
breaking the operation into two phases: planning and
execution.
a . Planning Phase
The planning phase of the TFR operation illustrated
a classic case of an imbalance in the tension between
political objectives and military requirements. Probably one
of the greatest controversies resulting from the mission was
whether the Task Force operation was restricted by the lack
of U.S. armor in the QRF and the lack of an AC-13 gunship
for fire support . Both the public and Congress raised
questions as to why armor and AC-13 gunship support were
denied and whether the Clinton administration was sending
troops into combat without adequate political support.
222 Senate Memorandum, 25.
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The request for U.S. armor originated with General
Montgomery and was presented to General Powell. Powell was
hesitant to approve the request for fear of collateral
damage. "I didn't want M1A1 tanks to blast buildings in
Mogadishu." 223 Because General Montgomery felt strongly about
the request, General Powell forwarded it to Secretary of
Defense, Les Aspin, on 23 September 1993. Secretary Aspin
denied the use of armor because he feared it would emphasize
military operations at a time when Washington was also trying
to find a diplomatic solution and becoming poised for
withdrawal. 224 Under Secretary Wisner also indicated that
increasing the scale of the Quick Reaction Force would be
inappropriate, given the context of both the UN and
Washington's attempt to shift to a more political solution. 225
Both Secretary Aspin, Under Secretary Wisner and General
Powell stated chat in the request for armor, the TFR raids
were not included as a reason.
General Garrison was aware of General Montgomery's
request for armor, but did not participate in it. In
training for this mission, armor was not an integral part of
the plan because, as General Garrison stated before the
223 Ibid., 34.
224 Senate Memorandum, 35. Also see Michael R. Gordon and John H.
Cushman Jr., "After Supporting Hunt for Aideed, U.S. is Blaming U.N. for
Losses," New York Times, 18 October 1993, Al
.
225 Senate Memorandum, 35.
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Senate Armed Services Committee, it would have impacted on
the speed and surprise of the actual Ranger operation. 226 But
had U.S. armor been present, especially Bradley fighting
vehicles, Garrison essentially stated
As for using five ton trucks with sand bags for the
October 3-4 raid, if Bradleys were available, of
course they would have been better and I hope to
hell I would have used them for the Ranger Ground
Reaction Force. 227
Colonel Boykin, Commander of the Army Commandos, essentially
added that "tanks and armor would have been great ... [t] heir
absence was clearly a bad mistake." 228 The Congressional
investigation reported that despite the UN and Washington's
desire to emphasize a political solution in Somalia,
...the Secretary of Defense should have given more
consideration to the requests from his military
commanders and the recommendation from the
Chairman, ' JCS and approved the request for
armor. . .Given the inclusion of 5-ton trucks with
sandbags in the Ranger Ground Reaction Force, it is
likely that Bradley fighting vehicles, if present
would have been used instead. [Their] inclusion in
that force might have resulted in reduced U.S.
casualties ... [and] U.S. Bradley fighting vehicles
and tanks definitely would have been used in the
rescue effort, would have allowed a faster rescue,
and possibly resulted in fewer casualties in the
rescue effort. 229
226 Garrison, Maj . Gen. William F., testimony before the Senate Armed





While General Garrison's planning did not specifically call
for the use of armor, if present it would have been used when
the October 3 raid unraveled. Clearly in the request for
armor, political objectives outweighed military requirements
and contributed to an increased number of casualties during
the operation.
While armor was not specifically requested by
General Garrison for the operation, air support in the form
of the AC-13 gunship was specifically requested. This
request was also supported by General Downing, Commander of
the U.S. Special Operations Command. The AC-130 was part of
all rehearsals and was also included in all three proposed
force packages presented to the policy makers. They were
eventually dropped from the force package for two reasons
.
First, to remain in concert with the U.S. policy of reducing
presence in Somalia, the U.S. troop level had to be as small
as possible. General Hoar and General Downing indicated that
there was considerable political pressure to keep the size of
the TFR deployment small. Under Secretary Wisner stated that
they wanted TFR to have as "sparing a number as possible" in
order to minimize the U.S. profile in Somalia and avoid
taking on a larger share of the UNOSOM II mission. 230 As a
result of political objectives, TFR was limited to 400
troops. The AC-130 option was eliminated because it would
230 Ibid., 31.
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have added another 250-300 people. 231 Second, there was
concern about the amount of collateral damage the AC-13
might inflict. Under Secretary Wisner, General Powell and
General Hoar were all concerned with minimizing collateral
damage. Powell stated that the AC-13 0s used in June had
"wrecked a few buildings and it wasn't the greatest imagery
on CNN. " 232
Although General Downing and Garrison initially
wanted the AC-13 0, both thought the mission was doable
without them. General Garrison indicated three relevant
factors concerning the AC-13 0. 233 First, it would have had a
serious psychological impact on the Somalis, as they were
terrified of the AC-130. Second, he might have used its
day/night surveillance capabilities, but its presence would
have been dup.1 icative of other platforms and might have
caused sensory overload. Third, He stated that despite the
absence of the AC-13 0, SOF helicopters and the QRF
helicopters provided adequate fire support during the
mission.
The Senate investigation determined that the
decision to eliminate the AC-13 gunship contradicted the
principle of "fight as you train." Everyone interviewed
231 rppR eventually deployed with 440 people after a struggle with
policy makers over the additional 40 troops.
232 Senate Memorandum, 31.
233 Senate Memorandum, 30.
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during the Senate investigation indicated that the AC-13 was
feared by the Somalis and as a result could have had a
tremendous psychological impact. The report concluded that
[t]he concern about collateral damage was
appropriate but could have been met with carefully
crafted rules of engagement that would have
precluded use of the AC-130 in the city except in
"in extremis" circumstances, such as occurred on
October 3--4. 234
Once again, political objectives unreasonably restricted the
tactical military requirements and decreased the potential
for the successful conduct of the TFR operations.
b. Execution Phase
Once the TFR force package was established by the
political and military "pulling and hauling, " the ROE used
during the actual conduct of the operations allowed the
tactical commander proper flexibility. The ROE used by TFR
for their operations were a simplified version of the UNOSOM
II ROE including the fragmentary orders 39 and 101, which
loosened the ROE. 235 The ROE were in the form of command by
negation, SOF could conduct operations as they saw fit unless
restricted by higher authority. Absent from this operation
was any organizational friction in the translation of the ROE
through the chain of command. General Garrison was allowed
to launch and conduct operations as he saw fit, without any
234 Senate Memorandum, 49.
23 5 See Appendix E for the complete TFR ROE,
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interference. General Hoar, USCINCCENT, stated "I did not
feel that I had to put restraints on Garrison regarding any
raid.
"
236 General Garrison indicated that he was able to run
the operations as if they were full combat operations. He
further indicated that once the shooting started, collateral
damage was not an issue on October 3-4. 237
As we have already seen, the ROE were probably as
loose as they could have been in a peace enforcement mission.
In the actual conduct of this mission the ROE criteria of
when, how, where and against whom force could be used did not
effect the requirements for the successful conduct of special
operations. As General Garrison stated:
...in our operations, speed, surprise and violence
of action are always the primary concerns. To
execute and accomplish that operation on October 3
and 4, we had those necessary capabilities to
initiate and we achieved all three things." 238
Task Force Ranger achieved temporary superior combat power in
their mission at the Olympic hotel and had actually completed
the most difficult part of the mission before the first
helicopter was downed. It was the downing of the first





site which created the casualties and lost the advantage for
SOF. As General Garrison stated, "All my casualties occurred
moving from the target to the downed helicopter." 239
Looking first at the criteria of when force can be
used, it can clearly be seen that this issue did not affect
the operation. At first one might question why the raid was
launched in the daylight when SOF prefer night operations.
Intelligence drove the mission timeline and the task force
had a limited amount of time to launch once a location of
Aideed was reported. 240 Once they were given intelligence
indicating Aideed' s location they had to act quickly before
he moved. Additionally, the Somalis hired by the CIA to
observe and report information were fearful of walking the
streets of Mogadishu at night. As the sun went down, the men
of the city gathered together and chewed khat 241 , a type of
drug. The use of khat and the heavy presence of weapons made
the streets of Mogadishu a dangerous place at night. As a
result, the majority of intelligence received from the Somali
Ibid., 8. In my interview with General Garrison, he pointed out
that the escape phase of special operations represents the most
dangerous phase. He stated that the Army helicopter pilots were aware
of the RPG threat and had rehearsed evasion. They assessed that the
level of threat was acceptable for the operation.
240 Garrison interview.
241 Khat is chewed like tobacco and when used for a few hours it is
chemically equal to a strong dose of Dexedrine and it creates an
addiction similar to cocaine. The Khat business yields over $100
million annually in Kenya and Somalia. For more information see "More
Than We Can Chew," Independent (London), June 1, 1994, sec. 2,1.
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agents was obtained during daylight hours. Conducting the
operation during the day probably reduced tactical surprise,
but this was not caused by the ROE. Once the operation was
initiated, Task Force Ranger only fired when they were fired
upon and operated well within the ROE, despite the number of
casualties they inflicted on the Somali aggressors.
The tactics used in the conduct of the operation
show that the requirements for successful special operations
were not affected by the ROE dictating how and how much force
could be used. SOF was granted more latitude than
conventional forces when conducting raids as other forces had
to give 15 -minute, 10 -minute and 5 -minute warnings under the
ROE in order to minimize collateral damage and civilian
casualties. 242 In conducting raids in Somalia, TFR was able
to maximize the capabilities of any weapons systems in their
possession if deemed necessary for mission accomplishment.
Clearly General Garrison was not restricted in his use of
helicopter gunships during the operation. He stated that
[i]t was not a problem of not having the capability
to put lead on South Mogadishu. .. if we had put one
more ounce of lead on South Mogadishu on the nights
of 3 and 4 October, I believe it would have sunk243
242 Allard, 65.
Garrison, Maj . Gen. William F., testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 12 May 1994, 39.
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Also, Task Force Ranger was allowed to conduct
operations as they had practiced for two months prior to
deployment, with the exception of the AC-13 0. 244 In the six
operations conducted before the 3 October raid they had
utilized the same method: Army commandos would storm the
target; Rangers would provide perimeter security; and
helicopters would loiter overhead to provide fire support in
the event of trouble. This repetitive method of operation
could have contributed the failure on 3 October. Aideed had
been given military training in the USSR and may have learned
from observing the same basic operation six times before he
became the target. 245 Nevertheless, the ROE did not affect
how the raids were conducted once TFR deployed.
The last two aspects of an operation which the ROE
can restrict are where force can be applied and against whom.
First, SOF had few restrictions regarding where force could
be applied. In the case of the hunt for Aideed, SOF were
free to conduct the operation wherever he appeared. 246
Second, considering the criteria of whom force could be
applied against, SOF were under the same ROE as the rest of
the military and could only fire when threatened.
244 General Garrison stated in my interview that he was able to
conduct the operation as if it was total combat.
245 Many policy makers and senior military officers expressed concern
that repeatedly using a similar assault template increased the amount of
risk in each follow-on operation. See Senate Memorandum, 38.
246 Garrison interview.
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Complicating target discrimination was the fact that Aideed
had a history of using women and children to conduct armed
attacks on UNOSOM II forces. 247 During the TFR operation,
U.S. soldiers were faced with women and children posing a
hostile threat. In some cases, the Somali men hid behind
women and shot at the Rangers through guns placed beneath the
armpits of the women. 248 Although hesitant to fire at women
and children when faced with a different culture of warfare,
the Army commandos and Rangers inflicted an estimated 10 00
casualties on the Somalis. Reports estimate that 300 Somalis
were killed and 70 injured, with about one third of these
being women and children. 249 Obviously, when Task Force
Ranger was threatened they were not restricted by the ROE in
defending themselves.
F . SOF SNIPER OPERATIONS
1 . Background
SOF snipers engaged Somali targets on at least 15
different occasions from the beginning of UNITAF to the end
of U.S. involvement in UNOSOM II and killed at least seven
Somalis and wounded eight others. 250 SOF snipers were a key
247 Aideed ' s use of women and children in armed attacks is documented




249 These figures where cited in many sources including the 12 May
1994 Senate hearings cited in the above note and iVewswee^c, 18 October
1993.
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element in the battle against the warring clans. Their
ability to be effective with little collateral damage made
them attractive to U.S. Commanders. 251 They ensured that
heavy weapons and "technicals" 252 were virtually removed from
the streets of Mogadishu. The ROE for engaging armed Somalis
and "technicals" read:
Crew served weapons are considered a threat to
UNOSOM Forces and the relief effort whether or not
the crew demonstrates hostile intent . Commanders
are authorized to use all necessary force to
confiscate and demilitarize crew served weapons in
their area of operations .. .Within the areas under
the control of UNOSOM Forces armed individuals may
be considered a threat to UNOSOM and the relief
effort whether or not the individual demonstrates
hostile intent. 253
The snipers also targeted personnel seen carrying heavy
weapons which could later be used against UN and U.S. forces.
SOF snipers worked from stationary positions at UN posts and
various other locations. They also operated from SOF
helicopters in counter sniper operations. In this case
snipers would be placed in the trail helicopter of a two
250 Tony Capaccic, "U.S. Snipers Enforce Peace Through Gun Barrels,"
Defense Week (Vol. 15, No. 5), 31 January 94, 30.
251 Capaccio, 35.
252
"Technical" was the name used to describe the Toyota trucks
operated by the Somalis which were outfitted with crew served machine
guns and grenade launchers. The name was initially used by members of
NGOs and was eventually adopted by military forces operating in Somalia,
The Somalis were called "Technical Assistants" so that the NGOs could
use a more legitimate name than "hired protection" for reimbursable
expenses
.
253 UNOSOM II ROE, see Appendix C.
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helicopter flight and wait for Somali snipers to take shots
at the lead helicopter. The U.S. sniper would then shoot the
Somali from the second helicopter.
In the case of the sniper missions there were more
complaints of a loose interpretation of the ROE on the part
of the snipers than seen in the Task Force Ranger operations
.
One reporter wrote, "Americans would do well to consider how
it is that their peacekeepers--dispatched by President Bush
to do 'God's work '--ended up as likely to draw a bead on a
Somali as to feed him. Or her." 254 Many factors complicated
the employment of SOF in this role. These factors included
the nature of multinational operations, the Somali gun
culture, local , anarchy, and the presence of NGOs . Overall,
SOF snipers were allowed relatively unrestricted operations
under the UNITAF and UNOSOM II ROE, especially when
Fragmentary orders 39 and 101 were released which allowed
unprovoked firing whenever heavy weapons or "technicals" were
sighted.
2 . Analysis
The SOF snipers operated directly from the written
UNOSOM II ROE with little interference by the chain of
command. 255 The CINC ' s staff refrained from continually
254 A.J. Bacevich, "Paying the Price of Doing 'God's Work'", Los
Angeles Times, 1 April 1994, B7
.
255 See Appendix F for an example of the ROE SEAL snipers used as a
criteria for lethal force. Their interpretation closely resembles that
of the UNOSOM II ROE.
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emphasizing minimal collateral damage before the operations.
They trusted the judgment of SOF rather than attempting to
influence it. Naturally, the chain of command required after
action reports when a shooting occurred because the political
situation was delicate. 256 Military lawyers attached to the
U.S. Task Force in Somalia reviewed reports filed by sniper
teams after each engagement "to see if they in fact were
operating under the rules of engagement." 257 The SOF snipers
remained well within the ROE when left to their own judgment.
Essentially The UN ROE provided that snipers could shoot
anyone with a machine gun or other heavy weapon, and may only
kill someone carrying an assault rifle or small arm if they
posed an immediate threat to friendly forces . The fact that
the operations in Somalia were multinational complicated the
situation for all forces, but particularly for SOF snipers.
Each country within the U.N had its own section of Mogadishu
to control. When snipers were deployed, they usually
operated within their own jurisdiction. 258 The militaries of
allied nations had different interpretations of the ROE than
256 Interview with Lieutenant Commander Mike McGuire in Washington
D.C. on 6 September 199 6. Lieutenant Commander McGuire was the Platoon
Commander for SEAL Team FOUR, DELTA Platoon during UNOSOM II. His
platoon conducted numerous operations in Somalia including: Helicopter
escort, Laser CAS, VIP security, CSAR alert, Port security and the
sniper operations.
257 Quote from Maj . Dick Gordon, JTF Somalia lawyer in article by Tony
Capaccio, "U.S. Snipers Enforce Peace Through Gun Barrels," 32.
While this was generally true, the U.S. snipers did occasionally
operate in the Pakistani controlled areas.
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the U.S. forces. The Somalis quickly learned which country
strictly enforced the U.N. ban on heavy weapons and which did
not. As a result, the Somalis were able to plan their travel
routes to avoid the strictly enforced sections.
The biggest disagreements over the interpretation of the
ROE came between the U.S. snipers and the Pakistani
snipers. 259 The Pakistanis did not strictly enforce the U.N.
ban on heavy weapons. Two reasons contributed to their
differing interpretation of the ROE when compared the U.S.
snipers. 260 First, they feared retribution should they kill a
Somali. When the Somali's located a sniper team, they would
usually return fire or inform others of the sniper team's
location. Perhaps fueling the Pakistani's fear were the
memories of the 5 June 1993 ambush which produced 88
Pakistani casualties. Second, the Pakistanis, unlike the
U.S. troops, had accepted the UN salary. This money
represented a sizable sum in Pakistan. As a result, their
motivation was not the success of the mission, but rather
increasing their chances of survival by avoiding unnecessary
confrontation with Somalis.
The difference in interpretations of the ROE between the
U.S. and Pakistanis climaxed when a Somali woman, who was




incident two U.S. Marine snipers sighted a Somali carrying a
light machine gun on a "technical" and fired two shots at
him. One round scored a hit while the other missed. The
woman was apparently struck by the stray bullet or by the
bullet which went through the gunman. The Pakistanis
protested the use of the Barret .50 caliber 82A1 sniper rifle
the U.S. snipers were using to engage targets. They argued
that in populated areas there was a possibility of rounds
simply going through the intended target and hitting innocent
civilians. The Pakistani commander of the Sixth Punjab
Rifles, Colonel Tariq Salim Malik, stated that he only
allowed his forces to use small caliber rifles in these
situations and implied that the U.S. snipers were going
beyond the ROE established to engage hostile Somalis. 261 A
Pakistan lieutenant, Mohamed Taha, commented, "you can't
shoot just anyone. . .we're here for humanitarian purposes, not
to kill everyone." 262 U.S. Officers countered that the
Pakistanis were failing to do their jobs and not effectively
engaging threats for fear of reprisal by locals. 263 Also in
some cases, the .50 caliber rifle was required in order for
the snipers to be effective at long range.
261 Julian Bedford, "U.S. Says Troops Did Duty Despite Woman's
Killing," .Reuters News Service, 12 January 1994.
Michael M. Phillips, "Pakistani, U.S. Officers Clash Over Somali
Peacekeeping Mission," Associated Press, 13 January 1994.
263 Ibid.
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Before the incident involving the pregnant women, Navy
SEAL snipers fired at two Somalis carrying a light machine
gun and had also raised protest by the Pakistanis who claimed
the targeted Somalis had permits which allowed them to carry
the weapons under UN rules. 264 Eventually, the differences in
interpreting the ROE caused the U.S. to remove their snipers
from UN posts controlled by Pakistan. The upcoming U.S.
withdrawal was cited as the reason for removal of U.S.
snipers
.
The value of the gun in the Somali culture and clan
society made the job of remaining within the ROE even tougher
for the SOF snipers. It seemed that virtually every male
over the age of twelve had a gun. UN Special Envoy Robert
Oakley stated that "There are three things that are most
important to a Somali male - his wife, his camel, and his
weapon." 265 The society which once measured a man by the size
of his herd now measured him by the size of his weapon. As a
result of the amount of guns in the streets of Mogadishu, the
Somalis killed each other quite often. The U.S. soldiers
264 ^e seALs carefully calibrated their use of force. In one incident
they saw a Somali with a RPG hiding behind a wall of a gas station.
They first fired with a bolt action 7.62 mm sniper rifle. When that
fell short, they resorted to a 7.62 mm repeating rifle. When that fell
short, they used the .50 caliber rifle. Because of they feared
overshooting and hitting an unintended target beyond the gas station,
they walked the rounds up a clearing in front of the target until they
hit the illegally armed Somali hiding behind the wall. (McGuire
interview)
.
265 F.M. Larenz, 30.
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joked "Guns don't kill Somalis, Somalis kill Somalis" 266
Granted this was harsh, but it demonstrated the situation
which the SOF snipers faced and the attitude of some soldiers
which could influence their interpretation of the ROE within
a peacekeeping environment.
The presence of NGOs, which had arrived before any of
the UN troops, further complicated the operations for SOF
snipers. The NGOs were required to hire Somali guards before
the arrival of UNITAF in order to protect themselves. Once
UNITAF and UNOSOM II began, they continued the practice when
they traveled to areas outside of UN control. 267 The use of
armed Somali guards by the NGOs complicated the situation as
the SOF snipers had difficulty distinguishing between
legitimate NGO guards and bandits. The NGOs complained that
their guards were treated differently in different sectors,
which came as a result of aggressive application of the ROE
by U.S. forces and timid application by Pakistan forces.
Part of the problem was that many of the NGOs guards were
hired to work only during daylight hours and they tended to
turn to banditry at night. Eventually, the NGOs and the
266 Jonathan Stevenson, 9.
F.M. Larenz, 40. Larenz states in his article that "in Mogadishu,
the price for vehicle rental in January 1993 was about $2,500 (US) per
month, which included the driver and two gunmen armed with Kalishnikovs
.
HROs were forced to pay extortionate fees for security services. Many
HROs were paying over $100,000 per month for their guards."
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military forces alleviated the situation by issuing standard
weapons permits and increasing coordination and awareness of
the situation.
As seen in SOF sniper operations, the ROE successfully
balanced the political desire to bring peace to the streets
of Mogadishu with the military requirements for effective use
of SOF snipers . The ROE did not restrict how force could be
applied, but only that it be proportionate. The fact that
the SOF snipers were allowed to target Somalis with large
caliber sniper rifles indicates a rather unrestrictive answer
to the ROE criteria of how and how much force to employ. The
criteria of where to apply force was restricted only by the
stipulation to minimize collateral damage written in the ROE
and not by interpretation within the chain of command. The
SOF snipers were able to engage targets within this
restriction and remain effective in their mission. The
criteria of when to use force and against whom was rather
unrestrictive in allowing the snipers to engage designated
targets without waiting for the first hostile shot. Overall,
the SOF snipers operated under ROE which allowed them the
flexibility to conduct their operations according to their
tactical requirements while remaining within the stated
political objectives of the peacekeeping mission.
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G. CONCLUSIONS
Overall the intervention into Somalia could be
considered a failure. 268 As Under Secretary of Defense Wisner
concluded, "the single most serious flaw in our policy was
that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by
military means," 269 Somalia was the first UN chapter VII
"peace enforcement" intervention in history and placed the
military in a difficult environment which included a
multinational force, NGOs, warring clans, a society with
plenty of guns and a local government in a state of anarchy.
These unique variables complicated the ability of the ROE to
balance the political objectives and military requirements.
The Clinton administration's attempt to follow a dual-
track approach to intervention in Somalia created a policy
destined to fail. This policy to reduce the U.S. military
presence in Somalia, while at the same time supporting UN
requests to conduct high risk military operations led to the
decision to deny General Montgomery's request for armor and
the decision to delete the AC-13 gunship from the TFR
package. These decisions made during the planning phase of
This, of course, is debatable. In a humanitarian context, the
mission can be considered successful in that it prevented the starvation
of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, but it can also be seen as a
failure because the political objective seemed to experience "mission
creep" in that troops were initially tasked to protect food deliveries
and later tasked to engage in a man hunt for Aideed in addition to




the TFR mission clearly had an affect on the outcome of the
operation. The TFR operation was a high risk, short duration
special operation conducted at a strategic level in order to
achieve a single objective- capture Mohamed Aideed. As a
result, the political and military "pulling and hauling"
resulted in the political objectives dominating the tactical
requirements of the military commander. Consequently, the
ROE dictated for the planning and conduct of the TFR
operations were imbalanced and unreasonably restrictive.
Armor and the AC-13 gunship would most likely have given TFR
a greater chance for tactical success and in turn would have
avoided a political debacle for the Clinton Administration.
Once the size and composition of the force package for
TFR was established, tightening of the ROE through
translation by the chain of command did not occur. When TFR
conducted their operations in Somalia they worked through a
short circuited chain of command and were not further
restricted by implicit ROE created by organizational
friction. However, the decisions made to eliminate armor and
the AC-130 during the planning phase could not be overcome by
the appropriate ROE during the execution phase.
The SOF snipers conducted a protracted special operation
at a tactical level with an objective of eradicating the
streets of Somalia of heavy weapons. They were given ROE
that were clear and without unnecessary restrictions despite
the complexities of this case: multinational forces, dynamic
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political objectives, multiple chains of command and lack of
an indigenous government. As a result, they were able to
conduct operations with efficiency. Additionally, the broad
political objectives were accurately translated through the
chain of command into appropriate ROE, written and implicit,
for the tactical commander. The political, military and
legal considerations which created the ROE and interpretation
by the chain of command allowed SOF snipers to plan and
conduct operations in a manner which they had trained and
with ample opportunity for success.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis addressed the affect that the ROE have on
the conduct of special operations. In the introductory
chapter, two questions were posed. First, can ROE be used to
achieve indirect political control over special operations?
Second, what are the causes and consequences of
"inappropriate" ROE when employing SOF in pursuit of
political objectives? Throughout this thesis, both questions
were examined and the following conclusions can logically be
drawn from the evidence.
In response to the first question, ROE can be used to
achieve indirect political control over both special and
conventional operations, but it is more difficult to do so
wisely with special operations than with conventional forces.
In this thesis I argued that the nature of special
operations, and the principles vital to their proper
employment, cause them to be most sensitive to sources of
inappropriate ROE in either a crisis or conflict.
Successful special operations represent somewhat of a
paradox. SOF are usually selected as a minimal force
military solution at the political and military strategic
level. However, at the tactical level , SOF must have
latitude to apply maximum force in order to succeed. The
policy maker selects SOF as a surgical instrument of military-
force rather than massive conventional units because of
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concern for minimizing collateral damage. Also,
conventional forces may be too blunt an instrument compared
to the surgical aspects of SOF in an environment requiring
otherwise restrictive ROE. In such a case, SOF may be
favored because massive, high profile conventional forces
might appear politically inappropriate. Even when SOF are
selected as the military option the policy maker may feel
compelled to refine the already surgical aspects of a special
operation further by limiting SOF ' s use of force. An attempt
to fine tune a special operation, which bv nature is already
a limited collateral damage option, can result in tactical
failure or an increase in casualties. The decision to
eliminate the AC-130 from the TFR package illustrated an
attempt to further refine the already surgical aspects of a
special operat .ons mission with disastrous results.
At the tactical level, SOF operate with small forces and
require superior transitory combat power in order to complete
operations successfully. FM 31-20 is worth restating:
In contrast to conventional forces, SOF cannot hope
to bring overwhelming combat power against a target
except at the lowest tactical level. They do not
normally seek dominance in size of force or
firepower. Instead, SOF focus on selecting and
applying sufficient military power to accomplish
the mission without adverse collateral effects.
The application of minimum force is dangerous, but
SOF commanders must sometimes accept the higher
risk associated with not massing in the
conventional sense. 270
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SOF require a temporary advantage in combat power in
order to successfully complete missions. Six principles
combine to promote this combat power advantage: simplicity,
security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. If ROE
affect any one on these principles, they can reduce the
possibility of SOF achieving a transitory combat power
advantage and become a cause for mission failure or
unnecessary lose of life.
Additionally, the tactical environment in which SOF
operate must also be considered. Operating deep behind enemy
lines without support requires that care be exercised to
ensure the ROE are consistent with mission accomplishment and
force survival rather than a threat to either.
SOF will be the first put in harm's way, so there is
little time for proper ROE dissemination and comprehension
through the chain of command down to the individual SOF
operator. SOF have the dubious opportunity of being the
first to learn of any ROE problems during live combat
operations
.
The difficulties in using ROE to control the conduct of
special operations indirectly were also evident during
discussions addressing the second question: how are
inappropriate ROE created? I showed that there are two
causes of inappropriate ROE. First, inappropriate ROE result
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20 Doctrine for
Special Operations Forces, (Washington D.C: Dept . of the Army, 1990),
1-6.
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from an imbalance in the natural tension between, the
requirements of statecraft and military efficiency present in
all military operations. Second, I showed that
organizational friction creates inappropriate written and
implicit ROE for the tactical unit.
The first cause, an imbalance in the political-military
tension, is greatest in the OOTW environment. The political
objectives and military requirements for success in OOTW have
a greater tendency to diverge than in conventional conflicts,
which approach total war. Military operations associated
with high level policy and high risk have the greatest
potential for an imbalance favoring political objectives over
tactical requirements. The ROE are a case where healthy
"pulling and hauling" between policy makers and military
commanders makes for better balance, and hence better overall
outcomes
.
This thesis showed that special operations can be
divided into coup de main or protracted campaigns, at either
the strategic, operational or tactical level. At the
strategic level of analysis, SOF ' s unique political and
military utility set them apart from general purpose forces
and increase both the military and political risk associated
with the outcome of special operations. As a result, coup de
main special operations conducted at the strategic level will
have a greater chance of a political-military imbalance,
because they are directly connected to high level policy and
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entail high ri.-k. Because these operations are short
duration missions, the policy maker has only one opportunity
to affect their conduct and will tend to exercise a more
cautious approach with restrictive ROE. The TFR operation
illustrated the ROE problems associated with high risk,
strategic coup de main operations. In the planning phase,
political objectives took priority over tactical
requirements, resulting in TFR deploying without the AC-13 0,
which was an organic tactical element in rehearsals . This
political-military imbalance contributed to the casualties
suffered on October 3-4.
Contrary to coup de main operations, protracted special
operations, such as the SOF sniper operations in Somalia,
achieve their goal in small increments over an extended time
period. This characteristic reduces risk for the policy
maker and tactical commander because there are many
opportunities over the course of time to change aspects of
the operation's execution, such as the ROE. As a result,
protracted special operations should be less vulnerable to
inappropriate ROE from an imbalance in the political-military
tension,
When special operations are conducted at the tactical or
operational level, such as SOF sniper operations in Somalia
or the Paitilla Airport operation, there seems to be less of




While inappropriate ROE can result from an imbalance in
the political-military tension, I also argued that
organizational friction is a deeper cause of inappropriate
ROE. Ideally, the ROE ensure, that all levels within the
military organization make decisions consistent with those
the policy maker would make if complete centralized control
existed. Unfortunately, the military organization is large
and complex, and the application of force is achieved by
tactical units and individuals. The ROE serve to impose
limits on the discretionary decentralized decision making
which occurs au all levels within the organization and
hopefully maintain goal congruence among all levels in
pursuit of the political goals designed to serve the national
interest. However, translation of the policy maker's broad
guidance can become misinterpreted as it flows through
multiple layers of command creating implicit ROE. In the
case of ROE in the OOTW environment, this can result in
rather restrictive ROE. The policy maker may emphasize the
need to minimize collateral damage in a broad statement, but
this statement may be translated and interpreted at each
level in the chain of command into operational ROE that
become more restrictive than intended. Because the tactical
unit represents the lowest level of command, written,




The Paitilla Airport operation illustrated these problems of
organizational friction.
The amount, of friction in an organization can be
influenced by the number of intermediate levels between the
policy maker and tactical military- commander, through which
the ROE must flow. As a result, inappropriate implicit or
inferred ROE are most likely in tactical level operations
which have multiple layers of command between the policy
maker and the tactical military commander. In strategic-
level operations, such as the TFR operation, the creation of
inappropriate ROE by organizational friction is less likely
due to shortened chains of command. Once TFR was deployed
they operated with autonomy and had little interference from
the chain of command.
The greatest source of organizational friction derives
from the intermediate levels of command between the policy
maker and the tactical commander. The policy maker does not
create tactical ROE, but provides broad guidance and
objectives. The intermediate, or staff, levels in the
defense organization draft tactical ROE. It is with this
group that the greatest problems associated with ROE can
occur because they must interpret and translate broad policy
objectives into achievable operational and tactical missions
and ROE. If this group is ignorant of SOF requirements for
tactical success or if SOF units fail to tell them of the
requirements, they will have a tendency to create
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inappropriate written and implicit ROE that are more suitable
for conventional operations. There must be a "push" up the
organization by the tactical units to ensure the next level
of command does not operate in a vacuum when translating the
policy maker's broad guidance into tactical ROE. Writing ROE
is a two-wav street and tactical units must provide the chain
of command their concerns and requirements with regards to
ROE.
In the current legislative model, the ROE are developed
at the staff level in writing by senior or mid-grade military
officers surrounded by advisors and counselors within a
leisurely environment . This environment encourages a
"subjective rationality" which results in numerous rules and
extensive written text in order to cover any and all possible
contingencies chat might arise during combat. To the
contrary, the operational environment within which SOF
operate is permeated by the fog of war. Special operators
alone must quickly rely on personal judgment and training
assisted only by what their memory retains regarding the
directed ROE for the mission.
Additionally, cultural differences between conventional
and special operations forces can magnify the problems.
Conventional soldiers on a staff may not fully understand the
ROE complications that will affect the conduct of special
operations. Ci.iltural differences in philosophy, training,
and doctrine can create organizational friction in
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translating theoretical ROE into realistic ROE. Bridging
this cultural gap by providing insight into ROE complications
when conducting special operations is vital . Placing SOF
members in staffs and ensuring that they take a proactive
role in the process of translating broad political and
strategic military objectives into appropriate tactical level
ROE is critical.
As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, ROE designed
for conventional forces can result in unwanted outcomes when
also applied to SOF. Just as ROE for air and naval forces
differ, SOF require unique considerations with regard to the
ROE used to control their unique operations in pursuit of
political objectives. "One size fits all" ROE do not allow
for the unique characteristics of special operations to be
capitalized upon in pursuit of national interests. This does
not mean that SOF should have their own appendix to the
standing ROE. Special operations are unconventional and
dynamic by nature. A ROE annex to assist conventional
planners in controlling special operations will not eliminate
the sources of inappropriate ROE.
Regardless of how well written, no ROE can completely
eliminate the possibility of either a type 1 (too
restrictive) or type 2 (too relaxed) ROE failure. Morality
and good judgment cannot be legislated and training cannot
anticipate every possible future tactical situation. Special
Operations Forces are mature, well trained soldiers who
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possess exceptional judgment. In time of conflict or crisis,
their training and judgment must be trusted to a greater
extent than conventional forces. Changes to the conduct of
special operations are best accomplished through training and
doctrine during peacetime, rather than through the ROE at the
brink of a crisis or conflict.
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APPENDIX A. ROE FOR OPERATION JUST CAUSE
Source: Appendix 1 to Annex C to USCINCSO OPORD 1-90 (Blue




A. Upon execution of OPORDS and commencement of combat
operations, commander will conduct all military operations
in accordance with the laws and directives governing armed
conflict. To the maximum extent possible, commanders should
use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the military
objectives. Captured combatants will be treated as prisoners
of war and processed accordingly. Upon cessation of
hostilities, as determined by USCINCSO, peacetime rules of
engagement will be re-implemented.
B. In peacetime or combat operations, the right of
self defense is never denied. These ROE do not infringe upon
the right of every commander or individual to employ
reasonable, necessary force to defend himself, and his unit,
against violent and dangerous attack.
2. Specific: Effective H Hour the Panamanian Defense
Forces (PDF) and all parts thereof, including the regular
forces, "Dignity" Battalions, Transito Police, Centurian
Police, and Doberman Riot Police, are deemed hostile.
A. PDF Personnel in uniform, day or night, unless
obviously attempting to surrender or defect or wearing
medical insignia (Red Cross) , may be attacked.
B. All armed civilian personnel accompanying the PDF,
or present in their vehicles or bases, may be attacked.
C. All PDF Vehicles of any type, armored or unarmored,
day or night, unless marked with a protective insignia (Red
Cross, White Flag, Etc.) may be attacked.
D. All Civilian vehicles carrying enemy forces or
supplies may be attacked.
E. All PDF Aircraft, except medical aircraft, may be
attacked and destroyed. Unidentified and commercial aircraft
may not be attacked unless they are carrying enemy forces.
F. All PDF ships, vessels, barges, and other water
craft may be attacked and destroyed.
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G. All PDF installations, bases facilities, and
equipment, except medical facilities and medical equipment,
may be attacked.
H. Controlled indirect fire weapons may be used
against the PDF.
I. All on-board aviation weapons systems are
authorized for use.
J. Pursuit of enemy forces is authorized, however such
pursuit will not cross the borders of Panama without
authorization from USCINCSO.
K. Conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance
operations prior to H Hour will be governed by the JCS
Peacetime Rule of Engagement.
L. Use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) in the conduct of
operation is permitted as may be authorized by COMJTFSO. The
decision to employ RCA in any given situation may not be
delegated to commanders below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel
or equivalent
.
M. Every effort will be made in the conduct of combat
operations to avoid unnecessary injury to noncombatants;
damage to civilian property, Historical Monuments, hospitals,
public works, and building dedicated to religion, art,
science, or charity; and the creation of refugees. Nothing
in these ROE authorized the commission of a war crime.
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APPENDIX 6. UNITAF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Source: UNITAF ROE card issued to troops on 2 DEC 1992.
"Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to
take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.
A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself
against attacks or threats of attacks
.
B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to
stop a hostile act.
C. When U.S. forces are attacked by unarmed hostile
elements, mobs, and/or rioters, U.S. forces should use the
minimum force necessary under the circumstances and
proportional to the threat.
D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish
your mission.
E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security
reasons or in self-defense
Remember
:
1. The United States is not at war.
2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
3. Use minimvm force to carry out mission.
4. Always be prepared to act in self-defense."
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APPENDIX C. UNOSOM II RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Source: Appendix 6 to UNOSOM II OPLAN I Rules of Engagement
(ROE)
.
1. UNOSOM Personnel may use deadly force:
A. To defend themselves, other U.S. personnel, or
persons and areas under their protection against hostile acts
or hostile intent.
B. To resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the
Force from discharging its duties.
2. Challenging:
A. Whenever practicable, a challenge should be given
before using deadly force.
B. Challenging is done by:
1. Shouting in English: "U.N., stop or I will
fire, " or;
2. Shouting in Somali: "U.N., ka hanaga joogo ama
waa gaban, " or;
3. Firing warning shots in the air.
3. Principles for use of force: When it becomes necessary
to use force, the following principles apply:
A. Action which may be reasonably expected to cause
excessive collateral damage is prohibited.
B. Reprisals are forbidden.
C. Minimum force is to be used at all times.
4. Specific Rules
A. UNOSOM Forces may use deadly force in response to a
hostile act, or when there is clear evidence of hostile
intent
.
B. Crew served weapons are considered a threat to
UNOSOM Forces and the relief effort, whether or not the crew
demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to
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use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-
served weapons in the area of operations.
C. Within those areas under the control of UNOSOM
Forces, armed individuals may be considered a threat to
UNOSOM, and the relief effort, whether or not the individual
demonstrated hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to
use all necessary force to disarm and demilitarize groups or
individuals in those areas under control UNOSOM. Absent a
hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles
will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.
D. If UNOSOM Forces are attacked or threatened by
unarmed hostile elements, mobs and/or rioters, UNOSOM Forces
are authorized to employ reasonable minimum force to repel
the attacks or threats . UNOSOM Forces may also employ the
following procedures: verbal warnings to demonstrators, show
of force including use of riot control formations, and
warning shots
.
E. Unattended means of force. Unattended means of
force, including booby traps, mines, and trip guns, are not
authorized.
F. Detention of Personnel. Personnel who interfere
with the accomplishment of the mission or otherwise use or
threaten deadly force against UNOSOM, U.N. , or Relief
Material, Distribution Site, or Convoys, may be detained.
Person who commit criminal acts in areas under the control of
U.N. Forces may likewise be detained. Detained personnel
will be evacuated to a designated location for turnover to
military police.
5. Definitions. The following definitions are used:
A. Self-Defense: Action to protect oneself or one's
unit against a hostile act or hostile intent.
B. Hostile Act: The use of force against UNOSOM
personnel or mission-essential property, or against personnel
in an area under UNOSOM responsibility.
C. Hostile Intent: The treat of imminent use of force
against UNOSOM Forces or other person in those areas under
the control of UNOSOM.
D. Minimum Force: The minimum authorized degree of









APPENDIX D. UNOSOM II FRAGMENTARY ORDERS 3 9 AND 101
ROE CHANGES EFFECTIVE 11 AUGUST 1993
Source: Task Force Ranger After Action Report.
The Force Commander has approved the following changes to the
Rules of Engagement
:
1. Organized, armed militias, technicals and other crew-
served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM II Forces
and may be engaged without provocation.
2. A. Armed Somalis in vehicles moving from known militia
areas on the outskirts of the city in the direction of or
near UNOSOM II forces during hours of darkness are considered
a demonstration of hostile intent and a threat to UNOSOM II
forces and may be engaged by air without provocation.
Weapons must be clearly identified and collateral damage must
be minimized.
B. Prior to engaging such targets, permission must be
obtained from the QRF Bde Commander in the case of U.S.
aircraft and Contingent Brigade Level Commanders in the case
of contingent aircraft. All reasonable efforts must be made
to identify the vehicle. Where hostile intent cannot be
clearly ascertained but is suspected, warning shots should be
fired to determine the intent of the vehicle occupants.
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APPENDIX E. TASK FORCE RANGER ROE
Source: Tab B and D (Task Force Ranger Rules of Engagement)
to Enclosure 7 (Rules of Engagement) to after action report
of Task Force Ranger in support of UNOSOM II.
Task Force Ranger Rules of Engagement




Shout in English: "U.N. , stop or I will fire," or






Deadly force authorized against:
Militia
Any armed civilian acting in a hostile manner.
Unarmed but hostile mobs when less lethal force is
ineffective.
Crew-served weapons
Individuals surrendering will be treated humanely
Non-lethal force (binding, gagging, flextieing) may be used
to seize and restrain designated individuals
Avoid Collateral casualties or unnecessary destruction of
property
Actions at roadblocks and secure defensive positions:
- Any vehicle attempting to breach a
checkpoint /roadblock may be attacked for the purpose of
disabling it.
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- Any vehicle which persists in attempting to breach a
checkpoint after UN Forces attempt to disable the vehicle or
which return/initiates is presumed to be hostile and may be
fired on
- Command-detonated mines may be used to protect secure
defensive positions.
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APPENDIX F ROE USED BY SOF SNIPERS IN ADDITION TO
UNOSOM II ROE
Source: LCDR Mike McGuire.
CRITERIA FOR USE OF LETHAL FORCE
* GENERAL:
- HOSTILE INTENT TOWARD






- HOSTILE INTENT OR ACT
- TECHNICAL VEHICLE OR CREW SERVED WEAPON






o San Bias Islandso o
PACIFIC OCEAN
Colombia
Map 1. Panama (McConnell
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Map 2. Panama City and surrounding area (McConnell)
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